elsa-core/doc/wiki/identity-tenancy-security.md
Sipke Schoorstra 74123110d5
feat(auth)!: structured authorization model, phases 1-6 (#7980)
* feat(auth): add the permission model and evaluator (Phase 1)

Additive only. Nothing changes behavior: no endpoint declares against this
yet, and no existing enforcement path routes through it.

A permission is {resource}:{verb}, both axes open and string-keyed. A
trailing wildcard on the resource axis matches the named node and every
descendant at any depth, so workflows/definitions/* covers
workflows/definitions itself; * on the verb axis matches any verb.
Wildcards are the only construct with forward reach.

A bare * parses to *:* at parse time rather than being special-cased in
the evaluator, so superuser stays an ordinary grant and a stored or seeded
* keeps authorizing across the vocabulary migration without a lock-out
window.

Adds:
- Permission, with parsing that rejects a value containing a comma, since
  the persistence converter joins collections with one
- CoreVerbs, the recommended set modules should reuse; a convention rather
  than a closed vocabulary
- PermissionMatcher, one matching rule shape on both axes
- IPermissionEvaluator, the single place permission decisions are made,
  skipping malformed claims so one bad stored grant cannot deny a principal
- PermissionRequirement and PermissionAuthorizationHandler
- The descriptor catalog in core: PermissionDescriptor now carries the
  verbs a resource supports and marks non-core ones, and the registry can
  report what a wildcard covers today

External Authentication keeps its own descriptor types for now; it moves to
the core catalog with the other modules in Phase 2, which keeps this change
purely additive.

55 unit tests cover the matcher table, wildcard forward reach, the
counterpart that concrete grants stay frozen, absence-is-denial, and the
seeded * case.

Refs #7974

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): contribute the permission catalog from every module (Phase 2)

Still additive. Existing endpoints keep their legacy declarations; nothing
changes behavior for them.

Every module exposing protected endpoints now declares its resources and
the verbs each accepts, following the pattern already proven in External
Authentication -- constants and descriptors colocated -- refined to one
constant per resource, with the verb supplied separately. 47 resources
across 15 modules, matching the settled vocabulary.

Descriptors are discovered from the same assemblies as a module's
endpoints, in AddFastEndpointsFromModule. Registering them per module
would let the catalog and the endpoints drift, which is the failure this
model exists to remove; tying them to one registration makes the catalog
necessarily describe the endpoints that exist.

Adds:
- GET /identity/permissions, the catalog a role editor renders from, so
  no client hard-codes permission strings
- GET /identity/permissions/reach, reporting what a wildcard covers today.
  This is the mitigation for forward reach on the resource axis: a
  wildcard is useful precisely because it covers things that do not exist
  yet, so an author needs to see what it reaches now
- GET /identity/me/permissions, resolving wildcards to concrete verbs so a
  client needs no matching logic, and listing denied resources with an
  empty verb list so "denied" is distinguishable from "unknown"
- IPermissionGrantValidator, wired into Roles/Create and Roles/Update,
  which previously persisted request.Permissions after only the
  caller-subset check. Concrete segments validate against the catalog;
  wildcards validate structurally and are accepted even when they match
  nothing today, since installing a module later is what gives such a
  grant meaning
- RequirePermission(resource, verb) and RequireAuthenticatedOnly() on the
  endpoint base classes, with the six copy-pasted ConfigurePermissions
  bodies collapsed into one implementation

New endpoints require new-format grants, so during the transition they
authorize only for holders of *, which parses to *:*. Phase 3 migrates the
rest and closes that gap.

70 unit tests, including the wildcard-accepting validator cases.

Refs #7974

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth)!: cut every endpoint over to the permission model (Phase 3)

BREAKING: legacy permission strings no longer authorize. A permanent alias
layer would keep two vocabularies valid forever, so the break is
deliberate and reported rather than absorbed. `*` survives unchanged --
it parses to `*:*` -- so an administrator cannot be locked out while
roles are re-authored.

All 168 declaration call sites across 151 files now use
RequirePermission(resource, verb) with the constants their module
declares, so a typo is a compile error rather than an unreachable
endpoint.

Enforcement consolidated onto IPermissionEvaluator:
- RoleAuthorizationService evaluates containment through the evaluator
  rather than by set membership. This matters: a caller holding
  workflows/*:view can now delegate workflows/definitions:view, which set
  membership got wrong and which would otherwise force administrators to
  hold every concrete grant they wish to delegate.
- The two Broker/Logout.cs endpoints declare explicitly. Logout is
  authenticated-only; ContinueLogout is anonymous, matching every other
  broker callback -- the route handle carries the authority and a
  top-level browser navigation sends no Authorization header.

Removes the C#/Python expression permissions (#7975). They conflated an
incoherent execution-side gate -- a workflow runs under the server's
authority, not the caller's, so the check never constrained what a script
could do -- with a meaningful authoring-side one. The host switch
(AllowHostCodeExecution) becomes the single control. This is a deliberate
reduction in control: where host code is enabled, any author who may write
definitions may use C# and Python.

Adds the fail-closed gate. Omitting a declaration previously inherited the
FastEndpoints default with no Elsa-level fallback, so an endpoint could
ship ungated unnoticed. EndpointCoverage asserts every endpoint declares
exactly one of RequirePermission, RequireAuthenticatedOnly or
AllowAnonymous, with no exemption list. Its canary assertion earned its
keep immediately by catching that the gate was scanning an assembly
containing no endpoints.

EndpointPermissionRegistry records what each endpoint declares. The
requirement is attached as an inline policy and is not readable back from
the definition, so this keeps the declaration introspectable -- and lets
tests assert a specific requirement rather than merely that one exists.

Two behavior notes worth calling out:
- The runtime status endpoint previously accepted either the read or the
  manage permission. It now requires workflows/runtime:view alone, which
  is least privilege; a role holding only control must also be granted
  view to read status.
- BPMN interchange repeats the workflow-definitions path locally rather
  than taking a dependency on Elsa.Workflows.Api for one constant. It
  contributes no descriptor: the resource is owned and described by
  Workflows.Api, and the registry keeps one entry per resource.

Also adds a startup validator that logs every stored role permission that
no longer resolves, identified by role, so an upgrade is loud.

188 unit tests pass across Api.Common, Workflows.Api and Identity.

Refs #7974, #7975, #7976

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): revocation bound and role audit notifications (Phase 4)

Default access-token lifetime drops from 1 hour to 15 minutes. This is
the revocation bound: permission claims are issued at sign-in and refresh
re-reads the user's roles, so removing a role takes effect at most one
access-token lifetime later. Refresh already rotates both tokens, so no
client change is required and the refresh lifetime is unchanged.

Adds an optional permission stamp for deployments needing a tighter
bound. The stamp is derived from the user's roles and their permissions
rather than stored as a counter on the user. That avoids changing the
Identity schema, which would have required migrations across all five EF
providers and made this milestone depend on the tenancy work. It also
means every node computes the same value from the same store with no
cross-node cache invalidation, which matters because Elsa has none.

The stamp is issued unconditionally and only validated when enabled, so
turning it on does not invalidate tokens already in flight; an absent
stamp is not treated as a mismatch for the same reason. It changes when a
role is added to or removed from the user and when a held role's
permissions change, but not when an unrelated role changes.

Role create and update now publish typed security notifications per ADR
0007, carrying the resulting grants so a reviewer can reconstruct what a
role conferred at a point in time without replaying every prior event.
This module owns no audit store: a future audit module subscribes and
sets its own retention.

Refs #7974

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): tenancy hardening for identity (Phase 5)

Closes the gaps that made "roles are configurable per tenant" untrue
however the rest of the stack behaved.

Uniqueness becomes per tenant. User.Name, Role.Name, Application.Name and
Application.ClientId carried globally unique indexes, so two tenants could
not both hold a role named Admin. Migrations for all five EF providers
drop the global indexes and create composite ones on (TenantId, Name).

The in-memory user and role stores now scope to the ambient tenant.
Isolation previously existed only on the Entity Framework path, and only
when multitenancy was enabled, so a deployment running the default stores
had none at all. The tenant-agnostic sentinel is honored, matching the EF
query filter, so a shared platform role stays visible from every tenant.

RoleFilter gains TenantId, matching UserFilter, and the role and user list
endpoints pass it explicitly rather than relying on an ambient filter that
only exists on one persistence path.

UserManager.CreateUserAsync sets TenantId explicitly instead of relying on
the EF saving handler, which does not run in memory and left users
unassigned there.

Refs #7974

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: migration guide, ADR, and security wiki for the authorization model

Adds docs/migrations/authorization-model.md, following the shape of the
external-authentication persistence guide. It leads with the three things
that are not a simple rename, because each silently produces a wrong
result if treated as one:

- The migration expands where new sub-resources are finer-grained than
  what they replace, so a one-for-one substitution narrows roles.
- read:* and exec:* become materially more powerful. They are literal
  claim values today, authorizing twelve of roughly forty read endpoints;
  their replacements work as the names always implied. Any role holding
  them needs review by hand, not an automated rewrite.
- The C#/Python expression permissions are removed rather than
  translated, which is a deliberate reduction in control where host code
  is enabled.

It also states plainly that `*` keeps working, and says to do that first,
since it is what stops an instance locking itself out mid-migration.

ADR 0012 records the model and, more usefully, why a closed verb
enumeration was drafted and rejected: it was justified on implication, but
aggregates were already excluded and no verb implies another, so the
bitwise check was expressing set containment all along.

The security wiki's API Authorization section replaces its Secrets-only
route table with the catalog endpoint as the authoritative source, and
states why read-only mode is a separate axis rather than a permission.

Refs #7974

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(auth): restore the suites after the tenancy and evaluator changes

The whole solution builds with zero errors and every affected suite
passes: 70 Api.Common, 23 Workflows.Api, 95 Identity, 154 External
Authentication unit, 133 External Authentication integration.

Most breakage was test call sites constructing the tenant-aware stores
and the evaluator-backed RoleAuthorizationService directly. Adds
TestTenantAccessor to Elsa.Testing.Shared rather than giving the
production constructors an optional accessor, which would have let a
missing registration silently disable isolation.

Several External Authentication tests created fixtures in tenant-a while
running under the default tenant, so the newly isolating store correctly
stopped finding them. They are now scoped to the tenant their own
fixtures use; JustInTimeProvisioningTests, which genuinely spans two
tenants, is scoped per case.

One production fix came out of it: IdentityFeature now ensures an
ITenantAccessor with TryAdd. The identity stores are tenant-scoped, so a
host that never enables multitenancy would otherwise fail to construct
them -- which is what the DI registration tests were reporting. TryAdd
leaves MultitenancyFeature's own registration untouched.

Refs #7974

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): register the identity services on the classic feature path

Found by running Elsa.Server.Web, not by the test suites: the app failed
at startup with "Unable to resolve service for type RoleSecurityNotifier
while attempting to activate Roles.Update".

RoleSecurityNotifier, the permission stamp services, the memory cache and
the stored-permission validator were registered only in the CShells shell
feature. Elsa.Server.Web uses the classic UseIdentity() path, whose
IdentityFeature registered none of them, so every host on that path
crashed while mapping endpoints. Unit tests did not catch it because they
construct services directly rather than through either feature.

Verified end to end against the running server:

- The seeded admin role stores "*". It parsed to *:* and resolved to
  concrete verbs across all 27 registered resources, which is the
  bare-wildcard parse rule working on real data rather than in a test.
- GET /identity/permissions returns the catalog for the modules this app
  installs -- 27 resources, 0 unverified, categories Dashboard, Identity,
  Resilience and Workflows -- rather than all 47, which is correct: the
  catalog describes what is installed.
- GET /identity/permissions/reach?resource=workflows/* reports 19 covered
  resources.
- A role holding only dashboard:view gets 200 on /dashboard/overview and
  403 on /identity/roles, /identity/users, /workflow-definitions and
  /identity/permissions, while /identity/me/permissions returns 200
  because it declares RequireAuthenticatedOnly -- confirming FR-019's
  third declaration state behaves as designed.
- That same principal's /me/permissions lists all 27 resources with 26
  carrying an empty verb list, so "denied" stays distinguishable from
  "unknown to this server".
- The startup validator logged no unresolvable permissions, as expected
  for a seed holding only "*".

Refs #7974

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): discover permission descriptors on the shell host path

Found by running Elsa.ModularServer.Web. The shell host started cleanly
and authorized correctly, but GET /identity/permissions returned zero
resources and /identity/me/permissions returned no grants.

Descriptor discovery was wired into AddFastEndpointsFromModule, which only
the classic module path calls. CShells discovers endpoints from features
implementing its own marker interface, so on a shell host no provider was
ever registered. Authorization still worked, because the evaluator reads
claims and needs no descriptors -- which is exactly why nothing failed
loudly. What silently broke was everything built on the catalog: role
authoring would have rejected every concrete grant as an unknown
resource, introspection returned nothing for clients to render, and the
stored-permission validator would have reported every concrete stored
permission as unresolvable.

ElsaFastEndpointsFeature now contributes descriptors from the loaded Elsa
assemblies, bounded to those and run once per shell.

Verified on the modular host, which installs far more modules than
Elsa.Server.Web:

- 47 resources registered, 0 unverified, across all 12 categories, with
  all 17 module-specific verbs present. That is the entire published
  vocabulary confirmed against a running server rather than a document.
- Reach reports workflows/* covering 20, external-authentication/*
  covering 8, and * covering 47.
- Creating a role with dashboard:view and workflows/*:view succeeds,
  confirming a wildcard grant survives authoring validation.
- Creating one with invented/resource:view and secrets:publish is
  rejected with 400.

Also makes those rejections actionable. The permission was reported
without the reason, so an operator learned which entry was wrong but not
why; both parts are now in the message, including the supported verbs for
the resource.

Refs #7974

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* wip: bpmn test vocabulary

* fix(auth): make enforcement DI-independent and finish the hub cutover

CI on #7980 was red. Running the full suite locally rather than the
subset I had been checking surfaced 24 failures across four projects,
in three distinct classes.

Enforcement no longer depends on a DI registration. RequirePermission
attached a PermissionRequirement evaluated by a registered handler, so a
host that had not called AddElsaAuthorization got 403 on every endpoint
with nothing to indicate why. Several test hosts wire FastEndpoints
directly and did exactly that. The requirement is now evaluated inline
against a shared stateless evaluator, with a host-registered
IPermissionEvaluator still taking precedence. Registration remains
worthwhile for the catalog and the validator; authorization can no longer
silently fail closed because of a missing one.

Registration also moved from AddFastEndpointsFromModule to
AddFastEndpointsAssembly. Registering an endpoint assembly is what should
guarantee its permissions work, and a host may never call the former.

Finishes T039. The four SignalR hubs still matched hard-coded legacy
permission strings, which no longer exist, so every hub denied access.
They now route through the evaluator like every other enforcement path.

Test fixtures granting legacy strings were updated to the new vocabulary.
Two categories were deliberately left alone: naming tests asserting the
legacy constants still hold their old values, which is true and worth
keeping, and the workflow script authorization tests, which asserted a
MissingPermission outcome that D21 removed -- those now assert the host
switch is the only control.

One test previously pinned that the hub honors a FastEndpoints-configured
permissions claim type. It now asserts the opposite, and says why: Elsa is
the only authority that expands roles into permission claims (ADR 0009),
and this model no longer uses the FastEndpoints permission mechanism, so
its separately configurable claim type is not consulted. That property is
also unreadable outside reflection.

Whole solution builds with 0 errors and every test project passes.

Refs #7974

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): scope the permission-stamp cache to the tenant

Greptile found and reproduced a cross-tenant authorization bug, and it was
mine: Phase 5 made user names unique per tenant rather than globally, but
PermissionStampValidator kept caching by user name alone. Tenant A's
lookup could therefore populate the cache with its own stamp and satisfy a
revoked token belonging to a same-named user in tenant B, without ever
resolving tenant B's user.

Both the cache key and the user lookup are now tenant-scoped. Added
PermissionStampValidatorTests, including the cross-tenant case; verified it
fails without the fix and passes with it.

Also from review:
- Removed the legacy permission constants left unused in the three hubs
  after they moved to the evaluator, so no stale vocabulary lingers.
- Narrowed two generic catch clauses. The IL scanner now catches only the
  exceptions an unresolvable metadata token actually throws, and the
  startup validator rethrows cancellation while still refusing to stop the
  host for anything else -- an unreachable or half-migrated store is
  exactly when an operator most needs the host up.

Whole solution builds with 0 errors and every test project passes.

Refs #7974

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(docs): correct path in log message for authorization model migration link

Aligns the log message path to the correct documentation directory, changing `docs` to `doc` to avoid confusion and incorrect linking during log output.

* fix(auth): update permissions method to use new syntax

* docs: consolidate docs/ into doc/

The repository had two documentation roots. Merge docs/ into doc/ and
remove the empty docs/ tree.

The two adr/ folders both numbered from 0001, so the identity and
authorization series is renumbered to continue the core series rather
than collide with it:

  docs/adr/0001-0012 -> doc/adr/0014-0025

Every reference is updated to match: the Status cross-links between the
renumbered ADRs, the ADR and path links in specs/012-external-authentication
and specs/013-rbac-authorization-model, and doc/wiki/identity-tenancy-security.md.

doc/adr/toc.md gains entries 14-25. doc/adr/graph.dot is regenerated out
to 25; it had been stale since ADR 10 and now also carries the partial
supersession edges declared by the ADRs themselves.

docs/codebase/ and docs/migrations/ move across unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(auth): simplify syntax in PermissionEvaluator and related classes

Streamlined syntax for method definitions by using expression-bodied members and simplified object instantiations across the Authorization module. This includes adjustments in `PermissionEvaluator`, `LocalHostRequirement`, and `WebApplicationExtensions` for better readability and maintainability.

* ci(bounty): point the footer step at the file's real path

The bounty workflow read docs/bounty-footer.md, the path the file had
when the workflow was added in b421b00e1. The file later moved to
doc/bounty/bounty-footer.md and the workflow was never updated, so the
read step has been resolving nothing and the appended comment was empty.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 23:44:55 +02:00

13 KiB

Identity, Tenancy, And Security

Elsa security and tenancy are split across identity, SAS token, tenant, tenant HTTP routing, API authorization, and persistence packages.

Identity

Start in src/modules/Elsa.Identity.

IdentityFeature registers:

  • identity token options
  • API key options
  • users, applications, and roles options
  • memory stores for users, applications, and roles
  • user, application, and role providers
  • user and role managers
  • secret hashing
  • access token issuing
  • API key generation/parsing
  • tenant resolvers based on claims and current user
  • FastEndpoints assembly

Identity supports store-based providers, configuration-based providers, and admin bootstrap providers.

Authentication

DefaultAuthenticationFeature wires default authentication. The reference server calls:

elsa
    .UseIdentity(...)
    .UseDefaultAuthentication();

See src/apps/Elsa.Server.Web/Program.cs.

Identity JWTs include a token_use claim. API bearer authentication accepts only access tokens (token_use=access), while /identity/refresh-token uses a dedicated refresh-token bearer scheme and accepts only refresh tokens (token_use=refresh). Clients should not send refresh tokens to normal API endpoints or access tokens to the refresh endpoint.

JWT signing keys must be configured with a secure random value before production startup. Missing keys, weak keys shorter than 32 ASCII characters, and known public defaults are rejected by options startup validation. Known public defaults are only tolerated in the explicit Development or Demo environments for local/demo hosts. Use environment variables or a secrets manager, such as Identity__Tokens__SigningKey for code-first hosts or CShells__Shells__Default__Features__Identity__SigningKey for shell-based hosts.

Default Admin Bootstrap

The default admin bootstrap is documented in src/modules/Elsa.Identity/README.md and ADR 0010.

Key points:

  • It creates initial admin role/user idempotently.
  • It is recommended for initial identity access.
  • Do not keep development defaults in production.
  • Shell-based configuration uses DefaultAdminUser shell feature.
  • Code-first configuration uses identity.UseDefaultAdmin(...).

SAS Tokens

SasTokensFeature registers data protection and ITokenService. Workflow API depends on SAS tokens. The default data protection application name is Elsa Workflows.

Use SAS tokens for protected links or temporary access flows where the API expects signed token semantics.

Tenancy

Start in src/modules/Elsa.Tenants.

Key features:

Tenant providers:

  • configuration-based tenants provider
  • store-based tenants provider

The reference server enables configuration-based tenants and a custom tenant resolver pipeline using CurrentUserTenantResolver.

ASP.NET Core Tenant Routing

Elsa.Tenants.AspNetCore integrates tenants with HTTP routing.

MultitenantHttpRoutingFeature:

  • is a dependency of HttpFeature and TenantsFeature
  • configures HTTP endpoint routes and base path providers to use tenant prefixes
  • registers route-prefix, header, and host tenant resolvers
  • lets hosts configure tenant header and HTTP tenancy options

This feature is important when HTTP workflow routes must be tenant-aware.

Tenant Persistence Conventions

Persistence is tenant-aware through EF Core model/saving handlers and tenant-aware DbContext factory decoration. ADRs explain conventions:

When changing persisted entities, verify tenant ID behavior and default tenant semantics.

API Authorization

A permission is {resource}:{verb} — a hierarchical resource path paired with a verb. Both axes are open and contributed by modules; see ADR 0025 for why neither is a closed set.

A trailing * on the resource axis matches the named node and every descendant, so workflows/*:view is one grant covering every resource beneath workflows/, including ones added in later releases. * as a verb matches any verb, and *:* is superuser. Wildcards are the only construct with forward reach; there are no aggregates and no verb implies another.

The catalog is the authoritative list. GET /identity/permissions returns every registered resource with the verbs it accepts, so no client should hard-code permission strings. GET /identity/permissions/reach reports what a wildcard grant currently covers, and GET /identity/me/permissions returns the caller's own effective grants.

Endpoints declare their requirement with RequirePermission(resource, verb), referencing the constant its owning module declares in Permissions/<Module>Permissions.cs alongside the descriptor, so the two cannot drift. An endpoint that needs an identity but no grant declares RequireAuthenticatedOnly(); one that needs neither declares AllowAnonymous(). An automated gate fails the build if an endpoint declares none of the three.

Deployment read-only mode is a separate axis and keeps its own enforcement — see AuthorizationPolicies and NotReadOnlyRequirement. A caller holding every grant is still refused while the deployment is read-only, which is why it is not expressible as a permission.

Upgrading from the previous verb:resource vocabulary is a breaking change; see the migration guide.

Secrets

Start in src/modules/Elsa.Secrets.

SecretsFeature registers secrets services and FastEndpoints. It provides:

Built-In Stores

Store Class Notes
Elsa-managed encrypted store EncryptedSecretStore Encrypts values with data protection. Default writable store.
Configuration-backed read-only ConfigurationSecretStore Maps configuration keys to secret values. Read-only; cannot be written from the API.

Secret Versioning

Each logical secret has an immutable technical name. ISecretManager.RotateAsync creates a new active version and retires the previous active version. Runtime code always resolves the latest active version; expired or revoked secrets fail resolution with a non-secret error.

Management Endpoints

Routes under /elsa/api (Elsa route prefix applies):

Route Permission
GET /secrets read:secrets
GET /secrets/{name} read:secrets
POST /secrets write:secrets
DELETE /secrets/{name} delete:secrets
POST /secrets/{name}/rotate write:secrets
POST /secrets/{name}/revoke write:secrets
POST /secrets/{name}/test test:secrets
POST /secrets/picker read:secrets
GET /secrets/descriptors read:secrets

Permission constants are in SecretsPermissions.

Using Secrets In Workflows

Activities with sensitive inputs can use the Secret expression in place of a literal value. Studio presents this as a no-code picker for inputs marked as sensitive, such as the HTTP Request Authorization input. The picker stores a SecretReference with the secret name, optional type, and optional scope; it does not store the current secret value in the workflow definition.

At runtime, the Secret expression calls ISecretResolver at the point of use and returns the latest active version. Rotating a secret through ISecretManager.RotateAsync updates future workflow runs without editing workflow JSON. If a reference includes a type or scope, resolution must match those constraints; for example, a text token reference should not resolve an RSA key, and a production reference should not resolve a development secret. Expired, revoked, missing, or incompatible secrets fail with a non-secret error message.

Sensitive activity inputs are not written to activity state after evaluation. Prefer a Secret expression for credentials such as bearer tokens, API keys, passwords, and connection strings instead of literals, variables, logs, workflow outputs, incident messages, or custom headers that are not marked sensitive. Treat any custom activity input that can carry credentials as sensitive by setting CanContainSecrets = true.

JavaScript expressions can resolve secrets when the host enables Elsa.Secrets.JavaScript:

const token = await getSecret("crm:token");
return `Bearer ${token}`;

getSecret(name) returns a Promise<string>, so JavaScript must either await it inside an async function/IIFE or compose it with .then(...). Do not write resolved values to logs, variables, outputs, exceptions, or activity state. Use the Secret expression for simple no-code binding, and use getSecret only when a script needs to combine a secret with runtime data.

Tests

Spec: specs/007-secrets-module/spec.md.

Ingress Rate Limiting

Elsa exposes opt-in ASP.NET Core rate limiting hooks for two ingress surfaces:

  • Elsa management API endpoints, through ApiEndpointOptions.RateLimitingPolicyName and UseWorkflowsApiRateLimiting(...).
  • Public HTTP workflow trigger routes, through HttpActivityOptions.RateLimitingPolicyName and UseWorkflowsRateLimiting(...).

The reference server registers disabled-by-default fixed-window policies under IngressRateLimiting. Enable them by setting IngressRateLimiting:Enabled to true, then tune the API and HTTP workflow permit/window values for production traffic. Set IngressRateLimiting:RegisterReferencePolicies to false when policy names and policies are supplied externally. Custom hosts should register named policies with services.AddRateLimiter(...), map Elsa API endpoints with MapWorkflowsApi(...), apply the Elsa metadata hooks after endpoint routing has selected endpoints and before the rate limiter middleware, and call app.UseRateLimiter() once in the host pipeline. The Elsa hooks only attach endpoint metadata; ASP.NET Core validates configured policy names when the rate limiter middleware handles matching requests. Leave the option disabled, omit the policy names in custom hosts, or set the reference-server policy options to empty strings to run without Elsa-provided rate limiting. The reference server only assigns its default policy names when Enabled is true.

Security Review Checklist

  • Does the endpoint require authentication or a permission?
  • Do SignalR hub methods enforce authentication and permission checks on every subscribed method, not only at the hub class level?
  • Does mutable API behavior honor read-only mode?
  • Does the operation need tenant scoping?
  • Are exposed API or HTTP workflow trigger routes protected by appropriate ingress rate limiting?
  • Does persistence apply tenant ID filters and saving handlers?
  • Are bootstrap credentials only for development or secret-managed environments?
  • Does any diagnostic/logging feature expose sensitive data without redaction?
  • Do token settings use production-grade signing keys and data protection configuration?