elsa-core/test/unit/Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.UnitTests/Foundational/ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidatorTests.cs

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2026-07-24 16:59:17 +00:00
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Models;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Options;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Validation;
fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping (#7997) * fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping Permission.IsValidPattern rejects inert wildcard spellings (such as "workflows*:delete") that parse but can never match. The grant boundary, stored-permission, and external-authentication options validators reject them at authoring time, and PermissionGrantValidator applies the same check to incoming grants. ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator now warns (never fails) when DeniedPermissions is non-empty, because any non-empty deny list refuses every wildcard grant that could reach a denied permission -- including the seeded administrator role's "*". The validator takes an ILogger, and AddExternalAuthenticationServices registers logging alongside its other framework dependencies (TryAdd-based, so host logging configuration wins). The operational consequence is recorded in the authorization-model migration guide. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): report subtree grants whose verb nothing under them supports 'workflows/*:frobnicate' reached a non-empty subtree and was therefore treated as resolved, so the startup audit stayed silent about a grant that cannot authorize anything. Require at least one reached descriptor to support a concrete verb; verb wildcards keep the reach-only check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
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namespace Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.UnitTests.Foundational;
public class ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidatorTests
{
fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping (#7997) * fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping Permission.IsValidPattern rejects inert wildcard spellings (such as "workflows*:delete") that parse but can never match. The grant boundary, stored-permission, and external-authentication options validators reject them at authoring time, and PermissionGrantValidator applies the same check to incoming grants. ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator now warns (never fails) when DeniedPermissions is non-empty, because any non-empty deny list refuses every wildcard grant that could reach a denied permission -- including the seeded administrator role's "*". The validator takes an ILogger, and AddExternalAuthenticationServices registers logging alongside its other framework dependencies (TryAdd-based, so host logging configuration wins). The operational consequence is recorded in the authorization-model migration guide. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): report subtree grants whose verb nothing under them supports 'workflows/*:frobnicate' reached a non-empty subtree and was therefore treated as resolved, so the startup audit stayed silent about a grant that cannot authorize anything. Require at least one reached descriptor to support a concrete verb; verb wildcards keep the reach-only check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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private readonly CapturingLogger<ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator> _logger = new();
fix(external-auth)!: wildcard-aware permission grant boundary, and startup smoke tests for both hosts (#7985) * fix(external-auth)!: match permission grant boundaries as patterns The deployment allow/deny boundary and the delegation authorizer compared permission strings with ordinal equality, so under the {resource}:{verb} vocabulary they could not see wildcards. A deny list naming 'workflows/*:delete' did not deny 'workflows/definitions:delete', and a grant of 'workflows/*:delete' outflanked a deny naming that leaf. The bypass was reachable. ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource passes a role's permissions to the boundary verbatim, survivors land in the issued token as permission claims, and PermissionEvaluator does expand wildcards there. So an ordinary role plus a deny list was enough, on every external sign-in, with no privileged actor involved. Restoring the ordinal boundary under the new tests fails seven of them. Deny is now matched in both directions, allow one-directionally, both through PermissionMatcher. A grant that is not a well-formed permission is dropped with a warning rather than carried into a token it cannot authorize anything in. Five non-endpoint checks -- delegation, role-reference removal, unsafe settings confirmation, the recovery override and the boundary itself -- also still compared against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants. Those carry two colons, so Permission.TryParse rejects them and no principal can hold one, while the migration guide tells operators to replace exactly those strings. All five now route through IPermissionEvaluator, and the module registers AddElsaAuthorization itself instead of depending on host ordering. Non-core verbs move to ExternalAuthenticationVerbs, declared beside the resources they apply to so a delegation check cannot spell one differently from the endpoint it guards. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: apply IDE code cleanup to the diagnostics and identity modules Redundant namespace qualifiers and usings removed, and primary-constructor and record syntax applied, across Elsa.Diagnostics.ConsoleLogs, Elsa.Diagnostics.StructuredLogs, Elsa.Expressions.JavaScript and Elsa.Identity. Produced by a solution-wide IDE cleanup that ran alongside the authorization work; separated from it so the permission changes can be reviewed on their own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(hosts): boot both hosts and assert their gated routes challenge This repo runs two parallel feature systems, the classic Features/ path and the CShells ShellFeatures/ path, and every module has to register in both. Nothing exercised either. The unit and integration suites construct services directly, so a module registered in one path and not the other, or a service missing from one container, passes every test and fails only when a host starts. Three bugs in #7980 were found by running these two hosts by hand, two of them shell-versus-classic divergences. Each host is booted through WebApplicationFactory, running its real Program with full feature registration, and asked for a handful of routes it is expected to serve behind a permission. A 404 means the module was never registered, a 5xx means the endpoint was found but its dependencies could not be constructed, and a 200 means no gate ran; only 401 passes. All routes are reported together, so a feature system that stops registering a group of modules reads as one failure rather than a queue of identical ones. Removing AddExternalAuthenticationServices from the shell feature -- the divergence this is built to catch -- fails the shell host on all five of its routes while the classic host stays green. The assertions go through HTTP rather than the container on purpose. The hosts have different topologies: the classic host's root provider holds everything and registers 125 routes, while CShells gives each shell its own provider and mounts routes per shell, leaving 6 in the root. A container or route-table assertion would have to encode that difference and would break whenever CShells changed internally. Behaviour at the edge is host-agnostic, and it is what actually has to match. Each host gains a namespaced entry-point marker because both already declare a Program in the global namespace, which a test project referencing both cannot tell apart. Coverage is off for this project: it references both hosts, so every module either pulls in would enter its denominator without adding real coverage, and coverlet cannot instrument a graph that size. TreatAsLocalProperty keeps CI's /p:CollectCoverage=true from overriding that. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-auth)!: fail closed on an unparseable grant boundary Two findings from review, both real. The grant boundary parsed its allow and deny lists and silently dropped what would not parse. An allow list of nothing but malformed entries therefore reduced to an empty set, and an empty allow list means unrestricted -- so a typo turned the boundary off entirely and let external grant sources put permissions straight into issued tokens. The deny side had the mirror of it: a malformed entry quietly stopped denying what it named. A boundary that does not parse now admits nothing, and ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator rejects the configuration at startup, so the mistake reaches an operator rather than a token. Failing startup is what makes the runtime behaviour safe to be strict about: it cannot be hit by someone mid-edit, only by validation having been bypassed. ConnectionEndpointSupport.HasPermission was a sixth ad-hoc permission check, missed when the other five were converted. It compared claim values against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants at four call sites -- policy management on create and update, session revocation, and unsafe settings confirmation -- and those constants carry two colons, so nothing can hold one once a deployment follows the migration guide. It now routes through IPermissionEvaluator like the rest, resolved from the request with a fallback to the shared evaluator, the same way EndpointSecurity does it. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style(external-auth): filter permission patterns with Where Addresses a review nit on ValidatePermissionPatterns. Behaviour is unchanged: a null list still iterates nothing, only malformed entries are reported, and the message text is identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-auth)!: apply the grant boundary to role permissions too Token issuance concatenated the user's Elsa role permissions raw alongside the boundary-filtered external grants. A permission the boundary had just excluded during grant resolution therefore reappeared in the issued token from the same roles, which made the deny list unenforceable for anything a role carried and left ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource filtering nothing that was not added back a moment later. The bypass did not even need that grant source configured: role permissions reached the token regardless of which sources a connection selected. Both origins now pass the same boundary. Re-applying it at issuance also picks up a boundary that changed since sign-in, since refreshing reissues. This is a behaviour change for deployments that configured a boundary expecting it to bound only claim-mapped permissions: an external login may now carry fewer permissions than before. Deployments with no boundary configured, the default, are unaffected -- every well-formed permission passes. The migration guide describes both directions. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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[Theory]
// The legacy spelling carries two colons, so it parses as nothing and would silently stop bounding anything.
[InlineData("external-authentication:connections:read")]
[InlineData("not a permission")]
[InlineData("workflows/definitions:")]
public void RejectsAGrantBoundaryEntryThatIsNotAWellFormedPermission(string permission)
{
var allowed = new ExternalAuthenticationOptions();
allowed.PermissionGrants.AllowedPermissions = [permission];
var denied = new ExternalAuthenticationOptions();
denied.PermissionGrants.DeniedPermissions = [permission];
var allowedResult = CreateValidator().Validate(null, allowed);
var deniedResult = CreateValidator().Validate(null, denied);
Assert.False(allowedResult.Succeeded);
Assert.Contains(allowedResult.Failures!, x => x.Contains("AllowedPermissions") && x.Contains("well-formed permission"));
Assert.False(deniedResult.Succeeded);
Assert.Contains(deniedResult.Failures!, x => x.Contains("DeniedPermissions") && x.Contains("well-formed permission"));
}
fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping (#7997) * fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping Permission.IsValidPattern rejects inert wildcard spellings (such as "workflows*:delete") that parse but can never match. The grant boundary, stored-permission, and external-authentication options validators reject them at authoring time, and PermissionGrantValidator applies the same check to incoming grants. ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator now warns (never fails) when DeniedPermissions is non-empty, because any non-empty deny list refuses every wildcard grant that could reach a denied permission -- including the seeded administrator role's "*". The validator takes an ILogger, and AddExternalAuthenticationServices registers logging alongside its other framework dependencies (TryAdd-based, so host logging configuration wins). The operational consequence is recorded in the authorization-model migration guide. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): report subtree grants whose verb nothing under them supports 'workflows/*:frobnicate' reached a non-empty subtree and was therefore treated as resolved, so the startup audit stayed silent about a grant that cannot authorize anything. Require at least one reached descriptor to support a concrete verb; verb wildcards keep the reach-only check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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[Theory]
// These parse, so they slipped past well-formedness — yet the matcher never satisfies them. In a deny
// list that is a silent un-denying, exactly what boundary validation exists to prevent.
[InlineData("workflows*:delete")]
[InlineData("work*/foo:view")]
[InlineData("work*/definitions/*:view")]
[InlineData("workflows:del*")]
public void RejectsAGrantBoundaryEntryWithAWildcardTheMatcherNeverSatisfies(string permission)
{
var allowed = new ExternalAuthenticationOptions();
allowed.PermissionGrants.AllowedPermissions = [permission];
var denied = new ExternalAuthenticationOptions();
denied.PermissionGrants.DeniedPermissions = [permission];
var allowedResult = CreateValidator().Validate(null, allowed);
var deniedResult = CreateValidator().Validate(null, denied);
Assert.False(allowedResult.Succeeded);
Assert.Contains(allowedResult.Failures!, x => x.Contains("AllowedPermissions") && x.Contains("would match nothing"));
Assert.False(deniedResult.Succeeded);
Assert.Contains(deniedResult.Failures!, x => x.Contains("DeniedPermissions") && x.Contains("would match nothing"));
}
fix(external-auth)!: wildcard-aware permission grant boundary, and startup smoke tests for both hosts (#7985) * fix(external-auth)!: match permission grant boundaries as patterns The deployment allow/deny boundary and the delegation authorizer compared permission strings with ordinal equality, so under the {resource}:{verb} vocabulary they could not see wildcards. A deny list naming 'workflows/*:delete' did not deny 'workflows/definitions:delete', and a grant of 'workflows/*:delete' outflanked a deny naming that leaf. The bypass was reachable. ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource passes a role's permissions to the boundary verbatim, survivors land in the issued token as permission claims, and PermissionEvaluator does expand wildcards there. So an ordinary role plus a deny list was enough, on every external sign-in, with no privileged actor involved. Restoring the ordinal boundary under the new tests fails seven of them. Deny is now matched in both directions, allow one-directionally, both through PermissionMatcher. A grant that is not a well-formed permission is dropped with a warning rather than carried into a token it cannot authorize anything in. Five non-endpoint checks -- delegation, role-reference removal, unsafe settings confirmation, the recovery override and the boundary itself -- also still compared against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants. Those carry two colons, so Permission.TryParse rejects them and no principal can hold one, while the migration guide tells operators to replace exactly those strings. All five now route through IPermissionEvaluator, and the module registers AddElsaAuthorization itself instead of depending on host ordering. Non-core verbs move to ExternalAuthenticationVerbs, declared beside the resources they apply to so a delegation check cannot spell one differently from the endpoint it guards. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: apply IDE code cleanup to the diagnostics and identity modules Redundant namespace qualifiers and usings removed, and primary-constructor and record syntax applied, across Elsa.Diagnostics.ConsoleLogs, Elsa.Diagnostics.StructuredLogs, Elsa.Expressions.JavaScript and Elsa.Identity. Produced by a solution-wide IDE cleanup that ran alongside the authorization work; separated from it so the permission changes can be reviewed on their own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(hosts): boot both hosts and assert their gated routes challenge This repo runs two parallel feature systems, the classic Features/ path and the CShells ShellFeatures/ path, and every module has to register in both. Nothing exercised either. The unit and integration suites construct services directly, so a module registered in one path and not the other, or a service missing from one container, passes every test and fails only when a host starts. Three bugs in #7980 were found by running these two hosts by hand, two of them shell-versus-classic divergences. Each host is booted through WebApplicationFactory, running its real Program with full feature registration, and asked for a handful of routes it is expected to serve behind a permission. A 404 means the module was never registered, a 5xx means the endpoint was found but its dependencies could not be constructed, and a 200 means no gate ran; only 401 passes. All routes are reported together, so a feature system that stops registering a group of modules reads as one failure rather than a queue of identical ones. Removing AddExternalAuthenticationServices from the shell feature -- the divergence this is built to catch -- fails the shell host on all five of its routes while the classic host stays green. The assertions go through HTTP rather than the container on purpose. The hosts have different topologies: the classic host's root provider holds everything and registers 125 routes, while CShells gives each shell its own provider and mounts routes per shell, leaving 6 in the root. A container or route-table assertion would have to encode that difference and would break whenever CShells changed internally. Behaviour at the edge is host-agnostic, and it is what actually has to match. Each host gains a namespaced entry-point marker because both already declare a Program in the global namespace, which a test project referencing both cannot tell apart. Coverage is off for this project: it references both hosts, so every module either pulls in would enter its denominator without adding real coverage, and coverlet cannot instrument a graph that size. TreatAsLocalProperty keeps CI's /p:CollectCoverage=true from overriding that. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-auth)!: fail closed on an unparseable grant boundary Two findings from review, both real. The grant boundary parsed its allow and deny lists and silently dropped what would not parse. An allow list of nothing but malformed entries therefore reduced to an empty set, and an empty allow list means unrestricted -- so a typo turned the boundary off entirely and let external grant sources put permissions straight into issued tokens. The deny side had the mirror of it: a malformed entry quietly stopped denying what it named. A boundary that does not parse now admits nothing, and ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator rejects the configuration at startup, so the mistake reaches an operator rather than a token. Failing startup is what makes the runtime behaviour safe to be strict about: it cannot be hit by someone mid-edit, only by validation having been bypassed. ConnectionEndpointSupport.HasPermission was a sixth ad-hoc permission check, missed when the other five were converted. It compared claim values against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants at four call sites -- policy management on create and update, session revocation, and unsafe settings confirmation -- and those constants carry two colons, so nothing can hold one once a deployment follows the migration guide. It now routes through IPermissionEvaluator like the rest, resolved from the request with a fallback to the shared evaluator, the same way EndpointSecurity does it. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style(external-auth): filter permission patterns with Where Addresses a review nit on ValidatePermissionPatterns. Behaviour is unchanged: a null list still iterates nothing, only malformed entries are reported, and the message text is identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-auth)!: apply the grant boundary to role permissions too Token issuance concatenated the user's Elsa role permissions raw alongside the boundary-filtered external grants. A permission the boundary had just excluded during grant resolution therefore reappeared in the issued token from the same roles, which made the deny list unenforceable for anything a role carried and left ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource filtering nothing that was not added back a moment later. The bypass did not even need that grant source configured: role permissions reached the token regardless of which sources a connection selected. Both origins now pass the same boundary. Re-applying it at issuance also picks up a boundary that changed since sign-in, since refreshing reissues. This is a behaviour change for deployments that configured a boundary expecting it to bound only claim-mapped permissions: an external login may now carry fewer permissions than before. Deployments with no boundary configured, the default, are unaffected -- every well-formed permission passes. The migration guide describes both directions. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 03:25:29 +00:00
[Fact]
public void AcceptsAGrantBoundaryOfWildcardPatterns()
{
var options = new ExternalAuthenticationOptions();
options.PermissionGrants.AllowedPermissions = ["workflows/*:delete", "*"];
options.PermissionGrants.DeniedPermissions = ["workflows/definitions:*"];
var result = CreateValidator().Validate(null, options);
Assert.DoesNotContain(result.Failures ?? [], x => x.Contains("well-formed permission"));
}
fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping (#7997) * fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping Permission.IsValidPattern rejects inert wildcard spellings (such as "workflows*:delete") that parse but can never match. The grant boundary, stored-permission, and external-authentication options validators reject them at authoring time, and PermissionGrantValidator applies the same check to incoming grants. ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator now warns (never fails) when DeniedPermissions is non-empty, because any non-empty deny list refuses every wildcard grant that could reach a denied permission -- including the seeded administrator role's "*". The validator takes an ILogger, and AddExternalAuthenticationServices registers logging alongside its other framework dependencies (TryAdd-based, so host logging configuration wins). The operational consequence is recorded in the authorization-model migration guide. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): report subtree grants whose verb nothing under them supports 'workflows/*:frobnicate' reached a non-empty subtree and was therefore treated as resolved, so the startup audit stayed silent about a grant that cannot authorize anything. Require at least one reached descriptor to support a concrete verb; verb wildcards keep the reach-only check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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/// <remarks>
/// A deny list is not a failure, but it costs a wildcard grant everything it could have conferred: deny
/// matches in both directions, so '*' satisfies every deny entry and an externally-authenticated superuser
/// silently loses it while local login keeps working. The warning names that at startup rather than leaving
/// it to be diagnosed from an issued token.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public void WarnsThatANonEmptyDenyListRefusesWildcardGrantsWhole()
{
var options = new ExternalAuthenticationOptions();
options.PermissionGrants.DeniedPermissions = ["workflows/*:delete"];
var result = CreateValidator().Validate(null, options);
Assert.True(result.Succeeded);
var warning = Assert.Single(_logger.Entries, x => x.Level == LogLevel.Warning);
Assert.Contains("DeniedPermissions", warning.Message);
Assert.Contains("refused entirely", warning.Message);
}
[Fact]
public void DoesNotWarnWhenNoPermissionsAreDenied()
{
var options = new ExternalAuthenticationOptions();
options.PermissionGrants.AllowedPermissions = ["workflows/*:delete"];
CreateValidator().Validate(null, options);
Assert.DoesNotContain(_logger.Entries, x => x.Level == LogLevel.Warning);
}
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[Fact]
public void RejectsDuplicateInstalledAdapterTypes()
{
var result = CreateValidator([new StubAdapter("oidc"), new StubAdapter("oidc")]).Validate(null, new ExternalAuthenticationOptions());
Assert.False(result.Succeeded);
Assert.Contains(result.Failures!, x => x.Contains("registered more than once"));
}
[Fact]
public void RejectsPublicClientWithWildcardOriginAndSecret()
{
var options = new ExternalAuthenticationOptions
{
Clients =
[
new AuthenticationClient(
"studio",
"Studio",
AuthenticationClientType.Public,
new HashSet<Uri> { new("https://studio.example/callback") },
new HashSet<Uri>(),
new HashSet<string> { "https://*.example" },
new HashSet<string> { "/" },
new SecretBinding("configuration", "studio-secret"),
true)
]
};
var result = CreateValidator().Validate(null, options);
Assert.False(result.Succeeded);
Assert.Contains(result.Failures!, x => x.Contains("invalid allowed origin"));
Assert.Contains(result.Failures!, x => x.Contains("must not define a client secret"));
}
[Fact]
public void RejectsNonHostConfigurationConnection()
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{
var options = new ExternalAuthenticationOptions
{
ConfigurationConnections =
[
RegistryTestData.Connection("tenant", "tenant-a", "contoso")
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]
};
var result = CreateValidator().Validate(null, options);
Assert.False(result.Succeeded);
Assert.Contains(result.Failures!, x => x.Contains("must use the host scope"));
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}
[Fact]
public void RejectsMultipleConfiguredPreferredConnections()
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{
var options = new ExternalAuthenticationOptions
{
ConfigurationConnections =
[
RegistryTestData.Connection("first", "*", "first", isPreferred: true),
RegistryTestData.Connection("second", "*", "second", isPreferred: true)
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]
};
var result = CreateValidator().Validate(null, options);
Assert.False(result.Succeeded);
Assert.Contains(result.Failures!, x => x.Contains("more than one preferred sign-in method"));
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}
[Fact]
public void RejectsNonPositiveRateLimitRules()
{
var options = new ExternalAuthenticationOptions
{
RateLimits = new ExternalAuthenticationRateLimitOptions
{
Discovery = new RateLimitRule(0, TimeSpan.Zero)
}
};
var result = CreateValidator().Validate(null, options);
Assert.False(result.Succeeded);
Assert.Contains(result.Failures!, x => x.Contains("Discovery") && x.Contains("positive permit limit and window"));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("http://elsa.example")]
[InlineData("https://elsa.example/?unexpected=true")]
public void RejectsUnsafeExternalCallbackBaseUri(string callbackBaseUri)
{
var options = new ExternalAuthenticationOptions
{
Redirects = new RedirectValidationOptions { ExternalCallbackBaseUri = new Uri(callbackBaseUri) }
};
var result = CreateValidator().Validate(null, options);
Assert.False(result.Succeeded);
Assert.Contains(result.Failures!, failure => failure.Contains("ExternalCallbackBaseUri"));
}
[Fact]
public void AllowsHttpLoopbackExternalCallbackBaseUriOnlyWhenDevelopmentModeIsEnabled()
{
var options = new ExternalAuthenticationOptions
{
Redirects = new RedirectValidationOptions
{
ExternalCallbackBaseUri = new Uri("http://127.0.0.1:5000"),
AllowDevelopmentLoopbackCallbacks = true
}
};
var result = CreateValidator().Validate(null, options);
Assert.True(result.Succeeded);
}
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[Fact]
public void AcceptsExactPublicClientAndInstalledConfigurationSelections()
{
var options = new ExternalAuthenticationOptions
{
AllowedAdapterTypes = ["oidc"],
Clients =
[
new AuthenticationClient(
"studio",
"Studio",
AuthenticationClientType.Public,
new HashSet<Uri> { new("https://studio.example/callback") },
new HashSet<Uri> { new("https://studio.example/logout") },
new HashSet<string> { "https://studio.example" },
new HashSet<string> { "/" },
null,
true)
],
ConfigurationConnections = [RegistryTestData.Connection("connection", "*", "contoso")]
};
var result = CreateValidator().Validate(null, options);
Assert.True(result.Succeeded);
}
fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping (#7997) * fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping Permission.IsValidPattern rejects inert wildcard spellings (such as "workflows*:delete") that parse but can never match. The grant boundary, stored-permission, and external-authentication options validators reject them at authoring time, and PermissionGrantValidator applies the same check to incoming grants. ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator now warns (never fails) when DeniedPermissions is non-empty, because any non-empty deny list refuses every wildcard grant that could reach a denied permission -- including the seeded administrator role's "*". The validator takes an ILogger, and AddExternalAuthenticationServices registers logging alongside its other framework dependencies (TryAdd-based, so host logging configuration wins). The operational consequence is recorded in the authorization-model migration guide. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): report subtree grants whose verb nothing under them supports 'workflows/*:frobnicate' reached a non-empty subtree and was therefore treated as resolved, so the startup audit stayed silent about a grant that cannot authorize anything. Require at least one reached descriptor to support a concrete verb; verb wildcards keep the reach-only check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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private ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator CreateValidator(IEnumerable<StubAdapter>? adapters = null)
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{
var extensions = new ExternalAuthenticationExtensionOptions();
foreach (var adapter in adapters ?? [new StubAdapter("oidc")])
extensions.Registrations.Add(new(ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind.Adapter, adapter.Type));
extensions.Registrations.Add(new(ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind.UnlinkedIdentityPolicy, "reject"));
extensions.Registrations.Add(new(ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind.UnlinkedIdentityPolicy, "create-user"));
extensions.Registrations.Add(new(ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind.PermissionGrantSource, "elsa-roles"));
extensions.Registrations.Add(new(ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind.PermissionGrantSource, "claim-mapping"));
extensions.Registrations.Add(new(ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind.PermissionGrantSource, "group-mapping"));
extensions.Registrations.Add(new(ExternalAuthenticationExtensionKind.PermissionGrantSource, "claim-pass-through"));
fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping (#7997) * fix(auth): validate wildcard permission patterns and warn on deny-list stripping Permission.IsValidPattern rejects inert wildcard spellings (such as "workflows*:delete") that parse but can never match. The grant boundary, stored-permission, and external-authentication options validators reject them at authoring time, and PermissionGrantValidator applies the same check to incoming grants. ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator now warns (never fails) when DeniedPermissions is non-empty, because any non-empty deny list refuses every wildcard grant that could reach a denied permission -- including the seeded administrator role's "*". The validator takes an ILogger, and AddExternalAuthenticationServices registers logging alongside its other framework dependencies (TryAdd-based, so host logging configuration wins). The operational consequence is recorded in the authorization-model migration guide. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): report subtree grants whose verb nothing under them supports 'workflows/*:frobnicate' reached a non-empty subtree and was therefore treated as resolved, so the startup audit stayed silent about a grant that cannot authorize anything. Require at least one reached descriptor to support a concrete verb; verb wildcards keep the reach-only check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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return new(Microsoft.Extensions.Options.Options.Create(extensions), _logger);
}
private sealed class CapturingLogger<T> : ILogger<T>
{
public List<LogEntry> Entries { get; } = [];
public IDisposable BeginScope<TState>(TState state) where TState : notnull => NullScope.Instance;
public bool IsEnabled(LogLevel logLevel) => true;
public void Log<TState>(LogLevel logLevel, EventId eventId, TState state, Exception? exception, Func<TState, Exception?, string> formatter) =>
Entries.Add(new(logLevel, formatter(state, exception)));
}
private sealed record LogEntry(LogLevel Level, string Message);
private sealed class NullScope : IDisposable
{
public static readonly NullScope Instance = new();
public void Dispose()
{
}
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}
}