* fix(external-auth): keep the default-roles guard when an update omits the policy
A PUT that omitted unlinkedPolicy hit ValidatePolicyAsync's null-policy early
return before the PolicyDefaultRoles guard, so an actor holding only
connections:update could clear a stored create-user policy and silently drop
its default-role assignments (refs #7977, #7992). The candidate role set is
now computed before the early return -- empty when the policy is omitted --
so clearing, adding, or switching a policy all count as changing default
roles. The cheap permission check also runs before the registry-backed role
comparison, so the common permitted path skips building the registry.
Adds integration coverage for the omitted-policy transition in both
directions and for clearing a policy that assigns no roles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(external-auth): dispose the request message in PutConnectionAsync
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(external-auth)!: require a permission to author policy default roles
Setting the defaultRoleIds of an unlinked-identity policy was guarded only by
the subset rule -- you could not grant roles carrying permissions you did not
hold -- so any actor able to edit a connection could decide what auto-created
users receive. The permission named for that decision,
external-authentication/policies/default-roles:update, was enforced in one
place: removing policy references while deleting a role.
The asymmetry is what makes this look like a check that was never wired
rather than a deliberate carve-out. Its sibling, policies:update, is already
enforced on the write path at both the create and update sites, through the
same RequiresPolicyManagement condition that covers the very policy the roles
live inside.
Demonstrated rather than argued: with the guard stubbed out, a caller holding
only connections:create and policies:update creates a connection whose policy
assigns "workflow-user", and the response is 201. The subset rule does not
object, because it answers a different question -- it prevents escalation, not
delegation of the decision.
The two checks are now reported independently for that reason. The permission
asks whether this actor may decide default roles at all; the subset rule asks
whether these particular roles stay inside what they already hold. It applies
only when roles are actually being set, so clearing the list, or a policy that
assigns none, needs nothing extra.
Breaking for roles holding the legacy policies:manage but not roles:assign
that set default roles today. Anyone who held roles:assign already maps to the
new permission and is unaffected. Documented in the migration guide.
Closes#7977
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-auth): gate default roles on the set changing, not on it existing
Review reproduced the over-reach through the real endpoints: validation runs
on every update, on enabling a connection, and on read-only validate, so
keying the permission off default roles being present meant that once anyone
set them, an administrator without the permission could no longer edit an
unrelated field on that connection, enable it, or validate it.
The permission now applies when the set changes -- adding, removing, or
clearing all count as deciding what auto-created users receive; leaving a
stored set alone does not. Order is not treated as meaningful, so reordering
is not a change.
The test that was supposed to cover this asserted only that a message was
absent, which passes for any failure response and made it vacuous exactly
when it mattered: it passed with the over-reach still in place, because the
request was failing 405 on the wrong verb. It now uses PUT and asserts
success, and reverting the fix makes it fail with the 400 review described.
Refs #7977
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-auth): treat abandoning a create-user policy as a role change
The permission check sat inside the create-user branch, so it only ran when
the candidate policy still created users. Switching a stored fallback to one
that does not -- 'reject', or match-user with a different noMatchAction --
skipped it entirely and dropped the policy's automatic role assignments
without the permission that governs them. Review reproduced it.
The effective default roles of a policy that does not create users are none,
so computing that first and comparing outside the branch makes abandonment a
change like any other. The subset rule stays inside the branch, because it
only has something to say about roles actually being assigned.
The new test expresses abandonment through noMatchAction rather than the
policy type, since the fixture's registry only knows match-user. Re-scoping
the check to create-user candidates makes it fail with OK instead of the
expected BadRequest, which is the bypass.
Refs #7977
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-auth): take the default-role baseline from the registry
A configuration-owned connection has no database row, so comparing against
the store alone made its configured default roles look newly assigned on
every validation. Validation needs only connections:view, so a caller with
exactly that could not validate such a connection at all -- review
reproduced it.
The baseline now comes from the registry, which answers for both ownerships
and is the question actually being asked: what does this connection assign
today. The store remains a fallback for a record the registry does not know.
The new test gives the fixture's configuration connection an unlinked policy
with default roles and validates it as a view-only caller. Reverting to the
store-only baseline makes it fail with the permission error, which is the
symptom review described.
Refs #7977
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(auth)!: retire the legacy permission constants and duplicate descriptors
Completes the cutover started in #7980. Seven `<Module>Permissions` classes
holding `verb:resource` strings are removed: AIPermissions, ConsoleLogs,
Dashboard, ExternalAuthentication, OpenTelemetry, Secrets and StructuredLogs.
AIPermissions was not in #7982's list, which was written before the cutover
finished; it is dead by the same measure as the rest.
Removed rather than marked obsolete, which #7982 asked to be an explicit
decision. Every string these classes held carries two colons, so it does not
parse under the new grammar and authorizes nothing. Keeping them obsolete
would leave code that compiles, still reads as a permission check, and
silently grants no access -- a warning that is easy to suppress in front of a
runtime failure that is invisible. A compile error names the call site and
can be fixed against the migration guide's mapping table. Classes their own
modules still reference, WorkflowPermissions and IdentityPermissions among
them, are untouched.
External Authentication's parallel descriptor system is collapsed onto the
core types: its own PermissionDescriptor record, its IPermissionDescriptorProvider
and IPermissionDescriptorRegistry, and DefaultPermissionDescriptorRegistry.
That was not only tidiness. The module's registry was fed exclusively by its
legacy names, so after the cutover every well-formed grant failed the
`unknown_permission_descriptor` check and the warning fired constantly for
correct configuration. The resolver now consults the core catalog, which is
keyed by resource and lists the verbs each accepts, and a wildcard is treated
as advertised because it names a pattern rather than a resource to look up.
The descriptor endpoint serves the core catalog too: choosing what an
external mapping may confer means choosing from everything Elsa declares.
The module contributes its resource descriptors explicitly rather than
relying on the host's assembly scan, for the same reason it registers
AddElsaAuthorization itself.
The two naming tests now pin the new resource name instead of the legacy
string. The convention worth holding was always that the module is called
'diagnostics/console-logs', not that a retired constant kept its old value.
Refs #7982
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(client): match the permission descriptor client model to the catalog
Moving the descriptor endpoint onto the core catalog changed its shape from a
single permission string to a resource plus the verbs that resource accepts,
and the Refit client model kept the old one. It still deserialized and still
compiled, handing callers a blank Name and no way to reach the verbs -- the
data went missing without anything failing.
The client model now mirrors the served descriptor, and a contract test
compares the two property sets so the next divergence is a test failure
rather than an empty field. NonCoreVerbs is excluded: the server derives it
from SupportedVerbs, so a client holding the verbs can compute it.
Found by review, not by the suites: nothing here throws.
Refs #7982
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-auth)!: match permission grant boundaries as patterns
The deployment allow/deny boundary and the delegation authorizer compared
permission strings with ordinal equality, so under the {resource}:{verb}
vocabulary they could not see wildcards. A deny list naming
'workflows/*:delete' did not deny 'workflows/definitions:delete', and a grant
of 'workflows/*:delete' outflanked a deny naming that leaf.
The bypass was reachable. ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource passes a role's
permissions to the boundary verbatim, survivors land in the issued token as
permission claims, and PermissionEvaluator does expand wildcards there. So an
ordinary role plus a deny list was enough, on every external sign-in, with no
privileged actor involved. Restoring the ordinal boundary under the new tests
fails seven of them.
Deny is now matched in both directions, allow one-directionally, both through
PermissionMatcher. A grant that is not a well-formed permission is dropped
with a warning rather than carried into a token it cannot authorize anything
in.
Five non-endpoint checks -- delegation, role-reference removal, unsafe
settings confirmation, the recovery override and the boundary itself -- also
still compared against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions
constants. Those carry two colons, so Permission.TryParse rejects them and no
principal can hold one, while the migration guide tells operators to replace
exactly those strings. All five now route through IPermissionEvaluator, and
the module registers AddElsaAuthorization itself instead of depending on host
ordering.
Non-core verbs move to ExternalAuthenticationVerbs, declared beside the
resources they apply to so a delegation check cannot spell one differently
from the endpoint it guards.
Refs #7982
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: apply IDE code cleanup to the diagnostics and identity modules
Redundant namespace qualifiers and usings removed, and primary-constructor
and record syntax applied, across Elsa.Diagnostics.ConsoleLogs,
Elsa.Diagnostics.StructuredLogs, Elsa.Expressions.JavaScript and
Elsa.Identity. Produced by a solution-wide IDE cleanup that ran alongside the
authorization work; separated from it so the permission changes can be
reviewed on their own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(hosts): boot both hosts and assert their gated routes challenge
This repo runs two parallel feature systems, the classic Features/ path and
the CShells ShellFeatures/ path, and every module has to register in both.
Nothing exercised either. The unit and integration suites construct services
directly, so a module registered in one path and not the other, or a service
missing from one container, passes every test and fails only when a host
starts. Three bugs in #7980 were found by running these two hosts by hand,
two of them shell-versus-classic divergences.
Each host is booted through WebApplicationFactory, running its real Program
with full feature registration, and asked for a handful of routes it is
expected to serve behind a permission. A 404 means the module was never
registered, a 5xx means the endpoint was found but its dependencies could not
be constructed, and a 200 means no gate ran; only 401 passes. All routes are
reported together, so a feature system that stops registering a group of
modules reads as one failure rather than a queue of identical ones.
Removing AddExternalAuthenticationServices from the shell feature -- the
divergence this is built to catch -- fails the shell host on all five of its
routes while the classic host stays green.
The assertions go through HTTP rather than the container on purpose. The
hosts have different topologies: the classic host's root provider holds
everything and registers 125 routes, while CShells gives each shell its own
provider and mounts routes per shell, leaving 6 in the root. A container or
route-table assertion would have to encode that difference and would break
whenever CShells changed internally. Behaviour at the edge is host-agnostic,
and it is what actually has to match.
Each host gains a namespaced entry-point marker because both already declare
a Program in the global namespace, which a test project referencing both
cannot tell apart.
Coverage is off for this project: it references both hosts, so every module
either pulls in would enter its denominator without adding real coverage, and
coverlet cannot instrument a graph that size. TreatAsLocalProperty keeps CI's
/p:CollectCoverage=true from overriding that.
Refs #7982
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-auth)!: fail closed on an unparseable grant boundary
Two findings from review, both real.
The grant boundary parsed its allow and deny lists and silently dropped what
would not parse. An allow list of nothing but malformed entries therefore
reduced to an empty set, and an empty allow list means unrestricted -- so a
typo turned the boundary off entirely and let external grant sources put
permissions straight into issued tokens. The deny side had the mirror of it:
a malformed entry quietly stopped denying what it named.
A boundary that does not parse now admits nothing, and
ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator rejects the configuration at startup,
so the mistake reaches an operator rather than a token. Failing startup is
what makes the runtime behaviour safe to be strict about: it cannot be hit by
someone mid-edit, only by validation having been bypassed.
ConnectionEndpointSupport.HasPermission was a sixth ad-hoc permission check,
missed when the other five were converted. It compared claim values against
the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants at four call sites --
policy management on create and update, session revocation, and unsafe
settings confirmation -- and those constants carry two colons, so nothing can
hold one once a deployment follows the migration guide. It now routes through
IPermissionEvaluator like the rest, resolved from the request with a fallback
to the shared evaluator, the same way EndpointSecurity does it.
Refs #7982
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style(external-auth): filter permission patterns with Where
Addresses a review nit on ValidatePermissionPatterns. Behaviour is unchanged:
a null list still iterates nothing, only malformed entries are reported, and
the message text is identical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external-auth)!: apply the grant boundary to role permissions too
Token issuance concatenated the user's Elsa role permissions raw alongside
the boundary-filtered external grants. A permission the boundary had just
excluded during grant resolution therefore reappeared in the issued token
from the same roles, which made the deny list unenforceable for anything a
role carried and left ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource filtering nothing that
was not added back a moment later. The bypass did not even need that grant
source configured: role permissions reached the token regardless of which
sources a connection selected.
Both origins now pass the same boundary. Re-applying it at issuance also
picks up a boundary that changed since sign-in, since refreshing reissues.
This is a behaviour change for deployments that configured a boundary
expecting it to bound only claim-mapped permissions: an external login may
now carry fewer permissions than before. Deployments with no boundary
configured, the default, are unaffected -- every well-formed permission
passes. The migration guide describes both directions.
Refs #7982
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): add the permission model and evaluator (Phase 1)
Additive only. Nothing changes behavior: no endpoint declares against this
yet, and no existing enforcement path routes through it.
A permission is {resource}:{verb}, both axes open and string-keyed. A
trailing wildcard on the resource axis matches the named node and every
descendant at any depth, so workflows/definitions/* covers
workflows/definitions itself; * on the verb axis matches any verb.
Wildcards are the only construct with forward reach.
A bare * parses to *:* at parse time rather than being special-cased in
the evaluator, so superuser stays an ordinary grant and a stored or seeded
* keeps authorizing across the vocabulary migration without a lock-out
window.
Adds:
- Permission, with parsing that rejects a value containing a comma, since
the persistence converter joins collections with one
- CoreVerbs, the recommended set modules should reuse; a convention rather
than a closed vocabulary
- PermissionMatcher, one matching rule shape on both axes
- IPermissionEvaluator, the single place permission decisions are made,
skipping malformed claims so one bad stored grant cannot deny a principal
- PermissionRequirement and PermissionAuthorizationHandler
- The descriptor catalog in core: PermissionDescriptor now carries the
verbs a resource supports and marks non-core ones, and the registry can
report what a wildcard covers today
External Authentication keeps its own descriptor types for now; it moves to
the core catalog with the other modules in Phase 2, which keeps this change
purely additive.
55 unit tests cover the matcher table, wildcard forward reach, the
counterpart that concrete grants stay frozen, absence-is-denial, and the
seeded * case.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): contribute the permission catalog from every module (Phase 2)
Still additive. Existing endpoints keep their legacy declarations; nothing
changes behavior for them.
Every module exposing protected endpoints now declares its resources and
the verbs each accepts, following the pattern already proven in External
Authentication -- constants and descriptors colocated -- refined to one
constant per resource, with the verb supplied separately. 47 resources
across 15 modules, matching the settled vocabulary.
Descriptors are discovered from the same assemblies as a module's
endpoints, in AddFastEndpointsFromModule. Registering them per module
would let the catalog and the endpoints drift, which is the failure this
model exists to remove; tying them to one registration makes the catalog
necessarily describe the endpoints that exist.
Adds:
- GET /identity/permissions, the catalog a role editor renders from, so
no client hard-codes permission strings
- GET /identity/permissions/reach, reporting what a wildcard covers today.
This is the mitigation for forward reach on the resource axis: a
wildcard is useful precisely because it covers things that do not exist
yet, so an author needs to see what it reaches now
- GET /identity/me/permissions, resolving wildcards to concrete verbs so a
client needs no matching logic, and listing denied resources with an
empty verb list so "denied" is distinguishable from "unknown"
- IPermissionGrantValidator, wired into Roles/Create and Roles/Update,
which previously persisted request.Permissions after only the
caller-subset check. Concrete segments validate against the catalog;
wildcards validate structurally and are accepted even when they match
nothing today, since installing a module later is what gives such a
grant meaning
- RequirePermission(resource, verb) and RequireAuthenticatedOnly() on the
endpoint base classes, with the six copy-pasted ConfigurePermissions
bodies collapsed into one implementation
New endpoints require new-format grants, so during the transition they
authorize only for holders of *, which parses to *:*. Phase 3 migrates the
rest and closes that gap.
70 unit tests, including the wildcard-accepting validator cases.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth)!: cut every endpoint over to the permission model (Phase 3)
BREAKING: legacy permission strings no longer authorize. A permanent alias
layer would keep two vocabularies valid forever, so the break is
deliberate and reported rather than absorbed. `*` survives unchanged --
it parses to `*:*` -- so an administrator cannot be locked out while
roles are re-authored.
All 168 declaration call sites across 151 files now use
RequirePermission(resource, verb) with the constants their module
declares, so a typo is a compile error rather than an unreachable
endpoint.
Enforcement consolidated onto IPermissionEvaluator:
- RoleAuthorizationService evaluates containment through the evaluator
rather than by set membership. This matters: a caller holding
workflows/*:view can now delegate workflows/definitions:view, which set
membership got wrong and which would otherwise force administrators to
hold every concrete grant they wish to delegate.
- The two Broker/Logout.cs endpoints declare explicitly. Logout is
authenticated-only; ContinueLogout is anonymous, matching every other
broker callback -- the route handle carries the authority and a
top-level browser navigation sends no Authorization header.
Removes the C#/Python expression permissions (#7975). They conflated an
incoherent execution-side gate -- a workflow runs under the server's
authority, not the caller's, so the check never constrained what a script
could do -- with a meaningful authoring-side one. The host switch
(AllowHostCodeExecution) becomes the single control. This is a deliberate
reduction in control: where host code is enabled, any author who may write
definitions may use C# and Python.
Adds the fail-closed gate. Omitting a declaration previously inherited the
FastEndpoints default with no Elsa-level fallback, so an endpoint could
ship ungated unnoticed. EndpointCoverage asserts every endpoint declares
exactly one of RequirePermission, RequireAuthenticatedOnly or
AllowAnonymous, with no exemption list. Its canary assertion earned its
keep immediately by catching that the gate was scanning an assembly
containing no endpoints.
EndpointPermissionRegistry records what each endpoint declares. The
requirement is attached as an inline policy and is not readable back from
the definition, so this keeps the declaration introspectable -- and lets
tests assert a specific requirement rather than merely that one exists.
Two behavior notes worth calling out:
- The runtime status endpoint previously accepted either the read or the
manage permission. It now requires workflows/runtime:view alone, which
is least privilege; a role holding only control must also be granted
view to read status.
- BPMN interchange repeats the workflow-definitions path locally rather
than taking a dependency on Elsa.Workflows.Api for one constant. It
contributes no descriptor: the resource is owned and described by
Workflows.Api, and the registry keeps one entry per resource.
Also adds a startup validator that logs every stored role permission that
no longer resolves, identified by role, so an upgrade is loud.
188 unit tests pass across Api.Common, Workflows.Api and Identity.
Refs #7974, #7975, #7976
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): revocation bound and role audit notifications (Phase 4)
Default access-token lifetime drops from 1 hour to 15 minutes. This is
the revocation bound: permission claims are issued at sign-in and refresh
re-reads the user's roles, so removing a role takes effect at most one
access-token lifetime later. Refresh already rotates both tokens, so no
client change is required and the refresh lifetime is unchanged.
Adds an optional permission stamp for deployments needing a tighter
bound. The stamp is derived from the user's roles and their permissions
rather than stored as a counter on the user. That avoids changing the
Identity schema, which would have required migrations across all five EF
providers and made this milestone depend on the tenancy work. It also
means every node computes the same value from the same store with no
cross-node cache invalidation, which matters because Elsa has none.
The stamp is issued unconditionally and only validated when enabled, so
turning it on does not invalidate tokens already in flight; an absent
stamp is not treated as a mismatch for the same reason. It changes when a
role is added to or removed from the user and when a held role's
permissions change, but not when an unrelated role changes.
Role create and update now publish typed security notifications per ADR
0007, carrying the resulting grants so a reviewer can reconstruct what a
role conferred at a point in time without replaying every prior event.
This module owns no audit store: a future audit module subscribes and
sets its own retention.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): tenancy hardening for identity (Phase 5)
Closes the gaps that made "roles are configurable per tenant" untrue
however the rest of the stack behaved.
Uniqueness becomes per tenant. User.Name, Role.Name, Application.Name and
Application.ClientId carried globally unique indexes, so two tenants could
not both hold a role named Admin. Migrations for all five EF providers
drop the global indexes and create composite ones on (TenantId, Name).
The in-memory user and role stores now scope to the ambient tenant.
Isolation previously existed only on the Entity Framework path, and only
when multitenancy was enabled, so a deployment running the default stores
had none at all. The tenant-agnostic sentinel is honored, matching the EF
query filter, so a shared platform role stays visible from every tenant.
RoleFilter gains TenantId, matching UserFilter, and the role and user list
endpoints pass it explicitly rather than relying on an ambient filter that
only exists on one persistence path.
UserManager.CreateUserAsync sets TenantId explicitly instead of relying on
the EF saving handler, which does not run in memory and left users
unassigned there.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: migration guide, ADR, and security wiki for the authorization model
Adds docs/migrations/authorization-model.md, following the shape of the
external-authentication persistence guide. It leads with the three things
that are not a simple rename, because each silently produces a wrong
result if treated as one:
- The migration expands where new sub-resources are finer-grained than
what they replace, so a one-for-one substitution narrows roles.
- read:* and exec:* become materially more powerful. They are literal
claim values today, authorizing twelve of roughly forty read endpoints;
their replacements work as the names always implied. Any role holding
them needs review by hand, not an automated rewrite.
- The C#/Python expression permissions are removed rather than
translated, which is a deliberate reduction in control where host code
is enabled.
It also states plainly that `*` keeps working, and says to do that first,
since it is what stops an instance locking itself out mid-migration.
ADR 0012 records the model and, more usefully, why a closed verb
enumeration was drafted and rejected: it was justified on implication, but
aggregates were already excluded and no verb implies another, so the
bitwise check was expressing set containment all along.
The security wiki's API Authorization section replaces its Secrets-only
route table with the catalog endpoint as the authoritative source, and
states why read-only mode is a separate axis rather than a permission.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(auth): restore the suites after the tenancy and evaluator changes
The whole solution builds with zero errors and every affected suite
passes: 70 Api.Common, 23 Workflows.Api, 95 Identity, 154 External
Authentication unit, 133 External Authentication integration.
Most breakage was test call sites constructing the tenant-aware stores
and the evaluator-backed RoleAuthorizationService directly. Adds
TestTenantAccessor to Elsa.Testing.Shared rather than giving the
production constructors an optional accessor, which would have let a
missing registration silently disable isolation.
Several External Authentication tests created fixtures in tenant-a while
running under the default tenant, so the newly isolating store correctly
stopped finding them. They are now scoped to the tenant their own
fixtures use; JustInTimeProvisioningTests, which genuinely spans two
tenants, is scoped per case.
One production fix came out of it: IdentityFeature now ensures an
ITenantAccessor with TryAdd. The identity stores are tenant-scoped, so a
host that never enables multitenancy would otherwise fail to construct
them -- which is what the DI registration tests were reporting. TryAdd
leaves MultitenancyFeature's own registration untouched.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): register the identity services on the classic feature path
Found by running Elsa.Server.Web, not by the test suites: the app failed
at startup with "Unable to resolve service for type RoleSecurityNotifier
while attempting to activate Roles.Update".
RoleSecurityNotifier, the permission stamp services, the memory cache and
the stored-permission validator were registered only in the CShells shell
feature. Elsa.Server.Web uses the classic UseIdentity() path, whose
IdentityFeature registered none of them, so every host on that path
crashed while mapping endpoints. Unit tests did not catch it because they
construct services directly rather than through either feature.
Verified end to end against the running server:
- The seeded admin role stores "*". It parsed to *:* and resolved to
concrete verbs across all 27 registered resources, which is the
bare-wildcard parse rule working on real data rather than in a test.
- GET /identity/permissions returns the catalog for the modules this app
installs -- 27 resources, 0 unverified, categories Dashboard, Identity,
Resilience and Workflows -- rather than all 47, which is correct: the
catalog describes what is installed.
- GET /identity/permissions/reach?resource=workflows/* reports 19 covered
resources.
- A role holding only dashboard:view gets 200 on /dashboard/overview and
403 on /identity/roles, /identity/users, /workflow-definitions and
/identity/permissions, while /identity/me/permissions returns 200
because it declares RequireAuthenticatedOnly -- confirming FR-019's
third declaration state behaves as designed.
- That same principal's /me/permissions lists all 27 resources with 26
carrying an empty verb list, so "denied" stays distinguishable from
"unknown to this server".
- The startup validator logged no unresolvable permissions, as expected
for a seed holding only "*".
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): discover permission descriptors on the shell host path
Found by running Elsa.ModularServer.Web. The shell host started cleanly
and authorized correctly, but GET /identity/permissions returned zero
resources and /identity/me/permissions returned no grants.
Descriptor discovery was wired into AddFastEndpointsFromModule, which only
the classic module path calls. CShells discovers endpoints from features
implementing its own marker interface, so on a shell host no provider was
ever registered. Authorization still worked, because the evaluator reads
claims and needs no descriptors -- which is exactly why nothing failed
loudly. What silently broke was everything built on the catalog: role
authoring would have rejected every concrete grant as an unknown
resource, introspection returned nothing for clients to render, and the
stored-permission validator would have reported every concrete stored
permission as unresolvable.
ElsaFastEndpointsFeature now contributes descriptors from the loaded Elsa
assemblies, bounded to those and run once per shell.
Verified on the modular host, which installs far more modules than
Elsa.Server.Web:
- 47 resources registered, 0 unverified, across all 12 categories, with
all 17 module-specific verbs present. That is the entire published
vocabulary confirmed against a running server rather than a document.
- Reach reports workflows/* covering 20, external-authentication/*
covering 8, and * covering 47.
- Creating a role with dashboard:view and workflows/*:view succeeds,
confirming a wildcard grant survives authoring validation.
- Creating one with invented/resource:view and secrets:publish is
rejected with 400.
Also makes those rejections actionable. The permission was reported
without the reason, so an operator learned which entry was wrong but not
why; both parts are now in the message, including the supported verbs for
the resource.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* wip: bpmn test vocabulary
* fix(auth): make enforcement DI-independent and finish the hub cutover
CI on #7980 was red. Running the full suite locally rather than the
subset I had been checking surfaced 24 failures across four projects,
in three distinct classes.
Enforcement no longer depends on a DI registration. RequirePermission
attached a PermissionRequirement evaluated by a registered handler, so a
host that had not called AddElsaAuthorization got 403 on every endpoint
with nothing to indicate why. Several test hosts wire FastEndpoints
directly and did exactly that. The requirement is now evaluated inline
against a shared stateless evaluator, with a host-registered
IPermissionEvaluator still taking precedence. Registration remains
worthwhile for the catalog and the validator; authorization can no longer
silently fail closed because of a missing one.
Registration also moved from AddFastEndpointsFromModule to
AddFastEndpointsAssembly. Registering an endpoint assembly is what should
guarantee its permissions work, and a host may never call the former.
Finishes T039. The four SignalR hubs still matched hard-coded legacy
permission strings, which no longer exist, so every hub denied access.
They now route through the evaluator like every other enforcement path.
Test fixtures granting legacy strings were updated to the new vocabulary.
Two categories were deliberately left alone: naming tests asserting the
legacy constants still hold their old values, which is true and worth
keeping, and the workflow script authorization tests, which asserted a
MissingPermission outcome that D21 removed -- those now assert the host
switch is the only control.
One test previously pinned that the hub honors a FastEndpoints-configured
permissions claim type. It now asserts the opposite, and says why: Elsa is
the only authority that expands roles into permission claims (ADR 0009),
and this model no longer uses the FastEndpoints permission mechanism, so
its separately configurable claim type is not consulted. That property is
also unreadable outside reflection.
Whole solution builds with 0 errors and every test project passes.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): scope the permission-stamp cache to the tenant
Greptile found and reproduced a cross-tenant authorization bug, and it was
mine: Phase 5 made user names unique per tenant rather than globally, but
PermissionStampValidator kept caching by user name alone. Tenant A's
lookup could therefore populate the cache with its own stamp and satisfy a
revoked token belonging to a same-named user in tenant B, without ever
resolving tenant B's user.
Both the cache key and the user lookup are now tenant-scoped. Added
PermissionStampValidatorTests, including the cross-tenant case; verified it
fails without the fix and passes with it.
Also from review:
- Removed the legacy permission constants left unused in the three hubs
after they moved to the evaluator, so no stale vocabulary lingers.
- Narrowed two generic catch clauses. The IL scanner now catches only the
exceptions an unresolvable metadata token actually throws, and the
startup validator rethrows cancellation while still refusing to stop the
host for anything else -- an unreachable or half-migrated store is
exactly when an operator most needs the host up.
Whole solution builds with 0 errors and every test project passes.
Refs #7974
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(docs): correct path in log message for authorization model migration link
Aligns the log message path to the correct documentation directory, changing `docs` to `doc` to avoid confusion and incorrect linking during log output.
* fix(auth): update permissions method to use new syntax
* docs: consolidate docs/ into doc/
The repository had two documentation roots. Merge docs/ into doc/ and
remove the empty docs/ tree.
The two adr/ folders both numbered from 0001, so the identity and
authorization series is renumbered to continue the core series rather
than collide with it:
docs/adr/0001-0012 -> doc/adr/0014-0025
Every reference is updated to match: the Status cross-links between the
renumbered ADRs, the ADR and path links in specs/012-external-authentication
and specs/013-rbac-authorization-model, and doc/wiki/identity-tenancy-security.md.
doc/adr/toc.md gains entries 14-25. doc/adr/graph.dot is regenerated out
to 25; it had been stale since ADR 10 and now also carries the partial
supersession edges declared by the ADRs themselves.
docs/codebase/ and docs/migrations/ move across unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(auth): simplify syntax in PermissionEvaluator and related classes
Streamlined syntax for method definitions by using expression-bodied members and simplified object instantiations across the Authorization module. This includes adjustments in `PermissionEvaluator`, `LocalHostRequirement`, and `WebApplicationExtensions` for better readability and maintainability.
* ci(bounty): point the footer step at the file's real path
The bounty workflow read docs/bounty-footer.md, the path the file had
when the workflow was added in b421b00e1. The file later moved to
doc/bounty/bounty-footer.md and the workflow was never updated, so the
read step has been resolving nothing and the appended comment was empty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ContinueLogout was unreachable and, once reached, produced no response.
Two independent defects, both of which had to be fixed for the endpoint
to work at all.
Authorization. The endpoint declared neither a permission nor
AllowAnonymous, so it inherited the FastEndpoints default and required an
authenticated caller. It cannot ever satisfy that: the broker revokes the
session before issuing the continuation handle, and the endpoint is
reached by a top-level browser navigation, which sends no Authorization
header -- the only transport Elsa authentication uses. Every other broker
endpoint the browser is navigated to is already AllowAnonymous for the
same reason. The single-use, hashed route handle carries the authority.
Response. The handler wrote to HttpContext.Response directly rather than
through the Send API, so the response never started and the FastEndpoints
auto-response overwrote the status with 204. Both branches were affected:
the redirect to the provider's end-session endpoint and the 400 for an
unknown handle were each discarded, so a caller received 204 No Content
either way. Now mirrors CompleteLogout, using Send.RedirectAsync and
BrokerEndpointSupport.SendErrorAsync.
Logout, in the same file, also relies on an inherited default, but there
the default is correct: it reads the external session id from the
principal, so it needs an identity and no permission. Left as-is with a
comment; an explicit authenticated-only declaration arrives with the
authorization model work.
Adds LogoutAuthorizationTests, which builds a host with authorization
enforced and no principal injected -- the existing broker fixture injects
one and disables endpoint security, so it could not catch either defect.
Verified failing before the change (401, then 204) and passing after.
Fixes#7976
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: stop two silent serialization and test-isolation traps
Two follow-ups from #7957.
ExternalAuthentication tests: the same process-global
EndpointSecurityOptions.SecurityIsEnabled race the shells API tests had,
across the six classes in that assembly that build an endpoint host —
five setting it to false and IdentityLinkAuthorizationTests to true.
Unlike the shells case these all call UseAuthorization(), so it does not
surface as a missing-middleware error: anonymous endpoints answer
401/403, and the authorization test's endpoints come back AllowAnonymous
and stop enforcing what it asserts. A module initializer cannot fix it
since the assembly genuinely needs both values, so the six now share one
collection with DisableParallelization. They are also the only six that
build a host, so nothing else can observe a leaked value.
Unaliased payloads: a payload whose type has no registered serialization
alias is written without a _type discriminator and read back as an
ExpandoObject whose keys carry the state serializer's camel-case naming
policy, so a consumer that published Status finds status. The
degradation is deliberate — the alias registry is an allow-list that
keeps arbitrary CLR type names out of deserialization — but it was
silent. It is now reported once per type, naming the type and both
lossless alternatives, and PublishEvent.Payload documents them. Measured
across the integration suite, only genuine user payload types reach this
path, so the warning does not fire for Elsa's own types.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: check the log level before claiming the once-per-type warning slot
WarnAboutUnaliasedType claimed a type's single report via TryAdd before
LogWarning applied its level filter, so a type first serialized while
Warning was disabled spent its slot on a call that logged nothing and
then stayed silent forever, including after the level was raised at
runtime. Check IsEnabled first, so the slot is only consumed by a report
that is actually emitted.
The regression test needs the capture to be the only logging provider:
IsEnabled on the composite logger is an OR across providers, so the test
builder's own xunit provider would otherwise keep Warning enabled
regardless of what the test asked for.
Reported by Greptile on #7969.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Use the same structural and secret-binding assessment for management, discovery, and initiation so incomplete overrides are never advertised as available sign-in methods.
Introduce a new test `ValidateRequiresCompleteConfigurationAndReturnsMissingSecretDetails` to verify that a connection requires a complete configuration, including handling missing secret details. Adjust configuration to enforce `RequiresClientSecret`.
