elsa-core/test/integration/Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.IntegrationTests/Operations/PreviewEndpointContractTests.cs

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fix(external-auth)!: wildcard-aware permission grant boundary, and startup smoke tests for both hosts (#7985) * fix(external-auth)!: match permission grant boundaries as patterns The deployment allow/deny boundary and the delegation authorizer compared permission strings with ordinal equality, so under the {resource}:{verb} vocabulary they could not see wildcards. A deny list naming 'workflows/*:delete' did not deny 'workflows/definitions:delete', and a grant of 'workflows/*:delete' outflanked a deny naming that leaf. The bypass was reachable. ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource passes a role's permissions to the boundary verbatim, survivors land in the issued token as permission claims, and PermissionEvaluator does expand wildcards there. So an ordinary role plus a deny list was enough, on every external sign-in, with no privileged actor involved. Restoring the ordinal boundary under the new tests fails seven of them. Deny is now matched in both directions, allow one-directionally, both through PermissionMatcher. A grant that is not a well-formed permission is dropped with a warning rather than carried into a token it cannot authorize anything in. Five non-endpoint checks -- delegation, role-reference removal, unsafe settings confirmation, the recovery override and the boundary itself -- also still compared against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants. Those carry two colons, so Permission.TryParse rejects them and no principal can hold one, while the migration guide tells operators to replace exactly those strings. All five now route through IPermissionEvaluator, and the module registers AddElsaAuthorization itself instead of depending on host ordering. Non-core verbs move to ExternalAuthenticationVerbs, declared beside the resources they apply to so a delegation check cannot spell one differently from the endpoint it guards. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: apply IDE code cleanup to the diagnostics and identity modules Redundant namespace qualifiers and usings removed, and primary-constructor and record syntax applied, across Elsa.Diagnostics.ConsoleLogs, Elsa.Diagnostics.StructuredLogs, Elsa.Expressions.JavaScript and Elsa.Identity. Produced by a solution-wide IDE cleanup that ran alongside the authorization work; separated from it so the permission changes can be reviewed on their own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(hosts): boot both hosts and assert their gated routes challenge This repo runs two parallel feature systems, the classic Features/ path and the CShells ShellFeatures/ path, and every module has to register in both. Nothing exercised either. The unit and integration suites construct services directly, so a module registered in one path and not the other, or a service missing from one container, passes every test and fails only when a host starts. Three bugs in #7980 were found by running these two hosts by hand, two of them shell-versus-classic divergences. Each host is booted through WebApplicationFactory, running its real Program with full feature registration, and asked for a handful of routes it is expected to serve behind a permission. A 404 means the module was never registered, a 5xx means the endpoint was found but its dependencies could not be constructed, and a 200 means no gate ran; only 401 passes. All routes are reported together, so a feature system that stops registering a group of modules reads as one failure rather than a queue of identical ones. Removing AddExternalAuthenticationServices from the shell feature -- the divergence this is built to catch -- fails the shell host on all five of its routes while the classic host stays green. The assertions go through HTTP rather than the container on purpose. The hosts have different topologies: the classic host's root provider holds everything and registers 125 routes, while CShells gives each shell its own provider and mounts routes per shell, leaving 6 in the root. A container or route-table assertion would have to encode that difference and would break whenever CShells changed internally. Behaviour at the edge is host-agnostic, and it is what actually has to match. Each host gains a namespaced entry-point marker because both already declare a Program in the global namespace, which a test project referencing both cannot tell apart. Coverage is off for this project: it references both hosts, so every module either pulls in would enter its denominator without adding real coverage, and coverlet cannot instrument a graph that size. TreatAsLocalProperty keeps CI's /p:CollectCoverage=true from overriding that. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-auth)!: fail closed on an unparseable grant boundary Two findings from review, both real. The grant boundary parsed its allow and deny lists and silently dropped what would not parse. An allow list of nothing but malformed entries therefore reduced to an empty set, and an empty allow list means unrestricted -- so a typo turned the boundary off entirely and let external grant sources put permissions straight into issued tokens. The deny side had the mirror of it: a malformed entry quietly stopped denying what it named. A boundary that does not parse now admits nothing, and ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator rejects the configuration at startup, so the mistake reaches an operator rather than a token. Failing startup is what makes the runtime behaviour safe to be strict about: it cannot be hit by someone mid-edit, only by validation having been bypassed. ConnectionEndpointSupport.HasPermission was a sixth ad-hoc permission check, missed when the other five were converted. It compared claim values against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants at four call sites -- policy management on create and update, session revocation, and unsafe settings confirmation -- and those constants carry two colons, so nothing can hold one once a deployment follows the migration guide. It now routes through IPermissionEvaluator like the rest, resolved from the request with a fallback to the shared evaluator, the same way EndpointSecurity does it. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style(external-auth): filter permission patterns with Where Addresses a review nit on ValidatePermissionPatterns. Behaviour is unchanged: a null list still iterates nothing, only malformed entries are reported, and the message text is identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-auth)!: apply the grant boundary to role permissions too Token issuance concatenated the user's Elsa role permissions raw alongside the boundary-filtered external grants. A permission the boundary had just excluded during grant resolution therefore reappeared in the issued token from the same roles, which made the deny list unenforceable for anything a role carried and left ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource filtering nothing that was not added back a moment later. The bypass did not even need that grant source configured: role permissions reached the token regardless of which sources a connection selected. Both origins now pass the same boundary. Re-applying it at issuance also picks up a boundary that changed since sign-in, since refreshing reissues. This is a behaviour change for deployments that configured a boundary expecting it to bound only claim-mapped permissions: an external login may now carry fewer permissions than before. Deployments with no boundary configured, the default, are unaffected -- every well-formed permission passes. The migration guide describes both directions. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 03:25:29 +00:00
using Elsa.Authorization;
using System.Net;
using System.Text.Json;
using Elsa.Common;
using Elsa.Common.Multitenancy;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Contracts;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Features;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Models;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Options;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Services;
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Stores.InMemory;
using FastEndpoints;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Builder;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using NSubstitute;
fix: stop two silent serialization and test-isolation traps (#7969) * fix: stop two silent serialization and test-isolation traps Two follow-ups from #7957. ExternalAuthentication tests: the same process-global EndpointSecurityOptions.SecurityIsEnabled race the shells API tests had, across the six classes in that assembly that build an endpoint host — five setting it to false and IdentityLinkAuthorizationTests to true. Unlike the shells case these all call UseAuthorization(), so it does not surface as a missing-middleware error: anonymous endpoints answer 401/403, and the authorization test's endpoints come back AllowAnonymous and stop enforcing what it asserts. A module initializer cannot fix it since the assembly genuinely needs both values, so the six now share one collection with DisableParallelization. They are also the only six that build a host, so nothing else can observe a leaked value. Unaliased payloads: a payload whose type has no registered serialization alias is written without a _type discriminator and read back as an ExpandoObject whose keys carry the state serializer's camel-case naming policy, so a consumer that published Status finds status. The degradation is deliberate — the alias registry is an allow-list that keeps arbitrary CLR type names out of deserialization — but it was silent. It is now reported once per type, naming the type and both lossless alternatives, and PublishEvent.Payload documents them. Measured across the integration suite, only genuine user payload types reach this path, so the warning does not fire for Elsa's own types. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: check the log level before claiming the once-per-type warning slot WarnAboutUnaliasedType claimed a type's single report via TryAdd before LogWarning applied its level filter, so a type first serialized while Warning was disabled spent its slot on a call that logged nothing and then stayed silent forever, including after the level was raised at runtime. Check IsEnabled first, so the slot is only consumed by a report that is actually emitted. The regression test needs the capture to be the only logging provider: IsEnabled on the composite logger is an OR across providers, so the test builder's own xunit provider would otherwise keep Warning enabled regardless of what the test asked for. Reported by Greptile on #7969. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 22:36:11 +00:00
using Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.IntegrationTests.Fixtures;
namespace Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.IntegrationTests.Operations;
fix: stop two silent serialization and test-isolation traps (#7969) * fix: stop two silent serialization and test-isolation traps Two follow-ups from #7957. ExternalAuthentication tests: the same process-global EndpointSecurityOptions.SecurityIsEnabled race the shells API tests had, across the six classes in that assembly that build an endpoint host — five setting it to false and IdentityLinkAuthorizationTests to true. Unlike the shells case these all call UseAuthorization(), so it does not surface as a missing-middleware error: anonymous endpoints answer 401/403, and the authorization test's endpoints come back AllowAnonymous and stop enforcing what it asserts. A module initializer cannot fix it since the assembly genuinely needs both values, so the six now share one collection with DisableParallelization. They are also the only six that build a host, so nothing else can observe a leaked value. Unaliased payloads: a payload whose type has no registered serialization alias is written without a _type discriminator and read back as an ExpandoObject whose keys carry the state serializer's camel-case naming policy, so a consumer that published Status finds status. The degradation is deliberate — the alias registry is an allow-list that keeps arbitrary CLR type names out of deserialization — but it was silent. It is now reported once per type, naming the type and both lossless alternatives, and PublishEvent.Payload documents them. Measured across the integration suite, only genuine user payload types reach this path, so the warning does not fire for Elsa's own types. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: check the log level before claiming the once-per-type warning slot WarnAboutUnaliasedType claimed a type's single report via TryAdd before LogWarning applied its level filter, so a type first serialized while Warning was disabled spent its slot on a call that logged nothing and then stayed silent forever, including after the level was raised at runtime. Check IsEnabled first, so the slot is only consumed by a report that is actually emitted. The regression test needs the capture to be the only logging provider: IsEnabled on the composite logger is an OR across providers, so the test builder's own xunit provider would otherwise keep Warning enabled regardless of what the test asked for. Reported by Greptile on #7969. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 22:36:11 +00:00
[Collection(nameof(EndpointSecurityCollection))]
public class PreviewEndpointContractTests : IAsyncLifetime
{
private const string PreviewHandle = "preview-handle";
private static readonly Uri ProviderAuthorizationUri = new("https://provider.example/authorize?state=provider-state");
private WebApplication? _app;
private HttpClient? _client;
private bool _wasSecurityEnabled;
public async Task InitializeAsync()
{
_wasSecurityEnabled = EndpointSecurityOptions.SecurityIsEnabled;
EndpointSecurityOptions.SecurityIsEnabled = false;
var clock = new TestClock(DateTimeOffset.Parse("2026-07-30T00:00:00Z"));
var options = Microsoft.Extensions.Options.Options.Create(new ExternalAuthenticationOptions());
var stateStore = new InMemoryExternalAuthenticationStateStore(clock);
var handleHasher = new TestHandleHasher();
var adapter = new TestAdapter();
var adapters = new TestAdapterRegistry(adapter);
var connection = CreateConnection();
var effectiveConnection = new EffectiveIdentityProviderConnection(connection, ConnectionSourceOwnership.Configuration, ConnectionScope.Host, ConnectionValidity.Valid, false, "test");
var connectionRegistry = Substitute.For<IIdentityProviderConnectionRegistry>();
connectionRegistry.FindByIdAsync("tenant-a", connection.Id, Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns(ValueTask.FromResult<EffectiveIdentityProviderConnection?>(effectiveConnection));
var settingsMigrations = Substitute.For<IAdapterSettingsMigrationService>();
settingsMigrations.MigrateAsync(adapter.Type, connection.AdapterSettingsVersion, Arg.Any<JsonElement>(), Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns(ValueTask.FromResult(new AdapterSettingsMigrationResult(connection.AdapterSettingsVersion, connection.AdapterSettings, false)));
var validityAssessor = Substitute.For<IIdentityProviderConnectionValidityAssessor>();
validityAssessor.AssessAsync(Arg.Any<EffectiveIdentityProviderConnection>(), Arg.Any<CancellationToken>())
.Returns(call => ValueTask.FromResult(call.Arg<EffectiveIdentityProviderConnection>()));
var management = new IdentityProviderConnectionManagementService(
null!,
connectionRegistry,
validityAssessor,
null!,
adapters,
settingsMigrations,
null!,
null!,
null!,
[],
[],
null!,
fix(external-auth)!: wildcard-aware permission grant boundary, and startup smoke tests for both hosts (#7985) * fix(external-auth)!: match permission grant boundaries as patterns The deployment allow/deny boundary and the delegation authorizer compared permission strings with ordinal equality, so under the {resource}:{verb} vocabulary they could not see wildcards. A deny list naming 'workflows/*:delete' did not deny 'workflows/definitions:delete', and a grant of 'workflows/*:delete' outflanked a deny naming that leaf. The bypass was reachable. ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource passes a role's permissions to the boundary verbatim, survivors land in the issued token as permission claims, and PermissionEvaluator does expand wildcards there. So an ordinary role plus a deny list was enough, on every external sign-in, with no privileged actor involved. Restoring the ordinal boundary under the new tests fails seven of them. Deny is now matched in both directions, allow one-directionally, both through PermissionMatcher. A grant that is not a well-formed permission is dropped with a warning rather than carried into a token it cannot authorize anything in. Five non-endpoint checks -- delegation, role-reference removal, unsafe settings confirmation, the recovery override and the boundary itself -- also still compared against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants. Those carry two colons, so Permission.TryParse rejects them and no principal can hold one, while the migration guide tells operators to replace exactly those strings. All five now route through IPermissionEvaluator, and the module registers AddElsaAuthorization itself instead of depending on host ordering. Non-core verbs move to ExternalAuthenticationVerbs, declared beside the resources they apply to so a delegation check cannot spell one differently from the endpoint it guards. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: apply IDE code cleanup to the diagnostics and identity modules Redundant namespace qualifiers and usings removed, and primary-constructor and record syntax applied, across Elsa.Diagnostics.ConsoleLogs, Elsa.Diagnostics.StructuredLogs, Elsa.Expressions.JavaScript and Elsa.Identity. Produced by a solution-wide IDE cleanup that ran alongside the authorization work; separated from it so the permission changes can be reviewed on their own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(hosts): boot both hosts and assert their gated routes challenge This repo runs two parallel feature systems, the classic Features/ path and the CShells ShellFeatures/ path, and every module has to register in both. Nothing exercised either. The unit and integration suites construct services directly, so a module registered in one path and not the other, or a service missing from one container, passes every test and fails only when a host starts. Three bugs in #7980 were found by running these two hosts by hand, two of them shell-versus-classic divergences. Each host is booted through WebApplicationFactory, running its real Program with full feature registration, and asked for a handful of routes it is expected to serve behind a permission. A 404 means the module was never registered, a 5xx means the endpoint was found but its dependencies could not be constructed, and a 200 means no gate ran; only 401 passes. All routes are reported together, so a feature system that stops registering a group of modules reads as one failure rather than a queue of identical ones. Removing AddExternalAuthenticationServices from the shell feature -- the divergence this is built to catch -- fails the shell host on all five of its routes while the classic host stays green. The assertions go through HTTP rather than the container on purpose. The hosts have different topologies: the classic host's root provider holds everything and registers 125 routes, while CShells gives each shell its own provider and mounts routes per shell, leaving 6 in the root. A container or route-table assertion would have to encode that difference and would break whenever CShells changed internally. Behaviour at the edge is host-agnostic, and it is what actually has to match. Each host gains a namespaced entry-point marker because both already declare a Program in the global namespace, which a test project referencing both cannot tell apart. Coverage is off for this project: it references both hosts, so every module either pulls in would enter its denominator without adding real coverage, and coverlet cannot instrument a graph that size. TreatAsLocalProperty keeps CI's /p:CollectCoverage=true from overriding that. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-auth)!: fail closed on an unparseable grant boundary Two findings from review, both real. The grant boundary parsed its allow and deny lists and silently dropped what would not parse. An allow list of nothing but malformed entries therefore reduced to an empty set, and an empty allow list means unrestricted -- so a typo turned the boundary off entirely and let external grant sources put permissions straight into issued tokens. The deny side had the mirror of it: a malformed entry quietly stopped denying what it named. A boundary that does not parse now admits nothing, and ExternalAuthenticationOptionsValidator rejects the configuration at startup, so the mistake reaches an operator rather than a token. Failing startup is what makes the runtime behaviour safe to be strict about: it cannot be hit by someone mid-edit, only by validation having been bypassed. ConnectionEndpointSupport.HasPermission was a sixth ad-hoc permission check, missed when the other five were converted. It compared claim values against the legacy ExternalAuthenticationPermissions constants at four call sites -- policy management on create and update, session revocation, and unsafe settings confirmation -- and those constants carry two colons, so nothing can hold one once a deployment follows the migration guide. It now routes through IPermissionEvaluator like the rest, resolved from the request with a fallback to the shared evaluator, the same way EndpointSecurity does it. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style(external-auth): filter permission patterns with Where Addresses a review nit on ValidatePermissionPatterns. Behaviour is unchanged: a null list still iterates nothing, only malformed entries are reported, and the message text is identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(external-auth)!: apply the grant boundary to role permissions too Token issuance concatenated the user's Elsa role permissions raw alongside the boundary-filtered external grants. A permission the boundary had just excluded during grant resolution therefore reappeared in the issued token from the same roles, which made the deny list unenforceable for anything a role carried and left ElsaRolePermissionGrantSource filtering nothing that was not added back a moment later. The bypass did not even need that grant source configured: role permissions reached the token regardless of which sources a connection selected. Both origins now pass the same boundary. Re-applying it at issuance also picks up a boundary that changed since sign-in, since refreshing reissues. This is a behaviour change for deployments that configured a boundary expecting it to bound only claim-mapped permissions: an external login may now carry fewer permissions than before. Deployments with no boundary configured, the default, are unaffected -- every well-formed permission passes. The migration guide describes both directions. Refs #7982 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 03:25:29 +00:00
new PermissionEvaluator(),
null!,
clock,
options,
null!,
null!,
new ServiceCollection().BuildServiceProvider(),
NullLogger<IdentityProviderConnectionManagementService>.Instance);
var previews = new PreviewSignInService(
management,
adapters,
[],
[],
Substitute.For<IExternalIdentityProvisioner>(),
Substitute.For<IPermissionGrantResolver>(),
stateStore,
new InMemoryPreviewResultStore(clock),
handleHasher,
new EphemeralDataProtectionProvider(),
clock,
options,
new ExternalAuthenticationSecurityNotifier(new ServiceCollection().BuildServiceProvider()));
var expiresAt = clock.UtcNow.AddMinutes(5);
await stateStore.PutAsync("PreviewStart", handleHasher.Hash(PreviewHandle), new BrokerTransaction
{
HandleHash = handleHasher.Hash(PreviewHandle),
Purpose = BrokerTransactionPurpose.Preview,
ClientId = "administrator-a",
CallbackUri = new Uri($"/external-authentication/previews/{PreviewHandle}/authorize", UriKind.Relative),
ReturnPath = "/",
TenantId = "tenant-a",
ConnectionId = connection.Id,
ConnectionMaterialRevision = connection.MaterialRevision,
PkceChallenge = string.Empty,
ExpiresAt = expiresAt
}, expiresAt);
var builder = WebApplication.CreateSlimBuilder();
builder.WebHost.UseTestServer();
builder.Services.AddFastEndpoints(endpointOptions =>
{
endpointOptions.Assemblies = [typeof(ExternalAuthenticationFeature).Assembly];
endpointOptions.Filter = endpoint => endpoint.Namespace == "Elsa.ExternalAuthentication.Endpoints.Previews";
});
builder.Services.AddAuthorization();
builder.Services.AddRateLimiter(_ => { });
builder.Services.AddSingleton(previews);
var tenantAccessor = Substitute.For<ITenantAccessor>();
tenantAccessor.TenantId.Returns("tenant-a");
builder.Services.AddSingleton(tenantAccessor);
_app = builder.Build();
_app.UseAuthorization();
_app.UseFastEndpoints();
await _app.StartAsync();
_client = _app.GetTestClient();
}
public async Task DisposeAsync()
{
EndpointSecurityOptions.SecurityIsEnabled = _wasSecurityEnabled;
_client?.Dispose();
if (_app is not null)
{
await _app.StopAsync();
await _app.DisposeAsync();
}
}
[Fact]
public async Task AuthorizeReturnsProviderRedirectAndConsumedHandleReturnsGone()
{
var firstResponse = await _client!.GetAsync($"/external-authentication/previews/{PreviewHandle}/authorize");
var secondResponse = await _client.GetAsync($"/external-authentication/previews/{PreviewHandle}/authorize");
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Found, firstResponse.StatusCode);
Assert.Equal(ProviderAuthorizationUri, firstResponse.Headers.Location);
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Gone, secondResponse.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task MissingPreviewResultReturnsNotFound()
{
var response = await _client!.GetAsync("/external-authentication/previews/missing-handle");
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.NotFound, response.StatusCode);
}
private static IdentityProviderConnection CreateConnection() => new()
{
Id = "connection-a",
TenantId = ConnectionScope.HostTenantId,
Key = "connection-a",
AdapterType = TestAdapter.AdapterType,
AdapterSettingsVersion = 1,
AdapterSettings = JsonSerializer.SerializeToElement(new { }),
DisplayName = "Connection A",
IsEnabled = true,
MaterialRevision = "material-revision-a",
Revision = 1
};
private sealed class TestClock(DateTimeOffset now) : ISystemClock
{
public DateTimeOffset UtcNow { get; } = now;
}
private sealed class TestHandleHasher : IExternalAuthenticationHandleHasher
{
public string Hash(string value) => $"hashed:{value}";
}
private sealed class TestAdapterRegistry(IExternalAuthenticationAdapter adapter) : IExternalAuthenticationAdapterRegistry
{
public IReadOnlyCollection<ExternalAuthenticationAdapterDescriptor> ListDescriptors() => [adapter.Describe()];
public bool TryGet(string type, out IExternalAuthenticationAdapter resolved)
{
resolved = adapter;
return string.Equals(type, adapter.Type, StringComparison.Ordinal);
}
}
private sealed class TestAdapter : IExternalAuthenticationAdapter
{
public const string AdapterType = "preview-endpoint-test";
public string Type => AdapterType;
public ExternalAuthenticationAdapterDescriptor Describe() => new(
Type,
"Preview endpoint test",
"Deterministic adapter for the preview endpoint contract.",
1,
[],
new ExternalAuthenticationAdapterCapabilities(true, true, false),
null);
public ValueTask<ConnectionValidationResult> ValidateAsync(ConnectionValidationContext context, CancellationToken cancellationToken = default) =>
ValueTask.FromResult(new ConnectionValidationResult(true, [], []));
public ValueTask<ExternalAuthorizationRequest> CreateAuthorizationRequestAsync(ExternalAuthorizationContext context, CancellationToken cancellationToken = default) =>
ValueTask.FromResult(new ExternalAuthorizationRequest(ProviderAuthorizationUri, []));
public ValueTask<ExternalAuthenticationResult> AuthenticateCallbackAsync(ExternalCallbackContext context, CancellationToken cancellationToken = default) => throw new NotSupportedException();
public ValueTask<ConnectionTestResult> TestAsync(ConnectionTestContext context, CancellationToken cancellationToken = default) => throw new NotSupportedException();
public ValueTask<ExternalLogoutRequest?> CreateLogoutRequestAsync(ExternalLogoutContext context, CancellationToken cancellationToken = default) => throw new NotSupportedException();
}
}