elsa-core/src/modules/Elsa.ExternalAuthentication/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs

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fix(external-authentication): scope role-deletion impact to the role's tenant (#8036) * fix(external-authentication): scope role-deletion impact to the role's tenant ExternalAuthenticationRoleDeletionDependencyContributor scanned every stored connection with an empty ConnectionFilter and every configured connection regardless of its tenant, so a role ID that exists in two tenants could report another tenant's references as its own impact -- and a configuration entry owned by another tenant could block a role deletion outright. Remediation had the same reach: it loaded a dependency's connection by the caller-supplied owner ID without checking which tenant owned it. Impact, prevalidation and remediation now only see connections in the role's tenant context, which is the tenant active on ITenantAccessor while the role-deletion coordinator runs. Host-scoped connections stay in scope for every tenant, because the connection registry resolves the host scope for every signing-in tenant and the provisioner resolves a connection's default role IDs in the signing-in user's tenant, so a host connection naming a role ID really does reference that tenant's role. Configuration entries that leave the tenant blank are host-scoped for the same reason the configuration source materializes them there. A connection carrying another tenant's ID is out of scope in both directions, and a connection loaded for remediation that is not in the role's tenant is treated as absent, which fails the request rather than mutating it. The stored connections are fetched per applicable scope so another tenant's rows are never materialized, and both connection stores already honor ConnectionFilter.Scope; the durable store now has a test pinning that, since the tenant boundary rests on it. Refs #8013 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-authentication): scan every tenant when deleting a tenant-agnostic role Role stores expose tenant-agnostic roles (TenantId == "*") from every tenant, but the role-deletion contributor derived its dependency scan boundary from the ambient tenant only, so deleting an agnostic role while tenant A was active left references from other tenants dangling. Resolve the role being deleted once per operation, through the active role store, and scan every connection and configuration entry regardless of tenant when it is agnostic. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(external-authentication): share the active role store lookup Extract the duplicated "active role store is the last registration" resolution into a single ActiveRoleStore accessor and rename ToScope to ToConnectionScope for clarity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-authentication): read one connection snapshot and prefer the agnostic role Reading the host and tenant scopes as two separate store queries let a connection whose TenantId changed mid-flight fall between the reads and escape both, letting role deletion proceed while a reference remained. FindConnectionsInRoleTenantScopeAsync now reads one snapshot and filters it in memory. IsAgnosticRoleAsync resolved a role by an unqualified ID lookup, which could return the ambient tenant's role instead of an agnostic role sharing its ID, silently narrowing impact scanning and leaving JIT-policy references in other tenants dangling; it now checks every role sharing the ID and gives the agnostic scope deterministic precedence. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(external-authentication): correct the scope-filter test comment Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-authentication): fail closed when a role ID resolves to more than one role A same-ID collision between a tenant-scoped role and an agnostic role can only occur in MemoryRoleStore (durable persistence keys roles by ID alone). In that case the coordinator's own deletion target is already ambiguous, so widening or narrowing the scope by guessing is wrong in either direction; throw instead of picking a side. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-authentication): scope role-deletion impact by the resolved role's tenant Replace the isAgnosticRole flag with ResolveRoleTenantIdAsync, which returns the resolved role's own TenantId and falls back to the ambient tenant only when the role cannot be resolved. With multitenancy disabled the EF role store installs no tenant query filter and can resolve a tenant-owned role by ID regardless of the ambient tenant, so scoping by the ambient tenant alone left that role's connection references out of scan while the coordinator deleted it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-authentication): require an agnostic replacement when remediating an agnostic role Authorization for a replacement role still resolves through the ambient tenant's role services, so a deletion initiated in tenant A could authorize a tenant-A-only replacement and then write it into tenant B's connection policy, where that role does not exist. When the deletion target is agnostic, require the replacement role to be agnostic too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-authentication): require agnostic replacements for host connections and reject ambiguous ones Extend the agnostic-replacement requirement to host-scoped connections, since a host connection is served to every signing-in tenant and a tenant-scoped replacement would resolve in the authorizing tenant but fail to resolve in every other tenant it serves. Recheck the replacement at removal time through the same agnostic-role resolution used at validation, instead of trusting whichever same-ID role a plain FindAsync happens to return, so a replacement collision introduced between validation and mutation is rejected. Resolve IsAgnosticRoleAsync's candidate directly and return true only when exactly one matching role is agnostic, so an ambiguous replacement ID is reported as replacement_role_unavailable_or_unauthorized instead of escaping as an exception. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-authentication): keep host-connection replacements allowed for default-tenant roles Revert the host-scope replacement guard added for host-scoped connections. IdentityProviderConnectionManagementService forces every managed connection to host scope, and in a deployment without multitenancy roles are created scoped to the default tenant rather than agnostic, so requiring an agnostic replacement for host-scoped connections would make every replacement remediation impossible in the default deployment. The replacement guard applies only when the deletion target itself is agnostic, as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 05:34:44 +00:00
using Elsa.Common.Multitenancy;
fix(external-auth)!: wildcard-aware permission grant boundary, and startup smoke tests for both hosts (#7985) * fix(external-auth)!: match permission grant boundaries as patterns The deployment allow/deny boundary and the delegation authorizer compared permission strings with ordinal equality, so under the {resource}:{verb} vocabulary they could not see wildcards. A deny list naming 'workflows/*:delete' did not deny 'workflows/definitions:delete', and a grant of 'workflows/*:delete' outflanked a deny naming that leaf. The bypass was reachable. ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource passes a role's permissions to the boundary verbatim, survivors land in the issued token as permission claims, and PermissionEvaluator does expand wildcards there. So an ordinary role plus a deny list was enough, on every external sign-in, with no privileged actor involved. Restoring the ordinal boundary under the new tests fails seven of them. Deny is now matched in both directions, allow one-directionally, both through PermissionMatcher. A grant that is not a well-formed permission is dropped with a warning rather than carried into a token it cannot authorize anything in. Five non-endpoint checks -- delegation, role-reference removal, unsafe settings confirmation, the recovery override and the boundary itself -- also still compared against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants. Those carry two colons, so Permission.TryParse rejects them and no principal can hold one, while the migration guide tells operators to replace exactly those strings. All five now route through IPermissionEvaluator, and the module registers AddElsaAuthorization itself instead of depending on host ordering. Non-core verbs move to ExternalAuthenticationVerbs, declared beside the resources they apply to so a delegation check cannot spell one differently from the endpoint it guards. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: apply IDE code cleanup to the diagnostics and identity modules Redundant namespace qualifiers and usings removed, and primary-constructor and record syntax applied, across Elsa.Diagnostics.ConsoleLogs, Elsa.Diagnostics.StructuredLogs, Elsa.Expressions.JavaScript and Elsa.Identity. Produced by a solution-wide IDE cleanup that ran alongside the authorization work; separated from it so the permission changes can be reviewed on their own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(hosts): boot both hosts and assert their gated routes challenge This repo runs two parallel feature systems, the classic Features/ path and the CShells ShellFeatures/ path, and every module has to register in both. Nothing exercised either. The unit and integration suites construct services directly, so a module registered in one path and not the other, or a service missing from one container, passes every test and fails only when a host starts. Three bugs in #7980 were found by running these two hosts by hand, two of them shell-versus-classic divergences. Each host is booted through WebApplicationFactory, running its real Program with full feature registration, and asked for a handful of routes it is expected to serve behind a permission. A 404 means the module was never registered, a 5xx means the endpoint was found but its dependencies could not be constructed, and a 200 means no gate ran; only 401 passes. All routes are reported together, so a feature system that stops registering a group of modules reads as one failure rather than a queue of identical ones. Removing AddExternalAuthenticationServices from the shell feature -- the divergence this is built to catch -- fails the shell host on all five of its routes while the classic host stays green. The assertions go through HTTP rather than the container on purpose. The hosts have different topologies: the classic host's root provider holds everything and registers 125 routes, while CShells gives each shell its own provider and mounts routes per shell, leaving 6 in the root. A container or route-table assertion would have to encode that difference and would break whenever CShells changed internally. Behaviour at the edge is host-agnostic, and it is what actually has to match. Each host gains a namespaced entry-point marker because both already declare a Program in the global namespace, which a test project referencing both cannot tell apart. Coverage is off for this project: it references both hosts, so every module either pulls in would enter its denominator without adding real coverage, and coverlet cannot instrument a graph that size. TreatAsLocalProperty keeps CI's /p:CollectCoverage=true from overriding that. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-auth)!: fail closed on an unparseable grant boundary Two findings from review, both real. The grant boundary parsed its allow and deny lists and silently dropped what would not parse. An allow list of nothing but malformed entries therefore reduced to an empty set, and an empty allow list means unrestricted -- so a typo turned the boundary off entirely and let external grant sources put permissions straight into issued tokens. The deny side had the mirror of it: a malformed entry quietly stopped denying what it named. A boundary that does not parse now admits nothing, and ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator rejects the configuration at startup, so the mistake reaches an operator rather than a token. Failing startup is what makes the runtime behaviour safe to be strict about: it cannot be hit by someone mid-edit, only by validation having been bypassed. ConnectionEndpointSupport.HasPermission was a sixth ad-hoc permission check, missed when the other five were converted. It compared claim values against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants at four call sites -- policy management on create and update, session revocation, and unsafe settings confirmation -- and those constants carry two colons, so nothing can hold one once a deployment follows the migration guide. It now routes through IPermissionEvaluator like the rest, resolved from the request with a fallback to the shared evaluator, the same way EndpointSecurity does it. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style(external-auth): filter permission patterns with Where Addresses a review nit on ValidatePermissionPatterns. Behaviour is unchanged: a null list still iterates nothing, only malformed entries are reported, and the message text is identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-auth)!: apply the grant boundary to role permissions too Token issuance concatenated the user's Elsa role permissions raw alongside the boundary-filtered external grants. A permission the boundary had just excluded during grant resolution therefore reappeared in the issued token from the same roles, which made the deny list unenforceable for anything a role carried and left ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource filtering nothing that was not added back a moment later. The bypass did not even need that grant source configured: role permissions reached the token regardless of which sources a connection selected. Both origins now pass the same boundary. Re-applying it at issuance also picks up a boundary that changed since sign-in, since refreshing reissues. This is a behaviour change for deployments that configured a boundary expecting it to bound only claim-mapped permissions: an external login may now carry fewer permissions than before. Deployments with no boundary configured, the default, are unaffected -- every well-formed permission passes. The migration guide describes both directions. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 03:25:29 +00:00
using Elsa.Extensions;
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using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Contracts;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Options;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Permissions;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Policies;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Providers;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Services;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Stores.InMemory;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Validation;
using Elsa.Identity.Contracts;
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using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Builder;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.RateLimiting;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Diagnostics.HealthChecks;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Extensions;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
namespace Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
public static class ServiceCollectionExtensions
{
/// <summary>Adds the explicit, non-readiness External Authentication health bridge.</summary>
public static IHealthChecksBuilder AddExternalAuthenticationHealthCheck(this IServiceCollection services, string name = "external-authentication", IEnumerable<string>? tags = null) =>
services.AddHealthChecks().AddCheck<ExternalAuthenticationHealthCheck>(name, HealthStatus.Degraded, tags ?? ["external-authentication", "optional"]);
/// <summary>
/// Adds the protocol-neutral External Authentication foundation and its single-node defaults.
/// Hosts requiring durable, multi-node state may replace the store registrations.
/// </summary>
public static IServiceCollection AddExternalAuthenticationServices(this IServiceCollection services, Action<ExternalAuthenticationOptions>? configureOptions = null)
{
var options = services.AddOptions<ExternalAuthenticationOptions>().ValidateOnStart();
if (configureOptions != null)
options.Configure(configureOptions);
fix(external-auth)!: wildcard-aware permission grant boundary, and startup smoke tests for both hosts (#7985) * fix(external-auth)!: match permission grant boundaries as patterns The deployment allow/deny boundary and the delegation authorizer compared permission strings with ordinal equality, so under the {resource}:{verb} vocabulary they could not see wildcards. A deny list naming 'workflows/*:delete' did not deny 'workflows/definitions:delete', and a grant of 'workflows/*:delete' outflanked a deny naming that leaf. The bypass was reachable. ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource passes a role's permissions to the boundary verbatim, survivors land in the issued token as permission claims, and PermissionEvaluator does expand wildcards there. So an ordinary role plus a deny list was enough, on every external sign-in, with no privileged actor involved. Restoring the ordinal boundary under the new tests fails seven of them. Deny is now matched in both directions, allow one-directionally, both through PermissionMatcher. A grant that is not a well-formed permission is dropped with a warning rather than carried into a token it cannot authorize anything in. Five non-endpoint checks -- delegation, role-reference removal, unsafe settings confirmation, the recovery override and the boundary itself -- also still compared against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants. Those carry two colons, so Permission.TryParse rejects them and no principal can hold one, while the migration guide tells operators to replace exactly those strings. All five now route through IPermissionEvaluator, and the module registers AddElsaAuthorization itself instead of depending on host ordering. Non-core verbs move to ExternalAuthenticationVerbs, declared beside the resources they apply to so a delegation check cannot spell one differently from the endpoint it guards. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: apply IDE code cleanup to the diagnostics and identity modules Redundant namespace qualifiers and usings removed, and primary-constructor and record syntax applied, across Elsa.Diagnostics.ConsoleLogs, Elsa.Diagnostics.StructuredLogs, Elsa.Expressions.JavaScript and Elsa.Identity. Produced by a solution-wide IDE cleanup that ran alongside the authorization work; separated from it so the permission changes can be reviewed on their own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(hosts): boot both hosts and assert their gated routes challenge This repo runs two parallel feature systems, the classic Features/ path and the CShells ShellFeatures/ path, and every module has to register in both. Nothing exercised either. The unit and integration suites construct services directly, so a module registered in one path and not the other, or a service missing from one container, passes every test and fails only when a host starts. Three bugs in #7980 were found by running these two hosts by hand, two of them shell-versus-classic divergences. Each host is booted through WebApplicationFactory, running its real Program with full feature registration, and asked for a handful of routes it is expected to serve behind a permission. A 404 means the module was never registered, a 5xx means the endpoint was found but its dependencies could not be constructed, and a 200 means no gate ran; only 401 passes. All routes are reported together, so a feature system that stops registering a group of modules reads as one failure rather than a queue of identical ones. Removing AddExternalAuthenticationServices from the shell feature -- the divergence this is built to catch -- fails the shell host on all five of its routes while the classic host stays green. The assertions go through HTTP rather than the container on purpose. The hosts have different topologies: the classic host's root provider holds everything and registers 125 routes, while CShells gives each shell its own provider and mounts routes per shell, leaving 6 in the root. A container or route-table assertion would have to encode that difference and would break whenever CShells changed internally. Behaviour at the edge is host-agnostic, and it is what actually has to match. Each host gains a namespaced entry-point marker because both already declare a Program in the global namespace, which a test project referencing both cannot tell apart. Coverage is off for this project: it references both hosts, so every module either pulls in would enter its denominator without adding real coverage, and coverlet cannot instrument a graph that size. TreatAsLocalProperty keeps CI's /p:CollectCoverage=true from overriding that. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-auth)!: fail closed on an unparseable grant boundary Two findings from review, both real. The grant boundary parsed its allow and deny lists and silently dropped what would not parse. An allow list of nothing but malformed entries therefore reduced to an empty set, and an empty allow list means unrestricted -- so a typo turned the boundary off entirely and let external grant sources put permissions straight into issued tokens. The deny side had the mirror of it: a malformed entry quietly stopped denying what it named. A boundary that does not parse now admits nothing, and ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator rejects the configuration at startup, so the mistake reaches an operator rather than a token. Failing startup is what makes the runtime behaviour safe to be strict about: it cannot be hit by someone mid-edit, only by validation having been bypassed. ConnectionEndpointSupport.HasPermission was a sixth ad-hoc permission check, missed when the other five were converted. It compared claim values against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants at four call sites -- policy management on create and update, session revocation, and unsafe settings confirmation -- and those constants carry two colons, so nothing can hold one once a deployment follows the migration guide. It now routes through IPermissionEvaluator like the rest, resolved from the request with a fallback to the shared evaluator, the same way EndpointSecurity does it. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style(external-auth): filter permission patterns with Where Addresses a review nit on ValidatePermissionPatterns. Behaviour is unchanged: a null list still iterates nothing, only malformed entries are reported, and the message text is identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-auth)!: apply the grant boundary to role permissions too Token issuance concatenated the user's Elsa role permissions raw alongside the boundary-filtered external grants. A permission the boundary had just excluded during grant resolution therefore reappeared in the issued token from the same roles, which made the deny list unenforceable for anything a role carried and left ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource filtering nothing that was not added back a moment later. The bypass did not even need that grant source configured: role permissions reached the token regardless of which sources a connection selected. Both origins now pass the same boundary. Re-applying it at issuance also picks up a boundary that changed since sign-in, since refreshing reissues. This is a behaviour change for deployments that configured a boundary expecting it to bound only claim-mapped permissions: an external login may now carry fewer permissions than before. Deployments with no boundary configured, the default, are unaffected -- every well-formed permission passes. The migration guide describes both directions. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 03:25:29 +00:00
// The module evaluates permissions outside endpoint authorization -- delegation, the grant boundary,
// and the recovery override -- so it depends on the evaluator whether or not a host wired one up.
// The call is TryAdd-based and idempotent, so a host that already registered one keeps it.
services.AddElsaAuthorization();
refactor(auth)!: retire the legacy permission constants and duplicate descriptor types (#7987) * refactor(auth)!: retire the legacy permission constants and duplicate descriptors Completes the cutover started in #7980. Seven `<Module>Permissions` classes holding `verb:resource` strings are removed: AIPermissions, ConsoleLogs, Dashboard, ExternalAuthentication, OpenTelemetry, Secrets and StructuredLogs. AIPermissions was not in #7982's list, which was written before the cutover finished; it is dead by the same measure as the rest. Removed rather than marked obsolete, which #7982 asked to be an explicit decision. Every string these classes held carries two colons, so it does not parse under the new grammar and authorizes nothing. Keeping them obsolete would leave code that compiles, still reads as a permission check, and silently grants no access -- a warning that is easy to suppress in front of a runtime failure that is invisible. A compile error names the call site and can be fixed against the migration guide's mapping table. Classes their own modules still reference, WorkflowPermissions and IdentityPermissions among them, are untouched. External Authentication's parallel descriptor system is collapsed onto the core types: its own PermissionDescriptor record, its IPermissionDescriptorProvider and IPermissionDescriptorRegistry, and DefaultPermissionDescriptorRegistry. That was not only tidiness. The module's registry was fed exclusively by its legacy names, so after the cutover every well-formed grant failed the `unknown_permission_descriptor` check and the warning fired constantly for correct configuration. The resolver now consults the core catalog, which is keyed by resource and lists the verbs each accepts, and a wildcard is treated as advertised because it names a pattern rather than a resource to look up. The descriptor endpoint serves the core catalog too: choosing what an external mapping may confer means choosing from everything Elsa declares. The module contributes its resource descriptors explicitly rather than relying on the host's assembly scan, for the same reason it registers AddElsaAuthorization itself. The two naming tests now pin the new resource name instead of the legacy string. The convention worth holding was always that the module is called 'diagnostics/console-logs', not that a retired constant kept its old value. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(client): match the permission descriptor client model to the catalog Moving the descriptor endpoint onto the core catalog changed its shape from a single permission string to a resource plus the verbs that resource accepts, and the Refit client model kept the old one. It still deserialized and still compiled, handing callers a blank Name and no way to reach the verbs -- the data went missing without anything failing. The client model now mirrors the served descriptor, and a contract test compares the two property sets so the next divergence is a test failure rather than an empty field. NonCoreVerbs is excluded: the server derives it from SupportedVerbs, so a client holding the verbs can compute it. Found by review, not by the suites: nothing here throws. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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// Contributed explicitly rather than left to the host's assembly scan, so the module's resources reach
// the catalog on any host that registers its services, the same reason AddElsaAuthorization is called
// here. Registration is TryAddEnumerable-backed, so a host that also scans this assembly gets one copy.
services.AddPermissionDescriptors<ExternalAuthenticationResourcePermissionsDescriptorProvider>();
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services.AddExternalAuthenticationExtension(ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind.UnlinkedIdentityPolicy, RejectUnlinkedIdentityPolicy.PolicyType);
services.AddExternalAuthenticationExtension(ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind.UnlinkedIdentityPolicy, CreateUserUnlinkedIdentityPolicy.PolicyType);
services.AddExternalAuthenticationExtension(ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind.UnlinkedIdentityPolicy, MatchExternalUserUnlinkedIdentityPolicy.PolicyType);
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services.AddExternalAuthenticationExtension(ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind.PermissionGrantSource, ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource.SourceType);
services.AddExternalAuthenticationExtension(ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind.PermissionGrantSource, ClaimMappingPermissionGrantSource.SourceType);
services.AddExternalAuthenticationExtension(ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind.PermissionGrantSource, GroupMappingPermissionGrantSource.SourceType);
services.AddExternalAuthenticationExtension(ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind.PermissionGrantSource, ClaimPassThroughPermissionGrantSource.SourceType);
fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping (#7997) * fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping Permission.IsValidPattern rejects inert wildcard spellings (such as "workflows*:delete") that parse but can never match. The grant boundary, stored-permission, and external-authentication options validators reject them at authoring time, and PermissionGrantValidator applies the same check to incoming grants. ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator now warns (never fails) when DeniedPermissions is non-empty, because any non-empty deny list refuses every wildcard grant that could reach a denied permission -- including the seeded administrator role's "*". The validator takes an ILogger, and AddExternalAuthenticationServices registers logging alongside its other framework dependencies (TryAdd-based, so host logging configuration wins). The operational consequence is recorded in the authorization-model migration guide. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): report subtree grants whose verb nothing under them supports 'workflows/*:frobnicate' reached a non-empty subtree and was therefore treated as resolved, so the startup audit stayed silent about a grant that cannot authorize anything. Require at least one reached descriptor to support a concrete verb; verb wildcards keep the reach-only check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 09:45:54 +00:00
// The validator warns about grant-boundary configuration, and ValidateOnStart resolves it on any
// IOptions access, so a logger has to be resolvable even on a bare service collection. AddLogging is
// TryAdd-based, so a host that already configured logging keeps its own.
services.AddLogging();
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services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Singleton<IValidateOptions<ExternalAuthenticationOptions>, ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator>());
services.AddDataProtection();
services.AddRateLimiter(_ => { });
services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Singleton<IConfigureOptions<RateLimiterOptions>, ConfigureExternalAuthenticationRateLimiterOptions>());
fix(external-authentication): scope role-deletion impact to the role's tenant (#8036) * fix(external-authentication): scope role-deletion impact to the role's tenant ExternalAuthenticationRoleDeletionDependencyContributor scanned every stored connection with an empty ConnectionFilter and every configured connection regardless of its tenant, so a role ID that exists in two tenants could report another tenant's references as its own impact -- and a configuration entry owned by another tenant could block a role deletion outright. Remediation had the same reach: it loaded a dependency's connection by the caller-supplied owner ID without checking which tenant owned it. Impact, prevalidation and remediation now only see connections in the role's tenant context, which is the tenant active on ITenantAccessor while the role-deletion coordinator runs. Host-scoped connections stay in scope for every tenant, because the connection registry resolves the host scope for every signing-in tenant and the provisioner resolves a connection's default role IDs in the signing-in user's tenant, so a host connection naming a role ID really does reference that tenant's role. Configuration entries that leave the tenant blank are host-scoped for the same reason the configuration source materializes them there. A connection carrying another tenant's ID is out of scope in both directions, and a connection loaded for remediation that is not in the role's tenant is treated as absent, which fails the request rather than mutating it. The stored connections are fetched per applicable scope so another tenant's rows are never materialized, and both connection stores already honor ConnectionFilter.Scope; the durable store now has a test pinning that, since the tenant boundary rests on it. Refs #8013 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-authentication): scan every tenant when deleting a tenant-agnostic role Role stores expose tenant-agnostic roles (TenantId == "*") from every tenant, but the role-deletion contributor derived its dependency scan boundary from the ambient tenant only, so deleting an agnostic role while tenant A was active left references from other tenants dangling. Resolve the role being deleted once per operation, through the active role store, and scan every connection and configuration entry regardless of tenant when it is agnostic. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(external-authentication): share the active role store lookup Extract the duplicated "active role store is the last registration" resolution into a single ActiveRoleStore accessor and rename ToScope to ToConnectionScope for clarity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-authentication): read one connection snapshot and prefer the agnostic role Reading the host and tenant scopes as two separate store queries let a connection whose TenantId changed mid-flight fall between the reads and escape both, letting role deletion proceed while a reference remained. FindConnectionsInRoleTenantScopeAsync now reads one snapshot and filters it in memory. IsAgnosticRoleAsync resolved a role by an unqualified ID lookup, which could return the ambient tenant's role instead of an agnostic role sharing its ID, silently narrowing impact scanning and leaving JIT-policy references in other tenants dangling; it now checks every role sharing the ID and gives the agnostic scope deterministic precedence. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(external-authentication): correct the scope-filter test comment Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-authentication): fail closed when a role ID resolves to more than one role A same-ID collision between a tenant-scoped role and an agnostic role can only occur in MemoryRoleStore (durable persistence keys roles by ID alone). In that case the coordinator's own deletion target is already ambiguous, so widening or narrowing the scope by guessing is wrong in either direction; throw instead of picking a side. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-authentication): scope role-deletion impact by the resolved role's tenant Replace the isAgnosticRole flag with ResolveRoleTenantIdAsync, which returns the resolved role's own TenantId and falls back to the ambient tenant only when the role cannot be resolved. With multitenancy disabled the EF role store installs no tenant query filter and can resolve a tenant-owned role by ID regardless of the ambient tenant, so scoping by the ambient tenant alone left that role's connection references out of scan while the coordinator deleted it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-authentication): require an agnostic replacement when remediating an agnostic role Authorization for a replacement role still resolves through the ambient tenant's role services, so a deletion initiated in tenant A could authorize a tenant-A-only replacement and then write it into tenant B's connection policy, where that role does not exist. When the deletion target is agnostic, require the replacement role to be agnostic too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-authentication): require agnostic replacements for host connections and reject ambiguous ones Extend the agnostic-replacement requirement to host-scoped connections, since a host connection is served to every signing-in tenant and a tenant-scoped replacement would resolve in the authorizing tenant but fail to resolve in every other tenant it serves. Recheck the replacement at removal time through the same agnostic-role resolution used at validation, instead of trusting whichever same-ID role a plain FindAsync happens to return, so a replacement collision introduced between validation and mutation is rejected. Resolve IsAgnosticRoleAsync's candidate directly and return true only when exactly one matching role is agnostic, so an ambiguous replacement ID is reported as replacement_role_unavailable_or_unauthorized instead of escaping as an exception. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-authentication): keep host-connection replacements allowed for default-tenant roles Revert the host-scope replacement guard added for host-scoped connections. IdentityProviderConnectionManagementService forces every managed connection to host scope, and in a deployment without multitenancy roles are created scoped to the default tenant rather than agnostic, so requiring an agnostic replacement for host-scoped connections would make every replacement remediation impossible in the default deployment. The replacement guard applies only when the deletion target itself is agnostic, as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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// The module reads the ambient tenant outside the multitenancy feature -- connection scoping and the
// role-deletion contributor's tenant boundary -- so it depends on an accessor whether or not a host
// enabled multitenancy. TryAdd keeps a host's own registration.
services.TryAddSingleton<ITenantAccessor, DefaultTenantAccessor>();
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services.TryAddSingleton<ConnectionRevisionCalculator>();
services.TryAddSingleton<FinalLoginPathGuard>();
services.TryAddSingleton<ExternalAuthenticationSecurityNotifier>();
services.TryAddScoped<ConnectionTestService>();
services.TryAddScoped<PreviewSignInService>();
services.TryAddSingleton<ExternalAuthenticationHealthCheck>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IOutboundDnsResolver, SystemOutboundDnsResolver>();
services.TryAddSingleton<OutboundDestinationValidator>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IValidatedAddressConnector, SocketValidatedAddressConnector>();
services.TryAddSingleton<ValidatedOutboundConnectionFactory>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IProviderHttpClientFactory, ProviderHttpClientFactory>();
services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Singleton<IIdentityProviderConnectionSource, ConfigurationIdentityProviderConnectionSource>());
services.TryAddSingleton<IIdentityProviderConnectionStore, InMemoryIdentityProviderConnectionStore>();
services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Singleton<IIdentityProviderConnectionSource, DatabaseIdentityProviderConnectionSource>());
services.TryAddSingleton<IIdentityProviderConnectionRegistry, DefaultIdentityProviderConnectionRegistry>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IIdentityProviderConnectionValidityAssessor, IdentityProviderConnectionValidityAssessor>();
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services.TryAddSingleton<ExtensionDescriptorValidator>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IExternalAuthenticationAdapterRegistry, DefaultExternalAuthenticationAdapterRegistry>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IUnlinkedIdentityPolicyRegistry, DefaultUnlinkedIdentityPolicyRegistry>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IExternalUserMatcherRegistry, DefaultExternalUserMatcherRegistry>();
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services.TryAddScoped<IPermissionGrantSourceRegistry, DefaultPermissionGrantSourceRegistry>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IAdapterSettingsMigrationService, AdapterSettingsMigrationService>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IExternalAuthenticationStateStore, InMemoryExternalAuthenticationStateStore>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IExternalAuthenticationHandleHasher, HmacExternalAuthenticationHandleHasher>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IAuthorizationGrantStore, InMemoryAuthorizationGrantStore>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IExternalAuthenticationSessionStore, InMemoryExternalAuthenticationSessionStore>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IPreviewResultStore, InMemoryPreviewResultStore>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IConnectionObservationStore, InMemoryConnectionObservationStore>();
services.TryAddSingleton<IConnectionRegistryVersionStore, InMemoryConnectionRegistryVersionStore>();
services.TryAddSingleton<InMemoryExternalIdentityProvisionerState>();
services.TryAddScoped<InMemoryExternalIdentityProvisioner>();
services.TryAddScoped<IExternalIdentityProvisioner>(serviceProvider => serviceProvider.GetRequiredService<InMemoryExternalIdentityProvisioner>());
services.TryAddScoped<IExternalIdentityLinkManagementStore>(serviceProvider => serviceProvider.GetRequiredService<InMemoryExternalIdentityProvisioner>());
services.TryAddScoped<ExternalIdentityLinkManagementService>();
services.TryAddScoped<IExternalIdentityResolver, DefaultExternalIdentityResolver>();
services.TryAddScoped<IPermissionGrantResolver, DefaultPermissionGrantResolver>();
services.TryAddScoped<IPermissionDelegationAuthorizer, DefaultPermissionDelegationAuthorizer>();
services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Singleton<ISecretBindingResolver, ConfigurationSecretBindingResolver>());
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services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Singleton<IUnlinkedIdentityPolicy, RejectUnlinkedIdentityPolicy>());
services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Singleton<IUnlinkedIdentityPolicy, CreateUserUnlinkedIdentityPolicy>());
services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Singleton<IUnlinkedIdentityPolicy, MatchExternalUserUnlinkedIdentityPolicy>());
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services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Scoped<IPermissionGrantSource, ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource>());
services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Scoped<IPermissionGrantSource, ClaimMappingPermissionGrantSource>());
services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Scoped<IPermissionGrantSource, GroupMappingPermissionGrantSource>());
services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Scoped<IPermissionGrantSource, ClaimPassThroughPermissionGrantSource>());
services.TryAddScoped<IExternalAuthenticationTokenIssuer, DefaultExternalAuthenticationTokenIssuer>();
services.TryAddScoped<IExternalAuthenticationBroker, ExternalAuthenticationBroker>();
services.TryAddScoped<IdentityProviderConnectionManagementService>();
services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Scoped<IRoleDeletionDependencyContributor, ExternalAuthenticationRoleDeletionDependencyContributor>());
services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Scoped<IUserDeletionDependencyContributor, ExternalAuthenticationUserDeletionDependencyContributor>());
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return services;
}
/// <summary>
/// Registers the stable identifier of a trusted deployment-installed extension
/// for startup selection validation.
/// </summary>
public static IServiceCollection AddExternalAuthenticationExtension(
this IServiceCollection services,
ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind kind,
string type)
{
ArgumentException.ThrowIfNullOrWhiteSpace(type);
services.Configure<ExternalAuthenticationExtensionOptions>(options =>
fix(external-auth)!: wildcard-aware permission grant boundary, and startup smoke tests for both hosts (#7985) * fix(external-auth)!: match permission grant boundaries as patterns The deployment allow/deny boundary and the delegation authorizer compared permission strings with ordinal equality, so under the {resource}:{verb} vocabulary they could not see wildcards. A deny list naming 'workflows/*:delete' did not deny 'workflows/definitions:delete', and a grant of 'workflows/*:delete' outflanked a deny naming that leaf. The bypass was reachable. ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource passes a role's permissions to the boundary verbatim, survivors land in the issued token as permission claims, and PermissionEvaluator does expand wildcards there. So an ordinary role plus a deny list was enough, on every external sign-in, with no privileged actor involved. Restoring the ordinal boundary under the new tests fails seven of them. Deny is now matched in both directions, allow one-directionally, both through PermissionMatcher. A grant that is not a well-formed permission is dropped with a warning rather than carried into a token it cannot authorize anything in. Five non-endpoint checks -- delegation, role-reference removal, unsafe settings confirmation, the recovery override and the boundary itself -- also still compared against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants. Those carry two colons, so Permission.TryParse rejects them and no principal can hold one, while the migration guide tells operators to replace exactly those strings. All five now route through IPermissionEvaluator, and the module registers AddElsaAuthorization itself instead of depending on host ordering. Non-core verbs move to ExternalAuthenticationVerbs, declared beside the resources they apply to so a delegation check cannot spell one differently from the endpoint it guards. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: apply IDE code cleanup to the diagnostics and identity modules Redundant namespace qualifiers and usings removed, and primary-constructor and record syntax applied, across Elsa.Diagnostics.ConsoleLogs, Elsa.Diagnostics.StructuredLogs, Elsa.Expressions.JavaScript and Elsa.Identity. Produced by a solution-wide IDE cleanup that ran alongside the authorization work; separated from it so the permission changes can be reviewed on their own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(hosts): boot both hosts and assert their gated routes challenge This repo runs two parallel feature systems, the classic Features/ path and the CShells ShellFeatures/ path, and every module has to register in both. Nothing exercised either. The unit and integration suites construct services directly, so a module registered in one path and not the other, or a service missing from one container, passes every test and fails only when a host starts. Three bugs in #7980 were found by running these two hosts by hand, two of them shell-versus-classic divergences. Each host is booted through WebApplicationFactory, running its real Program with full feature registration, and asked for a handful of routes it is expected to serve behind a permission. A 404 means the module was never registered, a 5xx means the endpoint was found but its dependencies could not be constructed, and a 200 means no gate ran; only 401 passes. All routes are reported together, so a feature system that stops registering a group of modules reads as one failure rather than a queue of identical ones. Removing AddExternalAuthenticationServices from the shell feature -- the divergence this is built to catch -- fails the shell host on all five of its routes while the classic host stays green. The assertions go through HTTP rather than the container on purpose. The hosts have different topologies: the classic host's root provider holds everything and registers 125 routes, while CShells gives each shell its own provider and mounts routes per shell, leaving 6 in the root. A container or route-table assertion would have to encode that difference and would break whenever CShells changed internally. Behaviour at the edge is host-agnostic, and it is what actually has to match. Each host gains a namespaced entry-point marker because both already declare a Program in the global namespace, which a test project referencing both cannot tell apart. Coverage is off for this project: it references both hosts, so every module either pulls in would enter its denominator without adding real coverage, and coverlet cannot instrument a graph that size. TreatAsLocalProperty keeps CI's /p:CollectCoverage=true from overriding that. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-auth)!: fail closed on an unparseable grant boundary Two findings from review, both real. The grant boundary parsed its allow and deny lists and silently dropped what would not parse. An allow list of nothing but malformed entries therefore reduced to an empty set, and an empty allow list means unrestricted -- so a typo turned the boundary off entirely and let external grant sources put permissions straight into issued tokens. The deny side had the mirror of it: a malformed entry quietly stopped denying what it named. A boundary that does not parse now admits nothing, and ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator rejects the configuration at startup, so the mistake reaches an operator rather than a token. Failing startup is what makes the runtime behaviour safe to be strict about: it cannot be hit by someone mid-edit, only by validation having been bypassed. ConnectionEndpointSupport.HasPermission was a sixth ad-hoc permission check, missed when the other five were converted. It compared claim values against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants at four call sites -- policy management on create and update, session revocation, and unsafe settings confirmation -- and those constants carry two colons, so nothing can hold one once a deployment follows the migration guide. It now routes through IPermissionEvaluator like the rest, resolved from the request with a fallback to the shared evaluator, the same way EndpointSecurity does it. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style(external-auth): filter permission patterns with Where Addresses a review nit on ValidatePermissionPatterns. Behaviour is unchanged: a null list still iterates nothing, only malformed entries are reported, and the message text is identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-auth)!: apply the grant boundary to role permissions too Token issuance concatenated the user's Elsa role permissions raw alongside the boundary-filtered external grants. A permission the boundary had just excluded during grant resolution therefore reappeared in the issued token from the same roles, which made the deny list unenforceable for anything a role carried and left ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource filtering nothing that was not added back a moment later. The bypass did not even need that grant source configured: role permissions reached the token regardless of which sources a connection selected. Both origins now pass the same boundary. Re-applying it at issuance also picks up a boundary that changed since sign-in, since refreshing reissues. This is a behaviour change for deployments that configured a boundary expecting it to bound only claim-mapped permissions: an external login may now carry fewer permissions than before. Deployments with no boundary configured, the default, are unaffected -- every well-formed permission passes. The migration guide describes both directions. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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options.Registrations.Add(new(kind, type)));
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return services;
}
}