* feat(bpmn): project interpreter diagnostics onto the scope's execution log
Under Option A only bound work carries an activity id, so gateways, events and
flows had no per-element trace in the journal. BpmnScopeHost now projects each
new BpmnExecutionState.Diagnostics entry onto the scope's own execution log
before Prune() runs, keyed by element id, with a persisted high-water mark so
a resumed scope never re-emits one. The scope's own start and completion stay
out, since they are already journaled as the activity's own lifecycle. Event
names and the payload shape are documented as a public compatibility surface
for elsa-studio#1000 to mirror.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(bpmn): project element and flow diagnostics dropped by the FlowId exclusion
The diagnostics exclusion keyed on Kind == TokenEmitted && FlowId is null/empty
also dropped an error or cancel boundary's own token emission, since a
boundary fires without an inbound flow. Narrow the rule to skip only
diagnostics that name neither an element nor a flow -- the scope's own
terminal Completed summary -- so every diagnostic keyed on an element or a
flow, including a start event's and a boundary's, is projected.
Also make DiagnosticSequence resilient: TryParse instead of Parse, logging a
warning and skipping projection for an id that doesn't match diag:N rather
than faulting the evaluation. Add a reflection-based test that keeps
BpmnDiagnosticEventNames in lockstep with BpmnDiagnosticKind, and record the
diagnostics volume measurement in the wiki.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(bpmn): require exact diag:N ids and seed the diagnostics cursor from prior state
Reject any diagnostic id that is not the exact "diag:" prefix followed by a
non-negative integer, so a malformed id can no longer poison the durable
projection cursor and cause later, genuinely valid, lower-sequence
diagnostics to be skipped forever.
Also seed a missing cursor from the highest valid sequence in the scope's
prior persisted state instead of treating it as zero, so a scope persisted
before diagnostics projection existed does not replay every retained
historical diagnostic as new on its next evaluation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The POST /identity/users response serialized the plain-text password
(including one the caller supplied), the password hash, and the salt.
The response now carries only id, name, roles, tenantId and a nullable
generatedPassword that is populated once, and only when Core generated
the password because none was supplied.
- CreateUserResult gains IsPasswordGenerated so the endpoint can tell a
generated password from a supplied one without re-deriving it.
- Response.FromResult centralises the mapping and omits credential
material.
- Expose Elsa.Identity internals to Elsa.Identity.UnitTests and add
contract tests covering the response shape, the no-echo rule, the
serialized JSON, and UserManager's generated-password flag.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(efcore-oracle): migrate LOB columns in V3_6 without in-place datatype alteration
Both Oracle V3_6 migrations were generated as in-place `ALTER TABLE ... MODIFY`
statements that change a column's datatype to or from a LOB type: NCLOB to JSON
for `WorkflowDefinitions.StringData`, and NVARCHAR2(450) to NCLOB for
`ActivityNodeId` on `WorkflowExecutionLogRecords` and `ActivityExecutionRecords`.
Oracle refuses both (ORA-22858 / ORA-22859), so neither migration could ever
apply and the reported ORA-22858 was unavoidable.
Convert the columns the way the ORA-22858 message prescribes instead: add a
temporary column of the target type, copy the values across, drop the original
and rename the temporary one. Because Oracle commits DDL implicitly, a run that
fails partway leaves its earlier statements applied - the reporter's already
committed `OriginalSource` column is exactly that - so every step is guarded
against the state a previous attempt can have left behind. The conversion block
derives what still needs doing from `ALL_TAB_COLUMNS`, skips a conversion that
already completed (including one applied by hand), and raises rather than copy
out of and drop a column whose datatype it does not recognize.
Add an offline regression test that generates the Oracle Management and Runtime
V3_6 scripts through `IMigrator.GenerateScript` without a connection and asserts
that no in-place datatype `MODIFY` is emitted for either column, that the
add/copy/drop/rename sequence appears in order, and that the re-run guards are
present. All 19 cases fail against the previous migrations.
Refs #8011
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(efcore-oracle): tighten migration helper visibility and index guard, share the script-generation test harness
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(efcore-oracle): brace the foreach bodies in the V3_6 migration tests
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(efcore-oracle): refuse to truncate node IDs on downgrade and validate same-named indexes
The Runtime V3_6 downgrade converted ActivityNodeId from NCLOB back to
NVARCHAR2(450) by copying DBMS_LOB.SUBSTR(..., 450, 1), silently
truncating any value the upgraded schema had allowed to grow past 450
characters. EnsureLobLengthAtMost now checks for oversized values while
the column is still a LOB and raises before any data is copied.
CreateIndexIfMissing also treated any index with a matching name as
already done. It now validates the existing index's table, uniqueness
and ordered column list against ALL_INDEXES/ALL_IND_COLUMNS so a
same-named index left behind by schema drift or manual recovery is not
mistaken for the one the migration means to create.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(efcore-oracle): correct the dynamic SQL rationale on the LOB length guard
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(efcore-oracle): preflight both tables before downgrading and escape schema names in migration SQL
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(efcore-oracle): copy every row NULL-preservingly so retries reproduce the current source
The filtered copy `WHERE "<column>" IS NOT NULL` skipped rows whose
nullable source had since become NULL. If a prior conversion committed
the copy and then failed before dropping the source column, an
operator clearing a value before retrying would find the predicate
skip that row, and the stale converted value would be renamed into
place. Replace the filtered UPDATE with an unconditional, NULL-
preserving CASE expression so a retry always reproduces the current
source exactly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(efcore): terminate raw SQL statements in the PostgreSQL and SQLite Runtime V3_6 migrations
The V3_6 Runtime migration's two DROP INDEX statements were emitted without a
trailing semicolon on PostgreSQL and SQLite, so `dotnet ef migrations script`
produced syntactically invalid SQL (an unterminated statement inside the
idempotent DO $EF$ block, and unseparated statements in the plain script).
MigrateAsync() was unaffected because EF executes each Sql() call individually.
Add the missing terminators and a regression test that generates the Runtime
migration script offline for both providers (idempotent and plain forms) and
asserts the DROP INDEX statements are properly terminated.
Refs #7912
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(efcore): share migration-script setup and cover the schema-prefixed statements
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(efcore): cover schema-prefixed migration statements without static state
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add regression coverage for both the single and bulk import endpoints
confirming that importing a workflow definition with a fresh
DefinitionId and IsReadonly=true succeeds and persists as read-only.
NotReadOnlyPolicy is only meant to block edits of existing read-only
workflows; on main it already resolves against the stored definition
(null for a new one), so these tests pin that behavior against
regression.
Refs #7981
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-authentication): scope role-deletion impact to the role's tenant
ExternalAuthenticationRoleDeletionDependencyContributor scanned every stored
connection with an empty ConnectionFilter and every configured connection
regardless of its tenant, so a role ID that exists in two tenants could report
another tenant's references as its own impact -- and a configuration entry
owned by another tenant could block a role deletion outright. Remediation had
the same reach: it loaded a dependency's connection by the caller-supplied
owner ID without checking which tenant owned it.
Impact, prevalidation and remediation now only see connections in the role's
tenant context, which is the tenant active on ITenantAccessor while the
role-deletion coordinator runs. Host-scoped connections stay in scope for every
tenant, because the connection registry resolves the host scope for every
signing-in tenant and the provisioner resolves a connection's default role IDs
in the signing-in user's tenant, so a host connection naming a role ID really
does reference that tenant's role. Configuration entries that leave the tenant
blank are host-scoped for the same reason the configuration source materializes
them there. A connection carrying another tenant's ID is out of scope in both
directions, and a connection loaded for remediation that is not in the role's
tenant is treated as absent, which fails the request rather than mutating it.
The stored connections are fetched per applicable scope so another tenant's
rows are never materialized, and both connection stores already honor
ConnectionFilter.Scope; the durable store now has a test pinning that, since
the tenant boundary rests on it.
Refs #8013
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-authentication): scan every tenant when deleting a tenant-agnostic role
Role stores expose tenant-agnostic roles (TenantId == "*") from every tenant, but the
role-deletion contributor derived its dependency scan boundary from the ambient tenant only,
so deleting an agnostic role while tenant A was active left references from other tenants
dangling. Resolve the role being deleted once per operation, through the active role store,
and scan every connection and configuration entry regardless of tenant when it is agnostic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(external-authentication): share the active role store lookup
Extract the duplicated "active role store is the last registration"
resolution into a single ActiveRoleStore accessor and rename ToScope to
ToConnectionScope for clarity.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-authentication): read one connection snapshot and prefer the agnostic role
Reading the host and tenant scopes as two separate store queries let a connection
whose TenantId changed mid-flight fall between the reads and escape both, letting
role deletion proceed while a reference remained. FindConnectionsInRoleTenantScopeAsync
now reads one snapshot and filters it in memory. IsAgnosticRoleAsync resolved a role
by an unqualified ID lookup, which could return the ambient tenant's role instead of
an agnostic role sharing its ID, silently narrowing impact scanning and leaving
JIT-policy references in other tenants dangling; it now checks every role sharing the
ID and gives the agnostic scope deterministic precedence.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(external-authentication): correct the scope-filter test comment
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-authentication): fail closed when a role ID resolves to more than one role
A same-ID collision between a tenant-scoped role and an agnostic role can only
occur in MemoryRoleStore (durable persistence keys roles by ID alone). In that
case the coordinator's own deletion target is already ambiguous, so widening
or narrowing the scope by guessing is wrong in either direction; throw instead
of picking a side.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-authentication): scope role-deletion impact by the resolved role's tenant
Replace the isAgnosticRole flag with ResolveRoleTenantIdAsync, which returns the
resolved role's own TenantId and falls back to the ambient tenant only when the
role cannot be resolved. With multitenancy disabled the EF role store installs
no tenant query filter and can resolve a tenant-owned role by ID regardless of
the ambient tenant, so scoping by the ambient tenant alone left that role's
connection references out of scan while the coordinator deleted it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-authentication): require an agnostic replacement when remediating an agnostic role
Authorization for a replacement role still resolves through the ambient tenant's
role services, so a deletion initiated in tenant A could authorize a tenant-A-only
replacement and then write it into tenant B's connection policy, where that role
does not exist. When the deletion target is agnostic, require the replacement
role to be agnostic too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-authentication): require agnostic replacements for host connections and reject ambiguous ones
Extend the agnostic-replacement requirement to host-scoped connections, since a host
connection is served to every signing-in tenant and a tenant-scoped replacement would
resolve in the authorizing tenant but fail to resolve in every other tenant it serves.
Recheck the replacement at removal time through the same agnostic-role resolution used
at validation, instead of trusting whichever same-ID role a plain FindAsync happens to
return, so a replacement collision introduced between validation and mutation is
rejected. Resolve IsAgnosticRoleAsync's candidate directly and return true only when
exactly one matching role is agnostic, so an ambiguous replacement ID is reported as
replacement_role_unavailable_or_unauthorized instead of escaping as an exception.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-authentication): keep host-connection replacements allowed for default-tenant roles
Revert the host-scope replacement guard added for host-scoped connections.
IdentityProviderConnectionManagementService forces every managed connection
to host scope, and in a deployment without multitenancy roles are created
scoped to the default tenant rather than agnostic, so requiring an agnostic
replacement for host-scoped connections would make every replacement
remediation impossible in the default deployment. The replacement guard
applies only when the deletion target itself is agnostic, as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix tenant context propagation for alteration jobs
Capture the current tenant when dispatching a background alteration job
and restore it while executing the queued callback.
Add regression coverage verifying that the dispatch-time tenant is used
and the worker's previous tenant context is restored.
Fixes#7961
* test(alterations): cover tenant restore on failure and concurrent tenant isolation
Add coverage for the spec lines that were previously untested: the
worker's tenant context is restored after execution even when the
job runner throws, and concurrent jobs dispatched under different
tenants do not exchange tenant context. Extract the shared service
provider / job queue / recording runner arrange logic into
constructor-initialized fields so the three tests stay DRY.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(alterations): cover default-tenant dispatch and share dispatcher test setup
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Sipke Schoorstra <sipkeschoorstra@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Initial plan
* Publish security notification after role deletion
Co-authored-by: sfmskywalker <938393+sfmskywalker@users.noreply.github.com>
* Fix atomic role deletion notifications
Co-authored-by: sfmskywalker <938393+sfmskywalker@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(identity): delegate MemoryRoleStore.DeleteAsync to TryDeleteAsync
Mirrors EFCoreRoleStore.DeleteAsync so the deletion logic exists once
instead of being duplicated between DeleteAsync and TryDeleteAsync.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(identity): scope the atomic role delete capability to a single role ID
Narrow IRoleStoreWithAtomicDelete.TryDeleteAsync to accept a single role
ID instead of a RoleFilter, closing a race where two concurrent deletes
matching multiple roles could each remove one and both report success.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: sfmskywalker <938393+sfmskywalker@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Sipke Schoorstra <sipkeschoorstra@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(identity)!: retire the SecurityRoot policy in favour of endpoint permissions
Completes T040. ADR 0010 already decided SecurityRoot was overloaded and that
endpoints should be authorized by their own permissions; this removes the last
of it.
Roles/Create and Applications/Create carried Policies(SecurityRoot) alongside
an existing RequirePermission, so the policy was redundant there and the line
is simply dropped.
Secrets/Hash carried only the policy. By default SecurityRoot resolved to
RequireAuthenticatedUser(), so any signed-in caller could exercise the password
hasher. It now declares identity/users:create, on the grounds that hashing a
secret is a step in provisioning a credential. This is a tightening: callers
who could hash before and hold no user-creation permission will now be refused.
The policy, its two registration paths and the IdentityPolicyNames constant are
removed. ConfigureAuthorizationOptions stays public and now defaults to a no-op
so hosts that add their own policies are unaffected.
BREAKING CHANGE: the SecurityRoot authorization policy and the
IdentityPolicyNames class are removed. Hosts referencing either should rely on
endpoint permissions, and use DefaultAdminUserFeature for initial bootstrap.
Note: SecurityRoot was the only attachment point for LocalHostPermissionRequirement,
so the localhost permission grant is now inert. The requirement type and the
EnableLocalHostPermissionGrantForSecurityRoot toggles are left in place rather
than deleted, but they no longer gate anything -- see the PR for why that path
was already incoherent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(identity)!: delete the localhost bootstrap grant and its machinery
Follows the SecurityRoot removal in the previous commit. SecurityRoot was the
only attachment point for LocalHostPermissionRequirement, so the localhost
permission grant is now removed outright rather than left inert:
LocalHostPermissionRequirement, LocalHostRequirement (already dead -- registered
as a handler but consumed by no policy), LocalHostPermissionRequirementOptions
and the two feature toggles all go.
The grant was the weakest of the three bootstrap mechanisms Elsa already has. It
trusted network position, which stops meaning anything behind a reverse proxy,
inside a container, or across a port-forward; it granted unauthenticated access,
so the bootstrap action carried no identity; it covered only localhost, so it
did nothing for a deployed environment; and it could not perform its headline
job, because it granted identity/users:create while POST /identity/users does
not carry the policy that injected it.
The replacements already exist and both work in deployed environments:
UseDefaultAdmin(...) seeds an admin role and user at startup, idempotently, and
UseAdminApiKey(...) accepts an out-of-band key. What the localhost grant did
usefully provide was a hint that something needed configuring, so
IdentityBootstrapDiagnostic replaces that: when the user store is empty and
neither mechanism is configured, startup logs an error naming both, instead of
every endpoint answering 403 with no explanation.
BREAKING CHANGE: LocalHostRequirement, LocalHostPermissionRequirement,
LocalHostPermissionRequirementOptions and the
Enable/DisableLocalHostPermissionGrantForSecurityRoot toggles are removed. Use
UseDefaultAdmin or UseAdminApiKey to bootstrap an instance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(identity): scope the hash endpoint's documentation to users, and pin the declarations
The hash endpoint's remarks said the callers that need it are "the ones standing up
users and applications", while the endpoint requires identity/users:create alone. An
application provisioner reading that would have been sent into a 403.
The documentation was the part that was wrong. `POST /identity/applications` generates
and hashes the client secret and the API key itself and returns both the plaintext and
the hash, so identity/applications:create is already sufficient to create an application
and the hash endpoint is not on that path at all. Say so, in the endpoint and in the
migration guide, rather than widening a grant nobody needs.
Adds EndpointPermissionTests over the three endpoints that carried the retired
SecurityRoot policy: the two that only lost a redundant policy line must keep the
permission they already declared, and Secrets/Hash must keep the one it gained. The
coverage gate only asks whether an endpoint declares something, so either half could
otherwise change unnoticed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(identity): state the hash endpoint's user-only scope in the summary, and complete the removal list
Moves the user-only scoping into the endpoint's <summary>, which is the part that reaches
the generated API description, rather than leaving it to a paragraph further down. The
remark now says outright that no application-provisioning flow reaches this endpoint and
none is documented to, with the reason: POST /identity/applications generates the client
secret and the API key itself, hashes both, and returns each plaintext alongside its hash.
The migration guide's removal list was partial — it named the requirements and the two
toggles but not the handlers, the options type, the EnableLocalHostPermissionGrant property
on either feature, or the already-obsolete DisableLocalHostRequirement() alias. A reader
hitting a compile error on any of those would not have found it in the guide. It also now
records that ConfigureAuthorizationOptions survives as a no-op default.
Adds the store-failure case to IdentityBootstrapDiagnosticTests: the broad catch is
load-bearing — an unmigrated database must not stop the host from starting — and nothing
was holding it in place. Disposes the test service provider, and folds the repeated arrange
blocks in DefaultAuthenticationFeatureTests into fields.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(identity): route the remaining permission checks through the evaluator
Completes T038 of the authorization model, and fixes a live defect it was
meant to catch.
RoleDeletionCoordinator.InspectAsync gated on the legacy string "delete:role",
compared by claim-value equality. Nothing has granted that spelling since the
vocabulary migration, so a caller holding identity/roles:delete passed the
endpoint's own RequirePermission check and was then refused mid-handler by the
coordinator. In practice role deletion worked only for holders of "*", across
all three routes that reach the coordinator (Delete, RemediateAndDelete and
GetDeletionImpact). The check now evaluates identity/roles:delete through
PermissionEvaluator, so structured and wildcard grants both reach it.
Every existing coordinator test acted as an administrator holding "*", which is
why this went unnoticed; the added cases exercise identity/roles:delete,
identity/*:delete and identity/roles:* and assert an unrelated grant is still
refused.
AIHttpContextIdentity matched an agent's required permissions by
case-insensitive exact-set containment, which both admitted casing the rest of
the model rejects and refused the wildcards it honours. It now evaluates each
required permission through the same evaluator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ai): restore the null-safe HttpContext access in the tools endpoint
The tools endpoint dereferenced HttpContext directly when passing the principal
to GetAuthorizedAgent, which threw a NullReferenceException and failed two
Elsa.AI.IntegrationTests cases on CI.
This was collateral from tightening a nullable warning in the chat endpoint. The
chat endpoint dereferences HttpContext.Response unconditionally a few lines
later, so HttpContext.User is safe there; the tools endpoint never does, and its
three sibling calls -- GetPermissions, GetActorId and GetTenantId -- all accept
a null context. The same edit was applied to both, and only chat could take it.
Reverting to HttpContext?.User preserves the endpoint's prior behaviour:
GetAuthorizedAgent treats a null principal as holding nothing, and an agent that
declares no required permissions stays authorized either way, because the
empty-requirements check runs before the null check.
Elsa.AI.IntegrationTests 69/69 (was 67 passed, 2 failed); Elsa.Identity.UnitTests
115/115; Elsa.AI.Host builds with no CS8602.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(013): reconcile RBAC and User Tasks task lists with the shipped code
The checkboxes in both task lists had gone stale: the authorization-model work
landed across many concurrent sessions without the lists being updated, leaving
specs/013-rbac-authorization-model/tasks.md reading 65 open / 6 done while the
migration was in fact complete across 17 modules and 155 endpoint files.
Every open task was re-verified against the working tree at origin/main. 56 were
confirmed complete and are now ticked; the 22 that remain open carry an inline
note naming the missing evidence, so the next reader can tell a real gap from
unticked bookkeeping. Two tasks landed in a different shape than specified
(the coverage gate as a shared per-assembly helper, the permission stamp as a
calculator rather than persisted state) and say so rather than being ticked
silently.
Verified by inspection, not by a full build; T063 stays open for that reason.
Docs only -- no code changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(013): resolve contradictions between task ticks and verification notes
Greptile flagged two entries whose task status and verification note disagreed.
Both were real, and they needed opposite fixes.
T017 is reverted to unchecked: the reconciler exists, but no test exercises its
repair logic, and this list's stated bar is that a checked item is exercised by
an automated test. The earlier tick was verified against implementation alone.
T041 stays checked and its verification note is corrected instead. The note
claimed coverage was EF Core/SQLite only and the shared suite unwritten; the
suite in fact spans in-memory, EF Core (SQLite, SQL Server, PostgreSQL, Oracle)
and VNext, with ConformanceCoverageTests failing the run when a provider
silently skips. MySQL remains genuinely uncovered and is now named as such.
Also splits the combined T053/T055 note, since T053's suites were run on
2026-08-27 while the solution-wide build in T055 has not been.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(013): narrow T041 to the coverage that actually exists
Greptile flagged that T041 names SQLite restart and index tests alongside the
shared conformance suite, and that the repository has neither. Confirmed: there
is no restart or reopen test anywhere in the User Tasks persistence suites, and
the only "index" match is a List.FindIndex call.
T041 is therefore reverted to unchecked and recorded as partially done. The
verification note now states precisely what exists -- shared conformance across
in-memory, EF Core (SQLite, SQL Server, PostgreSQL, Oracle) and VNext, plus
tenant and cursor coverage -- and what does not.
This is the same over-tick as T017 in the previous commit: both were verified
against part of the task's wording rather than all of it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(013): record T042 as partially done — localhost bootstrap still legacy
Third over-tick found in this reconciliation, and this one hides a live defect.
T042 names LocalHostPermissionRequirement among the sites to update. Its
BootstrapPermissions list still holds the legacy strings "create:application",
"create:user" and "create:role". All three endpoints it exists to unlock now
declare structured permissions (identity/applications:create,
identity/users:create, identity/roles:create), and a legacy string parses to a
different (resource, verb) pair entirely -- "create:user" reads as resource
"create", verb "user". So the localhost bootstrap grant injects claims that
authorize none of the endpoints it was meant to open.
Recorded here rather than fixed, because this list is documentation; the repair
belongs in its own change against Elsa.Api.Common.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-authors the nine User Tasks permissions as verbs on the user-tasks and
user-tasks/participants resources with a descriptor provider, replacing the
legacy verb:resource strings (UserTasksPermissions is removed along with the
other legacy constant classes). All 17 endpoints declare access through
RequirePermission, and UserTaskActor.HasPermission matches through
PermissionMatcher instead of string equality, so pattern grants reach these
endpoints for the first time. manage:user-tasks becomes user-tasks:supervise
to reflect that it grants oversight, not an aggregate. The migration guide
and contract specs carry the full mapping.
BREAKING CHANGE: legacy user-tasks permission strings no longer authorize
anything. Rewrite grants using the mapping table in
doc/migrations/authorization-model.md.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping
Permission.IsValidPattern rejects inert wildcard spellings (such as
"workflows*:delete") that parse but can never match. The grant boundary,
stored-permission, and external-authentication options validators reject them
at authoring time, and PermissionGrantValidator applies the same check to
incoming grants.
ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator now warns (never fails) when
DeniedPermissions is non-empty, because any non-empty deny list refuses every
wildcard grant that could reach a denied permission -- including the seeded
administrator role's "*". The validator takes an ILogger, and
AddExternalAuthenticationServices registers logging alongside its other
framework dependencies (TryAdd-based, so host logging configuration wins).
The operational consequence is recorded in the authorization-model migration
guide.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): report subtree grants whose verb nothing under them supports
'workflows/*:frobnicate' reached a non-empty subtree and was therefore
treated as resolved, so the startup audit stayed silent about a grant
that cannot authorize anything. Require at least one reached descriptor
to support a concrete verb; verb wildcards keep the reach-only check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
