* refactor(identity)!: retire the SecurityRoot policy in favour of endpoint permissions
Completes T040. ADR 0010 already decided SecurityRoot was overloaded and that
endpoints should be authorized by their own permissions; this removes the last
of it.
Roles/Create and Applications/Create carried Policies(SecurityRoot) alongside
an existing RequirePermission, so the policy was redundant there and the line
is simply dropped.
Secrets/Hash carried only the policy. By default SecurityRoot resolved to
RequireAuthenticatedUser(), so any signed-in caller could exercise the password
hasher. It now declares identity/users:create, on the grounds that hashing a
secret is a step in provisioning a credential. This is a tightening: callers
who could hash before and hold no user-creation permission will now be refused.
The policy, its two registration paths and the IdentityPolicyNames constant are
removed. ConfigureAuthorizationOptions stays public and now defaults to a no-op
so hosts that add their own policies are unaffected.
BREAKING CHANGE: the SecurityRoot authorization policy and the
IdentityPolicyNames class are removed. Hosts referencing either should rely on
endpoint permissions, and use DefaultAdminUserFeature for initial bootstrap.
Note: SecurityRoot was the only attachment point for LocalHostPermissionRequirement,
so the localhost permission grant is now inert. The requirement type and the
EnableLocalHostPermissionGrantForSecurityRoot toggles are left in place rather
than deleted, but they no longer gate anything -- see the PR for why that path
was already incoherent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(identity)!: delete the localhost bootstrap grant and its machinery
Follows the SecurityRoot removal in the previous commit. SecurityRoot was the
only attachment point for LocalHostPermissionRequirement, so the localhost
permission grant is now removed outright rather than left inert:
LocalHostPermissionRequirement, LocalHostRequirement (already dead -- registered
as a handler but consumed by no policy), LocalHostPermissionRequirementOptions
and the two feature toggles all go.
The grant was the weakest of the three bootstrap mechanisms Elsa already has. It
trusted network position, which stops meaning anything behind a reverse proxy,
inside a container, or across a port-forward; it granted unauthenticated access,
so the bootstrap action carried no identity; it covered only localhost, so it
did nothing for a deployed environment; and it could not perform its headline
job, because it granted identity/users:create while POST /identity/users does
not carry the policy that injected it.
The replacements already exist and both work in deployed environments:
UseDefaultAdmin(...) seeds an admin role and user at startup, idempotently, and
UseAdminApiKey(...) accepts an out-of-band key. What the localhost grant did
usefully provide was a hint that something needed configuring, so
IdentityBootstrapDiagnostic replaces that: when the user store is empty and
neither mechanism is configured, startup logs an error naming both, instead of
every endpoint answering 403 with no explanation.
BREAKING CHANGE: LocalHostRequirement, LocalHostPermissionRequirement,
LocalHostPermissionRequirementOptions and the
Enable/DisableLocalHostPermissionGrantForSecurityRoot toggles are removed. Use
UseDefaultAdmin or UseAdminApiKey to bootstrap an instance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(identity): scope the hash endpoint's documentation to users, and pin the declarations
The hash endpoint's remarks said the callers that need it are "the ones standing up
users and applications", while the endpoint requires identity/users:create alone. An
application provisioner reading that would have been sent into a 403.
The documentation was the part that was wrong. `POST /identity/applications` generates
and hashes the client secret and the API key itself and returns both the plaintext and
the hash, so identity/applications:create is already sufficient to create an application
and the hash endpoint is not on that path at all. Say so, in the endpoint and in the
migration guide, rather than widening a grant nobody needs.
Adds EndpointPermissionTests over the three endpoints that carried the retired
SecurityRoot policy: the two that only lost a redundant policy line must keep the
permission they already declared, and Secrets/Hash must keep the one it gained. The
coverage gate only asks whether an endpoint declares something, so either half could
otherwise change unnoticed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(identity): state the hash endpoint's user-only scope in the summary, and complete the removal list
Moves the user-only scoping into the endpoint's <summary>, which is the part that reaches
the generated API description, rather than leaving it to a paragraph further down. The
remark now says outright that no application-provisioning flow reaches this endpoint and
none is documented to, with the reason: POST /identity/applications generates the client
secret and the API key itself, hashes both, and returns each plaintext alongside its hash.
The migration guide's removal list was partial — it named the requirements and the two
toggles but not the handlers, the options type, the EnableLocalHostPermissionGrant property
on either feature, or the already-obsolete DisableLocalHostRequirement() alias. A reader
hitting a compile error on any of those would not have found it in the guide. It also now
records that ConfigureAuthorizationOptions survives as a no-op default.
Adds the store-failure case to IdentityBootstrapDiagnosticTests: the broad catch is
load-bearing — an unmigrated database must not stop the host from starting — and nothing
was holding it in place. Disposes the test service provider, and folds the repeated arrange
blocks in DefaultAuthenticationFeatureTests into fields.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(identity): route the remaining permission checks through the evaluator
Completes T038 of the authorization model, and fixes a live defect it was
meant to catch.
RoleDeletionCoordinator.InspectAsync gated on the legacy string "delete:role",
compared by claim-value equality. Nothing has granted that spelling since the
vocabulary migration, so a caller holding identity/roles:delete passed the
endpoint's own RequirePermission check and was then refused mid-handler by the
coordinator. In practice role deletion worked only for holders of "*", across
all three routes that reach the coordinator (Delete, RemediateAndDelete and
GetDeletionImpact). The check now evaluates identity/roles:delete through
PermissionEvaluator, so structured and wildcard grants both reach it.
Every existing coordinator test acted as an administrator holding "*", which is
why this went unnoticed; the added cases exercise identity/roles:delete,
identity/*:delete and identity/roles:* and assert an unrelated grant is still
refused.
AIHttpContextIdentity matched an agent's required permissions by
case-insensitive exact-set containment, which both admitted casing the rest of
the model rejects and refused the wildcards it honours. It now evaluates each
required permission through the same evaluator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ai): restore the null-safe HttpContext access in the tools endpoint
The tools endpoint dereferenced HttpContext directly when passing the principal
to GetAuthorizedAgent, which threw a NullReferenceException and failed two
Elsa.AI.IntegrationTests cases on CI.
This was collateral from tightening a nullable warning in the chat endpoint. The
chat endpoint dereferences HttpContext.Response unconditionally a few lines
later, so HttpContext.User is safe there; the tools endpoint never does, and its
three sibling calls -- GetPermissions, GetActorId and GetTenantId -- all accept
a null context. The same edit was applied to both, and only chat could take it.
Reverting to HttpContext?.User preserves the endpoint's prior behaviour:
GetAuthorizedAgent treats a null principal as holding nothing, and an agent that
declares no required permissions stays authorized either way, because the
empty-requirements check runs before the null check.
Elsa.AI.IntegrationTests 69/69 (was 67 passed, 2 failed); Elsa.Identity.UnitTests
115/115; Elsa.AI.Host builds with no CS8602.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-authors the nine User Tasks permissions as verbs on the user-tasks and
user-tasks/participants resources with a descriptor provider, replacing the
legacy verb:resource strings (UserTasksPermissions is removed along with the
other legacy constant classes). All 17 endpoints declare access through
RequirePermission, and UserTaskActor.HasPermission matches through
PermissionMatcher instead of string equality, so pattern grants reach these
endpoints for the first time. manage:user-tasks becomes user-tasks:supervise
to reflect that it grants oversight, not an aggregate. The migration guide
and contract specs carry the full mapping.
BREAKING CHANGE: legacy user-tasks permission strings no longer authorize
anything. Rewrite grants using the mapping table in
doc/migrations/authorization-model.md.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping
Permission.IsValidPattern rejects inert wildcard spellings (such as
"workflows*:delete") that parse but can never match. The grant boundary,
stored-permission, and external-authentication options validators reject them
at authoring time, and PermissionGrantValidator applies the same check to
incoming grants.
ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator now warns (never fails) when
DeniedPermissions is non-empty, because any non-empty deny list refuses every
wildcard grant that could reach a denied permission -- including the seeded
administrator role's "*". The validator takes an ILogger, and
AddExternalAuthenticationServices registers logging alongside its other
framework dependencies (TryAdd-based, so host logging configuration wins).
The operational consequence is recorded in the authorization-model migration
guide.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): report subtree grants whose verb nothing under them supports
'workflows/*:frobnicate' reached a non-empty subtree and was therefore
treated as resolved, so the startup audit stayed silent about a grant
that cannot authorize anything. Require at least one reached descriptor
to support a concrete verb; verb wildcards keep the reach-only check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(secrets)!: scope secrets to tenants
Secret was the one user-facing entity with no notion of tenancy. It did not
derive from Entity, so it carried no TenantId and no query filter applied to
it: in a multi-tenant deployment every tenant could see and resolve every
other tenant's secrets. Permissions did not help, because secrets:view is
evaluated against the caller rather than against which tenant owns the
secret, so any caller holding it reached the whole set.
Secret now derives from Entity and is filtered like everything else. The
infrastructure was already in place -- SecretsElsaDbContext derives from
ElsaDbContextBase and the feature from PersistenceFeatureBase, which
registers SetTenantIdFilter -- and the handler was skipping secrets for one
reason: it only applies to Entity.
No backfill, deliberately. The column is added nullable and existing rows
keep a null tenant, because SetTenantIdFilter already treats null as the
default tenant through a clause written for exactly this case. Single-tenant
deployments see no change at all, since the filter is only installed when
multitenancy is enabled. Multi-tenant deployments find pre-existing secrets
invisible until assigned, which is a visible failure rather than continued
cross-tenant exposure.
Two things this needed that were not obvious:
Secret self-initialized its Id and nothing else ever assigned one -- there is
no identity generator on the create path -- while Entity.Id is null!. Simply
deriving would have produced a null id on every insert, which any test that
builds a Secret by hand would have missed. A constructor preserves it.
The unique index moves from NormalizedName to (TenantId, NormalizedName),
matching User, Role and Application in the same release. Leaving it global
would have made secret names a shared resource: the second tenant to want
"smtp-password" could not create one.
Elsa.Secrets.Persistence.VNext cannot support this. It keys documents by name
alone and Elsa.Persistence.VNext has no tenant concept to filter on, so it now
throws outside the default tenant rather than serving one tenant's secret to
another. Making it tenant-aware means changing the document id scheme, which
relocates existing documents and is a storage change to make deliberately.
Refs #7972
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(secrets): let the VNext repository resolve without multitenancy
The tenancy guard took ITenantAccessor as a required dependency. That
interface is registered by the tenants module, so a host that never added
multitenancy has none, and resolving ISecretRepository threw for exactly the
deployments the guard is meant to leave alone.
The accessor is now optional, and its absence means no tenancy, which is the
default tenant.
Found by review, and it is worth naming why the tests missed it: every case
in VNextSecretRepositoryTests constructs the repository directly with a stub
accessor, so none of them ever went through the container where the failure
lived. The new case resolves through a service collection that adds only the
document store and the module's own registration, which is what a
single-tenant host looks like. Reverting the fix makes it fail with the same
missing-service exception review reported.
Refs #7972
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(auth)!: retire the legacy permission constants and duplicate descriptors
Completes the cutover started in #7980. Seven `<Module>Permissions` classes
holding `verb:resource` strings are removed: AIPermissions, ConsoleLogs,
Dashboard, ExternalAuthentication, OpenTelemetry, Secrets and StructuredLogs.
AIPermissions was not in #7982's list, which was written before the cutover
finished; it is dead by the same measure as the rest.
Removed rather than marked obsolete, which #7982 asked to be an explicit
decision. Every string these classes held carries two colons, so it does not
parse under the new grammar and authorizes nothing. Keeping them obsolete
would leave code that compiles, still reads as a permission check, and
silently grants no access -- a warning that is easy to suppress in front of a
runtime failure that is invisible. A compile error names the call site and
can be fixed against the migration guide's mapping table. Classes their own
modules still reference, WorkflowPermissions and IdentityPermissions among
them, are untouched.
External Authentication's parallel descriptor system is collapsed onto the
core types: its own PermissionDescriptor record, its IPermissionDescriptorProvider
and IPermissionDescriptorRegistry, and DefaultPermissionDescriptorRegistry.
That was not only tidiness. The module's registry was fed exclusively by its
legacy names, so after the cutover every well-formed grant failed the
`unknown_permission_descriptor` check and the warning fired constantly for
correct configuration. The resolver now consults the core catalog, which is
keyed by resource and lists the verbs each accepts, and a wildcard is treated
as advertised because it names a pattern rather than a resource to look up.
The descriptor endpoint serves the core catalog too: choosing what an
external mapping may confer means choosing from everything Elsa declares.
The module contributes its resource descriptors explicitly rather than
relying on the host's assembly scan, for the same reason it registers
AddElsaAuthorization itself.
The two naming tests now pin the new resource name instead of the legacy
string. The convention worth holding was always that the module is called
'diagnostics/console-logs', not that a retired constant kept its old value.
Refs #7982
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(client): match the permission descriptor client model to the catalog
Moving the descriptor endpoint onto the core catalog changed its shape from a
single permission string to a resource plus the verbs that resource accepts,
and the Refit client model kept the old one. It still deserialized and still
compiled, handing callers a blank Name and no way to reach the verbs -- the
data went missing without anything failing.
The client model now mirrors the served descriptor, and a contract test
compares the two property sets so the next divergence is a test failure
rather than an empty field. NonCoreVerbs is excluded: the server derives it
from SupportedVerbs, so a client holding the verbs can compute it.
Found by review, not by the suites: nothing here throws.
Refs #7982
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-auth)!: match permission grant boundaries as patterns
The deployment allow/deny boundary and the delegation authorizer compared
permission strings with ordinal equality, so under the {resource}:{verb}
vocabulary they could not see wildcards. A deny list naming
'workflows/*:delete' did not deny 'workflows/definitions:delete', and a grant
of 'workflows/*:delete' outflanked a deny naming that leaf.
The bypass was reachable. ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource passes a role's
permissions to the boundary verbatim, survivors land in the issued token as
permission claims, and PermissionEvaluator does expand wildcards there. So an
ordinary role plus a deny list was enough, on every external sign-in, with no
privileged actor involved. Restoring the ordinal boundary under the new tests
fails seven of them.
Deny is now matched in both directions, allow one-directionally, both through
PermissionMatcher. A grant that is not a well-formed permission is dropped
with a warning rather than carried into a token it cannot authorize anything
in.
Five non-endpoint checks -- delegation, role-reference removal, unsafe
settings confirmation, the recovery override and the boundary itself -- also
still compared against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions
constants. Those carry two colons, so Permission.TryParse rejects them and no
principal can hold one, while the migration guide tells operators to replace
exactly those strings. All five now route through IPermissionEvaluator, and
the module registers AddElsaAuthorization itself instead of depending on host
ordering.
Non-core verbs move to ExternalAuthenticationVerbs, declared beside the
resources they apply to so a delegation check cannot spell one differently
from the endpoint it guards.
Refs #7982
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: apply IDE code cleanup to the diagnostics and identity modules
Redundant namespace qualifiers and usings removed, and primary-constructor
and record syntax applied, across Elsa.Diagnostics.ConsoleLogs,
Elsa.Diagnostics.StructuredLogs, Elsa.Expressions.JavaScript and
Elsa.Identity. Produced by a solution-wide IDE cleanup that ran alongside the
authorization work; separated from it so the permission changes can be
reviewed on their own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(hosts): boot both hosts and assert their gated routes challenge
This repo runs two parallel feature systems, the classic Features/ path and
the CShells ShellFeatures/ path, and every module has to register in both.
Nothing exercised either. The unit and integration suites construct services
directly, so a module registered in one path and not the other, or a service
missing from one container, passes every test and fails only when a host
starts. Three bugs in #7980 were found by running these two hosts by hand,
two of them shell-versus-classic divergences.
Each host is booted through WebApplicationFactory, running its real Program
with full feature registration, and asked for a handful of routes it is
expected to serve behind a permission. A 404 means the module was never
registered, a 5xx means the endpoint was found but its dependencies could not
be constructed, and a 200 means no gate ran; only 401 passes. All routes are
reported together, so a feature system that stops registering a group of
modules reads as one failure rather than a queue of identical ones.
Removing AddExternalAuthenticationServices from the shell feature -- the
divergence this is built to catch -- fails the shell host on all five of its
routes while the classic host stays green.
The assertions go through HTTP rather than the container on purpose. The
hosts have different topologies: the classic host's root provider holds
everything and registers 125 routes, while CShells gives each shell its own
provider and mounts routes per shell, leaving 6 in the root. A container or
route-table assertion would have to encode that difference and would break
whenever CShells changed internally. Behaviour at the edge is host-agnostic,
and it is what actually has to match.
Each host gains a namespaced entry-point marker because both already declare
a Program in the global namespace, which a test project referencing both
cannot tell apart.
Coverage is off for this project: it references both hosts, so every module
either pulls in would enter its denominator without adding real coverage, and
coverlet cannot instrument a graph that size. TreatAsLocalProperty keeps CI's
/p:CollectCoverage=true from overriding that.
Refs #7982
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-auth)!: fail closed on an unparseable grant boundary
Two findings from review, both real.
The grant boundary parsed its allow and deny lists and silently dropped what
would not parse. An allow list of nothing but malformed entries therefore
reduced to an empty set, and an empty allow list means unrestricted -- so a
typo turned the boundary off entirely and let external grant sources put
permissions straight into issued tokens. The deny side had the mirror of it:
a malformed entry quietly stopped denying what it named.
A boundary that does not parse now admits nothing, and
ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator rejects the configuration at startup,
so the mistake reaches an operator rather than a token. Failing startup is
what makes the runtime behaviour safe to be strict about: it cannot be hit by
someone mid-edit, only by validation having been bypassed.
ConnectionEndpointSupport.HasPermission was a sixth ad-hoc permission check,
missed when the other five were converted. It compared claim values against
the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants at four call sites --
policy management on create and update, session revocation, and unsafe
settings confirmation -- and those constants carry two colons, so nothing can
hold one once a deployment follows the migration guide. It now routes through
IPermissionEvaluator like the rest, resolved from the request with a fallback
to the shared evaluator, the same way EndpointSecurity does it.
Refs #7982
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style(external-auth): filter permission patterns with Where
Addresses a review nit on ValidatePermissionPatterns. Behaviour is unchanged:
a null list still iterates nothing, only malformed entries are reported, and
the message text is identical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-auth)!: apply the grant boundary to role permissions too
Token issuance concatenated the user's Elsa role permissions raw alongside
the boundary-filtered external grants. A permission the boundary had just
excluded during grant resolution therefore reappeared in the issued token
from the same roles, which made the deny list unenforceable for anything a
role carried and left ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource filtering nothing that
was not added back a moment later. The bypass did not even need that grant
source configured: role permissions reached the token regardless of which
sources a connection selected.
Both origins now pass the same boundary. Re-applying it at issuance also
picks up a boundary that changed since sign-in, since refreshing reissues.
This is a behaviour change for deployments that configured a boundary
expecting it to bound only claim-mapped permissions: an external login may
now carry fewer permissions than before. Deployments with no boundary
configured, the default, are unaffected -- every well-formed permission
passes. The migration guide describes both directions.
Refs #7982
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Runs one suite unchanged against every implementation of IUserTaskRepository,
IUserTaskGuestSessionIssuer, and IUserTaskInvitationOutbox, plus a fault-injection
suite driving the real DefaultUserTaskManager and DefaultUserTaskInvitationService
against a real store. Gated providers report as skipped with a reason rather than
passing vacuously; ConformanceCoverageTests fails when a provider that must run is
unreachable or its variable is set but empty.
The suite found three defects, fixed here:
- VNextUserTaskRepository supplied no index values for WorkflowDefinitionId,
WorkflowInstanceId, ActivityInstanceId, CreatedAt, or CompletedAt, all declared by
its own schema provider, so every write through the VNext provider threw.
- The same provider resolved invitation token hashes by scanning on Status alone,
which matched no declared index, so anonymous invitation verification always threw.
- EFCoreUserTaskInvitationOutbox persisted the delivery recipient but never read it
back, so durably queued invitations reached the dispatcher with no address.
Also switches new ADRs to date-prefixed identifiers and generates doc/adr/toc.md via
scripts/adr/generate-toc.sh, with a --check mode and pull-request workflow so the
index is never hand-edited again.
* fix(user-tasks): let managers revoke a consumed guest invitation
Verification marks the winning invitation Consumed, which is what issues the
guest session — but RevokeAsync rejected Consumed and never touched sessions at
all. A manager therefore could not withdraw a live guest credential: it stayed
authorized until its TTL elapsed or the task closed. The invitations contract
specifies a revocable, task-scoped session, so this was a real gap.
RevokeAsync now accepts a consumed invitation, rejecting only the already
terminal Revoked and Expired states, and revokes the sessions that invitation
issued. Revocation is scoped to one invitation rather than the whole task, so
other guests keep working: UserTaskGuestSession carries its InvitationId and
IUserTaskGuestSessionIssuer gains RevokeForInvitationAsync, implemented for both
the in-memory and EF Core stores.
Reassignment already cut a guest off, because the policy requires the guest to
still be the assignee. That remains the recovery path for abandoned guest work;
this restores the documented direct revocation alongside it.
Adds three tests. The first fails against the previous behavior.
Reported by Greptile on #7955.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(user-tasks): make guest-session revocation fail closed and retryable
Greptile review of the previous commit found three real problems with it.
Revocation committed the invitation as Revoked before revoking its sessions, so
a session-store failure left a live credential behind a guard that rejected the
retry. Sessions are now swept before the terminal state is committed: a failure
commits nothing, leaves the invitation revocable, and a retry repairs it. A
retry against an already-revoked invitation is idempotently successful and
re-runs the sweep, so a caller repairing a partial failure is never told no.
Verification could also hand back a credential that outlived a concurrent
revoke: the manager's sweep ran before the session reached the store and found
nothing. VerifyAsync now re-reads the committed invitation after issuing and
withdraws the credential unless it is still the consumed one it verified.
Invitation-scoped revocation queried an unindexed column, so every revoke
scanned a growing tenant partition of retained session rows. Adds the
(TenantId, InvitationId) index to the EF model and migration, and advertises the
same index from the VNext schema provider.
Adds three tests covering the injected store failure, the idempotent retry, and
the revoke-during-verify race. RevokingAnAlreadyRevokedInvitationIsRefused
asserted the behavior this commit deliberately changes, so it is repurposed to
cover the refusal that remains: an unknown invitation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(user-tasks): sweep guest sessions on both sides of the revoke commit
Moving the sweep before the commit closed the fail-open failure path but opened
its mirror: a concurrent verification can issue a session after the sweep, still
read Consumed at its settled-state check because the revoke has not committed
yet, and hand back a credential that outlives a successful revoke.
Revocation now sweeps after the commit as well. Anything issued in that window
is caught by the second sweep, and any verification that issues after the commit
sees the revoked state at its own settled-state check and withdraws its own
credential. The first sweep still runs before the commit, so a session-store
failure commits nothing and stays retryable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds durable, identity-neutral, workflow-bound human tasks, and reconciles the
REST surface with the approved Studio contract.
- Flat summary/detail DTOs, a global capability descriptor, and workflow context
captured at activation.
- Scope is part of the list authorization predicate; manager decisions require
manage:user-tasks; a denied command answers 404 so it cannot prove a task exists.
- Guest sessions are task-scoped, action-allowlisted, and revoked when the task
closes. Invitations resolve by token hash through the repository, wait in a
Data Protection encrypted outbox, and are rate limited per caller.
- Masked form values are disclosed only through an audited reveal command.
- Store-specific concurrency failures are translated into a single
UserTaskRevisionConflictException, so a concurrent edit returns the documented
revision-conflict result behind any provider instead of a 500.
EF Core (SQLite, SQL Server, PostgreSQL, MySQL, Oracle) and VNext persistence,
hosted due/reconciliation/delivery workers, docs, and 49 tests.
Note: this branch also carries two commits inherited from its branch point that
are not part of User Tasks and are squashed in here — the revert-version
allocation change from #7917 (WorkflowDefinitionPublisher.RevertVersionAsync now
allocates from the last version rather than the latest) and an NU1903 package
pin. Merged deliberately rather than rebased out.
* feat(auth): add the permission model and evaluator (Phase 1)
Additive only. Nothing changes behavior: no endpoint declares against this
yet, and no existing enforcement path routes through it.
A permission is {resource}:{verb}, both axes open and string-keyed. A
trailing wildcard on the resource axis matches the named node and every
descendant at any depth, so workflows/definitions/* covers
workflows/definitions itself; * on the verb axis matches any verb.
Wildcards are the only construct with forward reach.
A bare * parses to *:* at parse time rather than being special-cased in
the evaluator, so superuser stays an ordinary grant and a stored or seeded
* keeps authorizing across the vocabulary migration without a lock-out
window.
Adds:
- Permission, with parsing that rejects a value containing a comma, since
the persistence converter joins collections with one
- CoreVerbs, the recommended set modules should reuse; a convention rather
than a closed vocabulary
- PermissionMatcher, one matching rule shape on both axes
- IPermissionEvaluator, the single place permission decisions are made,
skipping malformed claims so one bad stored grant cannot deny a principal
- PermissionRequirement and PermissionAuthorizationHandler
- The descriptor catalog in core: PermissionDescriptor now carries the
verbs a resource supports and marks non-core ones, and the registry can
report what a wildcard covers today
External Authentication keeps its own descriptor types for now; it moves to
the core catalog with the other modules in Phase 2, which keeps this change
purely additive.
55 unit tests cover the matcher table, wildcard forward reach, the
counterpart that concrete grants stay frozen, absence-is-denial, and the
seeded * case.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): contribute the permission catalog from every module (Phase 2)
Still additive. Existing endpoints keep their legacy declarations; nothing
changes behavior for them.
Every module exposing protected endpoints now declares its resources and
the verbs each accepts, following the pattern already proven in External
Authentication -- constants and descriptors colocated -- refined to one
constant per resource, with the verb supplied separately. 47 resources
across 15 modules, matching the settled vocabulary.
Descriptors are discovered from the same assemblies as a module's
endpoints, in AddFastEndpointsFromModule. Registering them per module
would let the catalog and the endpoints drift, which is the failure this
model exists to remove; tying them to one registration makes the catalog
necessarily describe the endpoints that exist.
Adds:
- GET /identity/permissions, the catalog a role editor renders from, so
no client hard-codes permission strings
- GET /identity/permissions/reach, reporting what a wildcard covers today.
This is the mitigation for forward reach on the resource axis: a
wildcard is useful precisely because it covers things that do not exist
yet, so an author needs to see what it reaches now
- GET /identity/me/permissions, resolving wildcards to concrete verbs so a
client needs no matching logic, and listing denied resources with an
empty verb list so "denied" is distinguishable from "unknown"
- IPermissionGrantValidator, wired into Roles/Create and Roles/Update,
which previously persisted request.Permissions after only the
caller-subset check. Concrete segments validate against the catalog;
wildcards validate structurally and are accepted even when they match
nothing today, since installing a module later is what gives such a
grant meaning
- RequirePermission(resource, verb) and RequireAuthenticatedOnly() on the
endpoint base classes, with the six copy-pasted ConfigurePermissions
bodies collapsed into one implementation
New endpoints require new-format grants, so during the transition they
authorize only for holders of *, which parses to *:*. Phase 3 migrates the
rest and closes that gap.
70 unit tests, including the wildcard-accepting validator cases.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth)!: cut every endpoint over to the permission model (Phase 3)
BREAKING: legacy permission strings no longer authorize. A permanent alias
layer would keep two vocabularies valid forever, so the break is
deliberate and reported rather than absorbed. `*` survives unchanged --
it parses to `*:*` -- so an administrator cannot be locked out while
roles are re-authored.
All 168 declaration call sites across 151 files now use
RequirePermission(resource, verb) with the constants their module
declares, so a typo is a compile error rather than an unreachable
endpoint.
Enforcement consolidated onto IPermissionEvaluator:
- RoleAuthorizationService evaluates containment through the evaluator
rather than by set membership. This matters: a caller holding
workflows/*:view can now delegate workflows/definitions:view, which set
membership got wrong and which would otherwise force administrators to
hold every concrete grant they wish to delegate.
- The two Broker/Logout.cs endpoints declare explicitly. Logout is
authenticated-only; ContinueLogout is anonymous, matching every other
broker callback -- the route handle carries the authority and a
top-level browser navigation sends no Authorization header.
Removes the C#/Python expression permissions (#7975). They conflated an
incoherent execution-side gate -- a workflow runs under the server's
authority, not the caller's, so the check never constrained what a script
could do -- with a meaningful authoring-side one. The host switch
(AllowHostCodeExecution) becomes the single control. This is a deliberate
reduction in control: where host code is enabled, any author who may write
definitions may use C# and Python.
Adds the fail-closed gate. Omitting a declaration previously inherited the
FastEndpoints default with no Elsa-level fallback, so an endpoint could
ship ungated unnoticed. EndpointCoverage asserts every endpoint declares
exactly one of RequirePermission, RequireAuthenticatedOnly or
AllowAnonymous, with no exemption list. Its canary assertion earned its
keep immediately by catching that the gate was scanning an assembly
containing no endpoints.
EndpointPermissionRegistry records what each endpoint declares. The
requirement is attached as an inline policy and is not readable back from
the definition, so this keeps the declaration introspectable -- and lets
tests assert a specific requirement rather than merely that one exists.
Two behavior notes worth calling out:
- The runtime status endpoint previously accepted either the read or the
manage permission. It now requires workflows/runtime:view alone, which
is least privilege; a role holding only control must also be granted
view to read status.
- BPMN interchange repeats the workflow-definitions path locally rather
than taking a dependency on Elsa.Workflows.Api for one constant. It
contributes no descriptor: the resource is owned and described by
Workflows.Api, and the registry keeps one entry per resource.
Also adds a startup validator that logs every stored role permission that
no longer resolves, identified by role, so an upgrade is loud.
188 unit tests pass across Api.Common, Workflows.Api and Identity.
Refs #7974, #7975, #7976
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): revocation bound and role audit notifications (Phase 4)
Default access-token lifetime drops from 1 hour to 15 minutes. This is
the revocation bound: permission claims are issued at sign-in and refresh
re-reads the user's roles, so removing a role takes effect at most one
access-token lifetime later. Refresh already rotates both tokens, so no
client change is required and the refresh lifetime is unchanged.
Adds an optional permission stamp for deployments needing a tighter
bound. The stamp is derived from the user's roles and their permissions
rather than stored as a counter on the user. That avoids changing the
Identity schema, which would have required migrations across all five EF
providers and made this milestone depend on the tenancy work. It also
means every node computes the same value from the same store with no
cross-node cache invalidation, which matters because Elsa has none.
The stamp is issued unconditionally and only validated when enabled, so
turning it on does not invalidate tokens already in flight; an absent
stamp is not treated as a mismatch for the same reason. It changes when a
role is added to or removed from the user and when a held role's
permissions change, but not when an unrelated role changes.
Role create and update now publish typed security notifications per ADR
0007, carrying the resulting grants so a reviewer can reconstruct what a
role conferred at a point in time without replaying every prior event.
This module owns no audit store: a future audit module subscribes and
sets its own retention.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): tenancy hardening for identity (Phase 5)
Closes the gaps that made "roles are configurable per tenant" untrue
however the rest of the stack behaved.
Uniqueness becomes per tenant. User.Name, Role.Name, Application.Name and
Application.ClientId carried globally unique indexes, so two tenants could
not both hold a role named Admin. Migrations for all five EF providers
drop the global indexes and create composite ones on (TenantId, Name).
The in-memory user and role stores now scope to the ambient tenant.
Isolation previously existed only on the Entity Framework path, and only
when multitenancy was enabled, so a deployment running the default stores
had none at all. The tenant-agnostic sentinel is honored, matching the EF
query filter, so a shared platform role stays visible from every tenant.
RoleFilter gains TenantId, matching UserFilter, and the role and user list
endpoints pass it explicitly rather than relying on an ambient filter that
only exists on one persistence path.
UserManager.CreateUserAsync sets TenantId explicitly instead of relying on
the EF saving handler, which does not run in memory and left users
unassigned there.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: migration guide, ADR, and security wiki for the authorization model
Adds docs/migrations/authorization-model.md, following the shape of the
external-authentication persistence guide. It leads with the three things
that are not a simple rename, because each silently produces a wrong
result if treated as one:
- The migration expands where new sub-resources are finer-grained than
what they replace, so a one-for-one substitution narrows roles.
- read:* and exec:* become materially more powerful. They are literal
claim values today, authorizing twelve of roughly forty read endpoints;
their replacements work as the names always implied. Any role holding
them needs review by hand, not an automated rewrite.
- The C#/Python expression permissions are removed rather than
translated, which is a deliberate reduction in control where host code
is enabled.
It also states plainly that `*` keeps working, and says to do that first,
since it is what stops an instance locking itself out mid-migration.
ADR 0012 records the model and, more usefully, why a closed verb
enumeration was drafted and rejected: it was justified on implication, but
aggregates were already excluded and no verb implies another, so the
bitwise check was expressing set containment all along.
The security wiki's API Authorization section replaces its Secrets-only
route table with the catalog endpoint as the authoritative source, and
states why read-only mode is a separate axis rather than a permission.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(auth): restore the suites after the tenancy and evaluator changes
The whole solution builds with zero errors and every affected suite
passes: 70 Api.Common, 23 Workflows.Api, 95 Identity, 154 External
Authentication unit, 133 External Authentication integration.
Most breakage was test call sites constructing the tenant-aware stores
and the evaluator-backed RoleAuthorizationService directly. Adds
TestTenantAccessor to Elsa.Testing.Shared rather than giving the
production constructors an optional accessor, which would have let a
missing registration silently disable isolation.
Several External Authentication tests created fixtures in tenant-a while
running under the default tenant, so the newly isolating store correctly
stopped finding them. They are now scoped to the tenant their own
fixtures use; JustInTimeProvisioningTests, which genuinely spans two
tenants, is scoped per case.
One production fix came out of it: IdentityFeature now ensures an
ITenantAccessor with TryAdd. The identity stores are tenant-scoped, so a
host that never enables multitenancy would otherwise fail to construct
them -- which is what the DI registration tests were reporting. TryAdd
leaves MultitenancyFeature's own registration untouched.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): register the identity services on the classic feature path
Found by running Elsa.Server.Web, not by the test suites: the app failed
at startup with "Unable to resolve service for type RoleSecurityNotifier
while attempting to activate Roles.Update".
RoleSecurityNotifier, the permission stamp services, the memory cache and
the stored-permission validator were registered only in the CShells shell
feature. Elsa.Server.Web uses the classic UseIdentity() path, whose
IdentityFeature registered none of them, so every host on that path
crashed while mapping endpoints. Unit tests did not catch it because they
construct services directly rather than through either feature.
Verified end to end against the running server:
- The seeded admin role stores "*". It parsed to *:* and resolved to
concrete verbs across all 27 registered resources, which is the
bare-wildcard parse rule working on real data rather than in a test.
- GET /identity/permissions returns the catalog for the modules this app
installs -- 27 resources, 0 unverified, categories Dashboard, Identity,
Resilience and Workflows -- rather than all 47, which is correct: the
catalog describes what is installed.
- GET /identity/permissions/reach?resource=workflows/* reports 19 covered
resources.
- A role holding only dashboard:view gets 200 on /dashboard/overview and
403 on /identity/roles, /identity/users, /workflow-definitions and
/identity/permissions, while /identity/me/permissions returns 200
because it declares RequireAuthenticatedOnly -- confirming FR-019's
third declaration state behaves as designed.
- That same principal's /me/permissions lists all 27 resources with 26
carrying an empty verb list, so "denied" stays distinguishable from
"unknown to this server".
- The startup validator logged no unresolvable permissions, as expected
for a seed holding only "*".
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): discover permission descriptors on the shell host path
Found by running Elsa.ModularServer.Web. The shell host started cleanly
and authorized correctly, but GET /identity/permissions returned zero
resources and /identity/me/permissions returned no grants.
Descriptor discovery was wired into AddFastEndpointsFromModule, which only
the classic module path calls. CShells discovers endpoints from features
implementing its own marker interface, so on a shell host no provider was
ever registered. Authorization still worked, because the evaluator reads
claims and needs no descriptors -- which is exactly why nothing failed
loudly. What silently broke was everything built on the catalog: role
authoring would have rejected every concrete grant as an unknown
resource, introspection returned nothing for clients to render, and the
stored-permission validator would have reported every concrete stored
permission as unresolvable.
ElsaFastEndpointsFeature now contributes descriptors from the loaded Elsa
assemblies, bounded to those and run once per shell.
Verified on the modular host, which installs far more modules than
Elsa.Server.Web:
- 47 resources registered, 0 unverified, across all 12 categories, with
all 17 module-specific verbs present. That is the entire published
vocabulary confirmed against a running server rather than a document.
- Reach reports workflows/* covering 20, external-authentication/*
covering 8, and * covering 47.
- Creating a role with dashboard:view and workflows/*:view succeeds,
confirming a wildcard grant survives authoring validation.
- Creating one with invented/resource:view and secrets:publish is
rejected with 400.
Also makes those rejections actionable. The permission was reported
without the reason, so an operator learned which entry was wrong but not
why; both parts are now in the message, including the supported verbs for
the resource.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* wip: bpmn test vocabulary
* fix(auth): make enforcement DI-independent and finish the hub cutover
CI on #7980 was red. Running the full suite locally rather than the
subset I had been checking surfaced 24 failures across four projects,
in three distinct classes.
Enforcement no longer depends on a DI registration. RequirePermission
attached a PermissionRequirement evaluated by a registered handler, so a
host that had not called AddElsaAuthorization got 403 on every endpoint
with nothing to indicate why. Several test hosts wire FastEndpoints
directly and did exactly that. The requirement is now evaluated inline
against a shared stateless evaluator, with a host-registered
IPermissionEvaluator still taking precedence. Registration remains
worthwhile for the catalog and the validator; authorization can no longer
silently fail closed because of a missing one.
Registration also moved from AddFastEndpointsFromModule to
AddFastEndpointsAssembly. Registering an endpoint assembly is what should
guarantee its permissions work, and a host may never call the former.
Finishes T039. The four SignalR hubs still matched hard-coded legacy
permission strings, which no longer exist, so every hub denied access.
They now route through the evaluator like every other enforcement path.
Test fixtures granting legacy strings were updated to the new vocabulary.
Two categories were deliberately left alone: naming tests asserting the
legacy constants still hold their old values, which is true and worth
keeping, and the workflow script authorization tests, which asserted a
MissingPermission outcome that D21 removed -- those now assert the host
switch is the only control.
One test previously pinned that the hub honors a FastEndpoints-configured
permissions claim type. It now asserts the opposite, and says why: Elsa is
the only authority that expands roles into permission claims (ADR 0009),
and this model no longer uses the FastEndpoints permission mechanism, so
its separately configurable claim type is not consulted. That property is
also unreadable outside reflection.
Whole solution builds with 0 errors and every test project passes.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): scope the permission-stamp cache to the tenant
Greptile found and reproduced a cross-tenant authorization bug, and it was
mine: Phase 5 made user names unique per tenant rather than globally, but
PermissionStampValidator kept caching by user name alone. Tenant A's
lookup could therefore populate the cache with its own stamp and satisfy a
revoked token belonging to a same-named user in tenant B, without ever
resolving tenant B's user.
Both the cache key and the user lookup are now tenant-scoped. Added
PermissionStampValidatorTests, including the cross-tenant case; verified it
fails without the fix and passes with it.
Also from review:
- Removed the legacy permission constants left unused in the three hubs
after they moved to the evaluator, so no stale vocabulary lingers.
- Narrowed two generic catch clauses. The IL scanner now catches only the
exceptions an unresolvable metadata token actually throws, and the
startup validator rethrows cancellation while still refusing to stop the
host for anything else -- an unreachable or half-migrated store is
exactly when an operator most needs the host up.
Whole solution builds with 0 errors and every test project passes.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(docs): correct path in log message for authorization model migration link
Aligns the log message path to the correct documentation directory, changing `docs` to `doc` to avoid confusion and incorrect linking during log output.
* fix(auth): update permissions method to use new syntax
* docs: consolidate docs/ into doc/
The repository had two documentation roots. Merge docs/ into doc/ and
remove the empty docs/ tree.
The two adr/ folders both numbered from 0001, so the identity and
authorization series is renumbered to continue the core series rather
than collide with it:
docs/adr/0001-0012 -> doc/adr/0014-0025
Every reference is updated to match: the Status cross-links between the
renumbered ADRs, the ADR and path links in specs/012-external-authentication
and specs/013-rbac-authorization-model, and doc/wiki/identity-tenancy-security.md.
doc/adr/toc.md gains entries 14-25. doc/adr/graph.dot is regenerated out
to 25; it had been stale since ADR 10 and now also carries the partial
supersession edges declared by the ADRs themselves.
docs/codebase/ and docs/migrations/ move across unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(auth): simplify syntax in PermissionEvaluator and related classes
Streamlined syntax for method definitions by using expression-bodied members and simplified object instantiations across the Authorization module. This includes adjustments in `PermissionEvaluator`, `LocalHostRequirement`, and `WebApplicationExtensions` for better readability and maintainability.
* ci(bounty): point the footer step at the file's real path
The bounty workflow read docs/bounty-footer.md, the path the file had
when the workflow was added in b421b00e1. The file later moved to
doc/bounty/bounty-footer.md and the workflow was never updated, so the
read step has been resolving nothing and the appended comment was empty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backport to release/3.8.0 so Elsa.Api.Client 3.8.0-rc2 exposes the
Resources/OutputConverters surface that Elsa Studio's release/3.8.0 branch
already consumes. Without it, Studio cannot build against a released client:
it was green against 3.8.0-preview.5397 (built from main) and broke when its
pin moved to 3.8.0-rc1 (built from this branch).
(cherry picked from commit d698e6b005)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`dotnet test test/unit/Elsa.Resilience.Core.UnitTests` exited 1 on a clean
checkout with all 56 tests passing. The failure was the coverlet gate, not a
test: the project pinned `<Threshold>49</Threshold>` against 48.17% measured
line coverage in Debug. Release measures slightly differently and cleared it,
so CI (which builds `--configuration Release`) stayed green while every local
run — Debug is the default — went red. A red exit for a suite that passes
trains people to ignore exit codes.
Rather than move the goalposts, cover the code. The gap was concentrated in
`ResilientActivityInvoker`, which had no tests at all, plus the serializer,
the activity-execution extensions and the retry telemetry listener.
`Elsa.Testing.Shared`'s `ActivityTestFixture` was already referenced here and
builds a real `ActivityExecutionContext`, which is what all of them needed.
Adds 40 tests. The invoker ones drive a real zero-delay Polly retry pipeline,
so the telemetry listener is exercised through the actual Polly path rather
than being called directly: pass-through when no strategy is configured, the
applied strategy recorded on the context, retry-then-succeed, one record per
retry carrying identifiers and details, null details dropped, the retries flag
and attempt count, exhausted retries rethrowing, and an unhandled exception
type not being retried. The extensions tests build a three-level context chain
to pin down that the retries flag propagates up the ancestor chain and not
down.
Line coverage goes 48.17% -> 98.17% in Debug and 97.8% in Release; the five
lines still uncovered are defensive early-returns. The threshold moves to 90,
below the lower of the two configurations with enough headroom that the
Debug/Release delta cannot straddle it again. Verified by deleting the invoker
tests once: coverage falls to 68.97% and the gate fails as it should.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Module.Apply() enumerated _features.Values directly while calling
feature.Apply(). A feature whose Apply() introduces another feature —
Module.Configure<T>() directly, or via a helper such as AddActivity<T>()
which configures WorkflowManagementFeature — mutated that collection
mid-enumeration and threw "Collection was modified; enumeration
operation may not execute", naming nothing about features. Whether it
fired depended on whether the other feature happened to be installed
already, so a module built or did not based on unrelated host config.
The module already treats introduction-during-apply as supported: the
ConfigureFeature loop iterates a snapshot for exactly this reason, and
Configure<T>() has an _isApplying branch that creates, resolves and
configures a feature introduced mid-Apply. Only the final apply loop
missed the same treatment, so make it tolerant rather than diagnose a
constraint the code does not hold.
The apply loop now runs in rounds until no new features appear, each
round topologically sorted so a late feature's dependencies apply before
it. Hosted services are registered in a single pass after that loop,
then moved back to the index the block previously occupied: registering
late is needed so features contributed during Apply() are included and
ordered by priority, while keeping the position matters because features
register hosted services directly from Apply() — WorkflowRuntimeFeature
adds DrainOrchestratorHostedService that way — and module-managed
services must keep starting first, or a priority such as ActivateTenants
at -1 would silently start ordering after them.
Adds Elsa.Features.UnitTests, covering the introduced feature applying,
a three-deep introduction chain, dependency ordering, hosted service
registration and priority ordering for late arrivals, the installed-
feature registry, and no double-apply, plus guards for pre-existing
ordering behaviour.
Closes#7944
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both tests read a value that is usually one thing and occasionally
another, with a race deciding which.
ReloadTests: EndpointSecurityOptions.SecurityIsEnabled is a process-
global static, and ShellsApiTestBase saved/set/restored it per test
method. ReloadTests and ReloadAllTests carry no [Collection], so xUnit
runs them in parallel. FastEndpoints reads that global once per host
while UseFastEndpoints() configures the endpoints, so when one class's
DisposeAsync restores true inside another class's set-false ->
UseFastEndpoints() window, that host's endpoints get authorization
metadata in a pipeline with no UseAuthorization, and every request to
them throws. Every test in the assembly wants security off, so set it
once in a module initializer and stop mutating it per test.
PublishEvent_WithPayload_TransmitsPayloadToConsumer: the payload's
representation is not stable. While it is still the original CLR object
its properties are PascalCase; once it has been through
JsonWorkflowStateSerializer it is an ExpandoObject whose keys were
camelCased by that serializer's naming policy. Which one the test sees
depends on whether GetSingleWorkflowInstanceAsync returned the live
in-memory instance or one read back from the store, and TryGetProperty
is case-sensitive. Assert the payload's content through a DTO with
PropertyNameCaseInsensitive instead of one of the two representations.
Also require a terminal instance at both exits of
GetSingleWorkflowInstanceAsync: it accepted any save, and an instance is
saved several times over its lifetime, so it could hand a caller that
asserts Finished an instance that is still running.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A container that schedules a child and then decides the child must not run
had no way to withdraw it. `IActivityScheduler` exposed no removal operation,
and `CancelActivityAsync` no-opped on a context whose status was `Pending`,
so a container could tear a branch down and still have an activity from that
branch execute afterwards, side effects and all. Fixes#7943.
- `IActivityScheduler.RemoveWhere` removes work items and keeps the order the
survivors would have been taken in; implemented in both the FIFO and LIFO
schedulers.
- `CancelActivityAsync` (both the public extension and the internal one used
when a container completes) cancels `Pending` contexts as well as running
ones, and withdraws the work item that would have started the cancelled
activity plus the items it had scheduled for children with no context yet.
Withdrawal is a real removal rather than a terminal status honoured at dequeue
time, because the scheduler is also read: `Flowchart.HasPendingWork` inspects
it to decide whether it may complete, and the work item list is extracted into
the persisted workflow state — a withdrawn-but-queued item would be persisted
and rehydrated with a fresh context after a suspend/resume.
`StateMachine` had hand-rolled the same operation to drop competing triggers by
clearing the scheduler and re-scheduling everything else; it now calls
`RemoveWhere`. `Elsa.Bpmn` no longer needs to refuse a teardown whose subtree
still has queued work, so `BpmnWorkTeardown` drops the `NotSupportedException`
and records the teardown reason on the torn-down activity's journal instead.
BREAKING: `IActivityScheduler` gains a member; external implementations must
add `RemoveWhere`.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(bpmn): add Analyze/Import/Export endpoints to Elsa.Bpmn.Interchange
Thin FastEndpoints wrappers over Bpmn.Interchange, sharing one
BpmnInterchangeDocumentService so Analyze and Import can never disagree
about what a document costs. Import surfaces capability refusal
(BpmnCapabilityRequirements.Analyze, walked into nested processes) with
the missing capability and offending element ids, and reuses
BpmnWorkBinder to bind the root BpmnProcess scope. Export re-reads the
original XML persisted alongside the workflow definition and re-runs it
through BpmnXmlWriter, so retained extension elements, foreign
attributes and BPMN DI layout survive the round trip without being
reconstructed from the reduced Elsa activity graph.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(bpmn): make a stale BPMN export refuse instead of mislead
Export now refuses with 422 (naming the reason) when a workflow definition's
BPMN source is missing or no longer matches the definition's version, rather
than exporting stale or absent content while reporting success. Import
records the definition's version alongside the source XML so Export can
detect drift caused by a later save replacing custom properties wholesale.
Also: the interchange package now consumes the runtime host's declared
capability set from a new public Elsa.Bpmn.Hosting.BpmnRuntimeCapabilities
instead of restating it (one value, one home); the Import endpoint's
capability-refusal message no longer misattributes driving elements across
capabilities; the three BPMN REST endpoints get HTTP-level test coverage
(multipart validation, exception-to-status-code mapping, permission gating);
and the wiki documents the endpoints and Export's known limitation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(bpmn): alert when the library defines a capability Elsa does not declare
Restores the deleted comparison between BpmnRuntimeCapabilities.Declared (ours)
and BpmnHostCapabilities.Full (the library's) — these are two different
constants, not the tautology the earlier deletion assumed. The pinned
Bpmn.Semantics 0.1.1-preview.19 currently defines exactly the four flags Elsa
declares, so capability refusal at import/build is wired but unreachable; this
test is what will say the moment a library bump changes that, and its failure
message names the decision (implement and declare, or leave undeclared on
purpose) rather than just failing silently.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(bpmn): return 400 for a malformed export version and clarify a partial-import refusal
- Export/Endpoint.cs: a non-numeric or out-of-range VersionOptions query value now returns a
400 naming the offending value instead of throwing through FromString and bubbling into a 500.
- BpmnInterchangeDocumentService: the message shown when a definition carries BPMN source but not
its version marker (a second save that never completed after ImportAsync's first) now says so
explicitly, distinct from "never imported" and "stale".
- BpmnInterchangeDocumentService: replace the implicit filter in EnsureCapabilitiesSatisfied's
foreach with an explicit .Where(...), same behaviour.
- Test projects: extract the duplicated ReadAsset/Path.Combine helper in
BpmnInterchangeTestBase and BpmnInterchangeEndpointTests into a single BpmnAssetReader, guarded
against a rooted or nested file name.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(bpmn): write both BPMN import markers in one save
Move the BPMN source XML off the pre-import model and onto the same
explicit save that already records the definition's version, so a
failed or cancelled post-import save leaves neither custom property
behind instead of a partial, undiagnosable state. Update
BpmnAssetReader to use Path.Join instead of Path.Combine so its
rooted/nested-name guard is defence-in-depth rather than the only
thing standing between the code and a wrong path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(runtime): let a trigger index payloads under per-payload stimulus names
TriggerIndexingContext.TriggerName is a single field read once after all
payloads have been collected, so one ITrigger could only ever register its
payloads under one stimulus name. An implementation that assigned the name
more than once - which the stimulus extension methods do as a side effect -
had the last write applied to every row, and since Hash derives from the same
name, the earlier payloads were stored under a hash no publisher computes.
Adds an additive, opt-in path: a payload returned from GetTriggerPayloadsAsync
may be wrapped in NamedTriggerPayload, which carries the stimulus name for that
payload alone. The indexer takes name and payload from the same source, so
Hash always matches the Name stored beside it, and the wrapper is unwrapped
before storage so payload consumers (validators, the trigger diff comparer,
the scheduler) see the payload the trigger produced.
TriggerName keeps its existing meaning as the default for payloads that do not
carry their own, so every existing ITrigger indexes identically: same Name,
same Hash, same Payload, same row count. The empty-payload placeholder row is
left alone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(runtime): refuse a nested trigger payload wrapper
NamedTriggerPayload documented that its Payload is never itself a
wrapper, but nothing enforced it. Reject a NamedTriggerPayload whose
payload is another NamedTriggerPayload at construction time, matching
the existing guard against a blank name.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(bpmn): bind BPMN work declarations to Elsa activities
Turns the reader's BpmnWorkBinding declarations into the activity nodes a
BpmnProcess scope runs. Six of the seven kinds bind automatically: TimerWait to
Delay, MessageWait/SignalWait to Event, MessagePublish to PublishEvent,
CallProcess to DispatchWorkflow, NestedProcess to a nested BpmnProcess. The
seventh, UnboundTask, is an authoring decision and is read from a new elsa:
vendor extension inside the document, so an exported .bpmn is self-contained.
Every binding for a scope is bound whatever its slot, so a ScopeListener needs
no special case. Each binding gets its own freshly built activity with a
scope-qualified id: ActivityVisitor skips an activity it has already collected,
so one instance shared between two scopes would leave the second scope with no
child in Elsa's identity graph.
The binder lives in Elsa.Bpmn.Interchange because BpmnWorkBinding is a
Bpmn.Interchange type; binding it in Elsa.Bpmn would pull the interchange
library into the execution module's closure, which is the split D12 draws.
Every ambiguity resolves loudly: an unbound task, a dead binding declaration, a
malformed ISO-8601 duration, a call activity with nothing to call, and an
activity type nothing registered all refuse at bind time rather than producing a
process that runs to completion doing none of what the document says.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(bpmn): declare document variables on the bound scope, refuse duplicate input names
BpmnWorkBinder.BindScope never copied BpmnProcessDefinition.Variables onto the
produced BpmnProcess's Elsa Variables, so a document-declared collection variable
was Absent to IBpmnVariableReader and a collection-mode multi-instance over it
faulted the element instead of running once per item. BindScope now declares an
Elsa Variable for each document variable, seeding the declared default as the
JsonElement it already is.
BpmnActivityBindingFormat.Read silently let a second <elsa:input name="..."> with
a duplicate name overwrite the first rather than refusing it, unlike every other
malformed-document case this binder already refuses. It now throws
BpmnBindingException naming the binding and the duplicated input, and the XML doc
now states that rule plus the (verified) XML text-node escaping that already
applies to input JSON.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(bpmn): carry every declared activity input through the binding format
BpmnActivityBindingFormat.Write only found properties whose CLR type derives
from Input, silently dropping attribute-declared inputs like Switch.Cases from
an export. Read accepted any <elsa:input name="..."> without checking the
activity declares it, so a mistyped or stale name imported silently with the
configuration missing since Elsa's deserializer ignores unknown members. Both
now go through IActivityDescriber.GetInputProperties, the same enumeration
ActivityDescriptor.Inputs is built from, so Write and Read agree on what an
activity's inputs are and Read refuses a name that enumeration does not
report.
Also makes BpmnWorkBinder.RefuseUnusedDeclarations filter its loop explicitly
with .Where(...) instead of an implicit if, per static analysis.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(bpmn): filter undeclared input names explicitly
Express the undeclared-input-name check as an explicit Where filter
instead of an implicit filter inside the loop body, and report every
undeclared name at once rather than only the first. Also fix the
refusal message, which previously named the activity type twice.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(bpmn): describe the input payload shape accurately
The XML doc on BpmnActivityBindingFormat claimed every <elsa:input> is the
{"typeName":...,"expression":...} wrapper a stored workflow definition uses.
That only holds for Input<T>-typed properties: an [Input]-attributed
plain-typed property such as Switch.Cases is serialized as its own JSON
shape (an array), not the wrapper, which Write already does correctly and
the round-trip test already covers. Correct the doc to describe the payload
as the configured activity serializer's output for that input, dependent on
how the activity declares it, and add a second short example showing the
attribute-declared shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(bpmn): scope variables, trigger opt-out and composability for BpmnProcess
Completes the container W2 left minimal, with the four things it deferred.
Scope variables. BpmnScopeVariables implements IBpmnVariableReader over the
scope's memory register, walking outward so an inner scope sees the enclosing
one's data, and BpmnScopeHost now declares ScopeVariables and hands the reader
to every snapshot. The read is three-valued: false for a name nothing in scope
declares, Null for a declared variable holding nothing, and StoredExternally
for a value JSON cannot carry.
That last case deviates from the issue, deliberately. The issue names the
unmaterialized-driver case, which is not detectable from the container's side:
PersistentVariablesMiddleware loads with no excludeTags, and
VariablePersistenceManager marks a block IsInitialized before testing the
exclusion, so a variable whose driver was never read is indistinguishable from
one whose driver returned null. Closing that needs a change to
Elsa.Workflows.Core, which is out of bounds here, so the reader answers only
what the block actually says and the XML doc records why. The route it does
have is real and in the same spirit: a value the host holds and cannot put on
the wire faults loudly rather than reading as an empty collection.
Trigger opt-out. BpmnProcess.IsRootScope names the BPMN meaning of Elsa's
CanStartWorkflow rather than adding a second flag that could disagree with the
gate TriggerIndexer actually reads. It is off unless something says otherwise,
and the applier refuses to start a BpmnProcess that claims root position as
another scope's work: the damage a mis-flagged subprocess does happens at
publish time, so repairing the object graph at runtime would leave the trigger
registered while every test went green. ITrigger itself remains #7929.
Composability and outcomes. A BpmnProcess in a Flowchart runs and the flowchart
carries on (D11), and a nested transaction completing Cancelled reaches its
parent's completion callback with that outcome intact, which is the only reason
the parent routes the cancel boundary rather than the ordinary sequence flow.
Every guard was mutation-tested red before green: both non-Present answers of
the reader, the reader left unwired, the opt-out's default flipped (7 tests red,
including the pre-existing nested-scope ones), the refusal removed, and the
outcome dropped at each end of the trip to the parent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(bpmn): apply review findings on scope variables, command batching, and outcome doc
Read a scope variable through Elsa's configured serializer (via IPayloadSerializer,
serialized against the value's own runtime type so a polymorphic value is not wrapped
in Elsa's type-tagged envelope) instead of bare JsonSerializerDefaults, so a value only
Elsa's converters can carry no longer collapses to StoredExternally. Refuse a root-scope
StartWork before any command in the batch is applied, not mid-list, so a refusal cannot
leave scope memory partially mutated under ContinueWithIncidentsStrategy. Document that
BpmnProcess completes with only its interpreter outcome, so a default/null-port
Flowchart connection never fires from it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(bpmn): filter the pre-scan explicitly
Use commands.OfType<BpmnHostCommand.StartWork>() in ApplyAsync's
root-scope pre-scan instead of a foreach + type-check, matching the
static analysis suggestion. The apply loop below is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings the 3.8.0 release line into main, including the package-manifest
runtime-kind mechanism (src/PackageManifest.props + src/PackageManifestHints.cs)
that main did not have. All 72 manifest-producing packages now declare
compatibility.runtimeKinds = ["elsa.server"]; the two Bpmn modules added on
main pick this up automatically via their ShellFeatures directory.
Conflict resolutions:
- .specify/feature.json, CONTEXT.md, ROADMAP.md, build/_build.csproj: took
main's, which is newer in every case. Verified byte-identical to main
afterwards, so nothing from the release branch was dropped.
- NuGet.Config: union of package sources, minus valence-consolelogstream-feedz.
main removed that feed deliberately in 7389e0a67 and now consumes
ConsoleLogStreaming 1.1.0 from nuget.org.
- Elsa.sln: union of main's Bpmn projects and the release branch's
ExternalAuthentication projects; the two sets are disjoint.
Reverted an unintended revert:
release/3.8.0 had lost commit 33181b2c9 ("test: cover Oracle bulk upsert SQL
generation") through an evil merge in c557c455a. That commit is present at the
merge base, so git resolved the release branch's older content as an
intentional change and would have silently undone it on main. It is three
coupled pieces:
- test/unit/Elsa.Persistence.EFCore.UnitTests (deleted, plus its Elsa.sln
project declaration and NestedProjects entry)
- InternalsVisibleTo("Elsa.Persistence.EFCore.UnitTests")
- the fix itself in BulkUpsertExtensions.GenerateOracleUpsert: internal
visibility, ISqlGenerationHelper.DelimitIdentifier quoting, and explicit
CAST(... AS NVARCHAR2(...)) on string columns
Dropping the third would have been an Oracle runtime regression: unquoted
identifiers lose case, and ODP.NET binds .NET strings as VARCHAR2 while Elsa's
Oracle migrations declare NVARCHAR2, causing a datatype mismatch. Merge base
and main are identical for that file and every hunk on the release side is a
revert plus cosmetics, so main's version was kept in full.
Accepted deliberate release-branch changes, verified as real refactors rather
than losses: AI EF Core migrations moved into the provider projects
(5c0d8b0f4), and AIPersistenceFeature.cs renamed to
EFCoreAIPersistenceShellFeatureBase.cs (ShellFeatures/ still present, so
manifest generation is unaffected).
Verified: dotnet build Elsa.sln succeeds with 0 errors and 2 pre-existing
NU1903 warnings; Elsa.Persistence.EFCore.UnitTests passes 1/1; all 72 emitted
manifests declare elsa.server and Elsa.Api.Common emits none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(bpmn): host-side applier for the Bpmn.Semantics port
Translates the interpreter's three host commands onto ActivityExecutionContext
and feeds its four entry points, plus the minimum BpmnProcess container needed
to exercise them end to end through IWorkflowRunner.
StartWork schedules the bound activity, CancelWorkSubtree calls the public
CancelActivityAsync extension (already recursive), and SignalEnclosingScope
sends a BpmnScopeSignal up the ancestor chain. OnWorkFaulted rides the
FaultSignal seam: it asks the interpreter what BPMN made of the fault and calls
StopPropagation only on a Caught disposition, leaving a Propagated one strictly
alone so an enclosing scope or the incident strategy takes it.
A unit of work is keyed on the child ActivityExecutionContext.Id, recorded in
the scope's own persisted ledger, never on Tag: the completion-callback dispatch
rewrites the receiving context's Tag, so a nested scope wears a different tag
than its parent remembers it by. Interpreter correlation travels on the child's
context rather than on the shared activity instance.
Evaluations go through one queue per workflow instance, so a scope signalled
mid-apply is drained after the command list rather than re-entering the
interpreter. Commands are applied in the order returned.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(bpmn): cover the teardown refusal path
Adds a focused unit test that drives BpmnWorkTeardown.CancelSubtreeAsync
into the NotSupportedException branch by constructing a real context tree
with a scheduled-but-not-invoked descendant, so a regression that silently
drops the detection is caught. Also records why BpmnWorkLedger's
append-only, handle-keyed Records list cannot strand a context on a
duplicate StartWork for a live (BindingRef, IterationId) slot, a case the
port's own guarantee makes unreachable from this applier.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(bpmn): keep a refused teardown from stranding ledger state
A subtree cancellation refused with NotSupportedException is absorbed
into an incident under ContinueWithIncidentsStrategy rather than
crashing, so the end-of-command ledger save was being skipped and the
persisted ledger kept claiming work BPMN had just torn down. Save the
ledger removal before the possible throw instead of after, so a later
completion callback for the stranded activity finds no live record and
is discarded instead of being fed to the interpreter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(bpmn): guard against Elsa.Bpmn* reimplementing Bpmn.* library types
Adds a reflection-based architecture test asserting no type under Elsa.Bpmn
or Elsa.Bpmn.Interchange shares a type name with Bpmn.Model/Bpmn.Semantics
(and Bpmn.Interchange for the interchange assembly), plus a positive check
that both assemblies still depend on their respective library packages -
closing the gap that let elsa-foundation grow a parallel BpmnElement/BpmnGraph
semantics core undetected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(bpmn): move the library-duplication guard to the interchange test project
Elsa.Bpmn.UnitTests referencing Elsa.Bpmn.Interchange (plus three
redundant PackageReferences already flowing transitively) inverted the
layering the guard exists to protect. Elsa.Bpmn.Interchange.UnitTests
already sees both assemblies transitively with no new references, so
the guard moves there unchanged apart from namespace and doc. Also
drops the silent null-forgive on Assembly.GetName().Name in favor of
an explained fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(bpmn): drop the dependency-direction assertions the compiler already enforces
Mutation testing showed AssertDependsOnPackage and the two positive facts using
it can never go red: any state that would trip them fails the test project's
build first (CS0234), because the guard's own typeof bindings already require
the Bpmn.* packages. Delete the decorative facts and the now-unused helper,
and document that the typeof bindings are load-bearing on purpose.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(bpmn): prove the duplication detector actually detects
Split AssertNoTypeNameCollisions into a thin assertion wrapper around a
new FindTypeNameCollisions helper, and add a fact that points the
detector at the test assembly (which carries a deliberately colliding
BpmnGraph fixture) so CI sees the guard fail as well as pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the valence-works/bpmn package feed and pins Bpmn.Model,
Bpmn.Semantics and Bpmn.Interchange at 0.1.1-preview.19, then wires
two new module projects consuming those libraries without
reimplementing anything they provide (D12): Elsa.Bpmn for BPMN
execution and Elsa.Bpmn.Interchange for XML import/export, kept as a
separate package so hosts that only execute BPMN don't take the XML
reader. Both are marked IsPackable=false until the Bpmn.* packages
are published to nuget.org. Test projects are added for both, unit
and integration, and all four are wired into Elsa.sln so PR CI
discovers and runs them. This unblocks #7925 and the rest of the
BPMN runtime work in #7909.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(core): a fault a container claimed is not an incident (#7911)
RecoverFromFault reset the counts and the status but left behind the two other
things Fault recorded: the ActivityIncident and the exception. So a container
that successfully handled a child's fault still left the workflow carrying an
incident.
That is not cosmetic. Code reads a non-empty WorkflowExecutionContext.Incidents
as "this workflow failed" without looking further; HttpWorkflowsMiddleware is
one, and it hands the caller a fault response. A workflow whose container caught
the error and finished normally was reported to its caller as failed.
RecoverFromFault is now the inverse of Fault: it removes the incident Fault
appended, matched on this activity's node id and most recent first so an
activity that faults, recovers and faults again keeps the incident that was
never recovered, and it clears the recorded exception so the activity does not
sit in Running carrying one.
The execution log still records the failure, so nothing is hidden from anyone
reading the journal. Two integration assertions that encoded the old behaviour
are updated; they were written from the reasoning this change corrects.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(core): tie an incident to the execution that raised it, not its node
Recovery matched the incident to remove on ActivityNodeId, which identifies the
static workflow node rather than an execution of it. A node inside a loop,
retried, or run concurrently raises one incident per execution, all under the
same node id, so recovering one execution could remove another's incident and
leave its own behind.
ActivityIncident now carries the ActivityInstanceId of the execution that raised
it, and recovery matches on that. Within a single execution the most recent is
still taken, so fault, recover, fault again keeps the incident that was never
recovered. The property is optional: an incident recorded against the workflow
itself has no execution, and so do incidents persisted before this existed.
Caught by review on #7923.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api-client): mirror ActivityInstanceId on the client incident model
The server model gained the property in the previous commit and the API client
carries a hand-maintained copy of it. Left alone, a client deserializing an
incident would silently drop the only field that says which execution raised it.
Also records two consequences of recovery that were implicit: it relies on the
incident collection preserving insertion order to pick an execution's newest
incident, which holds only because the collection is list-backed; and clearing
the exception also clears it from the activity's execution record, which is
intended for the same reason the incident goes, with the journal keeping the
evidence either way.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A container activity had no way to learn that one of its children faulted.
ExceptionHandlingMiddleware caught the exception, called context.Fault(e) and
handed off to the workflow-global IIncidentStrategy; the container's completion
callback never fired, because the child never completed.
Add a seam on the ancestor-bubbling signal channel that already exists:
- FaultSignal(Exception, ActivityExecutionContext), beside CancelSignal. Its XML
doc carries the contract, including why a handler must not call
RecoverFromFault and why the CompleteActivityAsync sweep is a backstop rather
than the mechanism.
- An internal bool-returning TrySendSignalAsync, since SignalContext
.StopPropagationRequested is internal and SendSignalAsync reported nothing.
SendSignalAsync keeps its public signature and delegates to it.
- ExceptionHandlingMiddleware sends the signal after faulting and, when an
ancestor stops propagation, calls RecoverFromFault once and returns instead of
raising an incident.
RecoverFromFault now transitions to Running only when the activity is still
Faulted. It is called after the handler runs, so the unconditional transition
would otherwise undo a handler that cancelled or completed the faulted child.
The counts are still reset unconditionally, and the one pre-existing caller is
unaffected.
Behavior is unchanged when nobody handles the signal: verified by running the
new unhandled-fault theory against the pre-change middleware, and by
IncidentStrategyTests and Primitives/FaultTests passing unmodified.
Refs #7911
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a new `Elsa.Http.Webhooks` module, enabling workflows to receive incoming webhook events and dispatch outgoing webhooks. This integrates the WebhooksCore library.
Further improvements include:
- Enhanced validation for configured application instance names, providing clearer feedback, especially regarding Azure Service Bus entity name limits.
- Improved API error reporting for shell reload operations, distinguishing between blueprint not found (404) and other failures (503).
- Updated release announcement rendering to dynamically reference the correct major.minor release line for feedback messages.
Use the same structural and secret-binding assessment for management, discovery, and initiation so incomplete overrides are never advertised as available sign-in methods.
Sipke Schoorstra